

JPRS 73842

13 July 1979

No. 1995

Near East/North Africa Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		1. REPORT NO. IPRS 73842	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 1995			5. Report Date 13 July 1979	
7. Author(s)			6.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
			11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)	
			13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
15. Supplementary Notes			14.	
16. Abstract (Limit 200 words) This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.				
17. Document Analysis - a. Descriptors				
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-Arab Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Libya	<input type="checkbox"/> Sultanate of Oman	
Sociology	<input type="checkbox"/> North African Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mauritania	<input type="checkbox"/> Syria	
Economics	<input type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan	<input type="checkbox"/> Morocco	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tunisia	
Culture (Social Sciences)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Algeria	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	<input type="checkbox"/> United Arab Emirates	
Ethnology	<input type="checkbox"/> Bahrain	<input type="checkbox"/> Persian Gulf Area	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Western Sahara	
Geography	<input type="checkbox"/> Egypt	<input type="checkbox"/> Qatar	<input type="checkbox"/> Yemen Arab Republic	
Techological	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iran	<input type="checkbox"/> Saudi Arabia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Islamic Affairs	
Military Sciences	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iraq	<input type="checkbox"/> Spanish North Africa		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Israel	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sudan		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Jordan			
	<input type="checkbox"/> Kuwait			
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lebanon			
b. Identifiers/Open Ended Terms				
c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 15				
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 138
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price

13 July 1979

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PLO CHIEF OF SECURITY DEPARTMENT INTERVIEWED BY YUGOSLAV DAILY

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 79 p 6

[Interview with Abu Iyad, chief of PLO security department by Hido Biscevic and Bozo Ozbolt: "'The Palestinians Are Entitled to a Country'"]

[Text] "Our people have not given up the revolution and will fight with every means to continue it. This people, whose fallen warriors never even saw their own Palestine, that people will never surrender," Abu Iyad declared in a conversation with special correspondents of VJESNIK and VECERNJI LIST concerning the most recent events in southern Lebanon, the position of the PLO concerning the Middle East crisis and its impact on the movement of the non-aligned.

In the offices of the Bureau for Foreign Information of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Beirut, which is located in one of the buildings in "our square kilometer," we sit between four walls covered with posters, photos and slogans, in an atmosphere of a wartime lull, of armed guards and traditional Lebanese tea served to guests, and we hear the report of infrequent gun bursts ("Today is Saturday, you know, things calm down over the weekend," we are told), and we are awaiting the arrival of Abu Iyad, chief of the Department for Security of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In every country which has its own land beneath its feet this post would be referred to as minister for internal affairs. In the Palestinian situation, however, Abu Iyad is the "custodian of the revolution." For our two guides and guards he is a personage whom they wait to see with just as much excitement as we do. For most sensationalistic front-page editors of Western magazines he is a "pyromaniac" whose people do not always buy tickets when they travel by air. For the rest of the world he is one of the leading strategists--or, better, practitioners--of the Palestinian revolution, whose position can best be described metaphorically as "Arafat's right hand."

As we listen to anecdotes from his everyday life, while they tell us that the situation at present is so dangerous that neither Abu Iyad, nor the

other PLO leaders, "never sleep twice in the same bed," while they explain to us that all the Palestinian fighters use the familiar form of address with Abu Iyad and the other leaders, including even Yasir Arafat, emphasizing that this is another glimpse of the democratic character of the revolution, we hear that the entire block has been barricaded off, we listen to the Beirut twilight being torn by the squealing brakes of Palestinian automobiles closing off traffic through the surrounding streets, and we see the bodyguards take their places in the corridor.

What a wonderful challenge for a newsman, one might say. However, 2 days in Beirut are enough for a man to become so accustomed to the atmosphere of rifles, street patrols, checkpoints at intersections and in front of every building where PLO officers are located that later he hardly notices when the elderly sentry at the entrance to the Bureau for Foreign Information, a man who obviously has been through it all, knows the details of Amman, of Black September and Tall El Zataar, who at every entrance examines the bag containing the cameras, though at the same time he winks as a sign of recognition.

He later explained to us that Yasir Arafat would also stop by during the interview with Abu Iyad. Sufficient reason for that kind of security, our interpreter says with a smile.

Abu Iyad, a man of sanguine appearance, much more accustomed than his guests to this bodyguard atmosphere of utter uncertainty (in which this same Bureau for Foreign Information may even tomorrow be located in another street, or even another country), enters the room, cordially greets the "sahafi Yugoslavi" ("Yugoslav newsmen"), whose visit to Beirut he has known about for several days now. After all, is he not chief of the PLO Department for Security? Were not we ourselves certain that he knew of our visit, surrounded as we were 24 hours a day by a welcome escort of two guards?

Obviously in a good mood, he orders tea and sweetmeats for his "friends," sits at the telephone and calls Yasir Arafat over some strange telephone lines which in a week we have been unable to figure out--lifts the receiver, waits, and when Abu Amar, as the Palestinians refer to Yasir Arafat, comes to the telephone at the other end, he invites him to come over and greet us.

And indeed, less than 10 minutes later the thud of a rifle butt on the floor of the corridor interrupts the conversation of the guards, and Yasir Arafat enters through the ensuing silence and greets us cordially. Following a brief conversation, an equally brief conference with Abu Iyad, the same rapid lowering of rifle butts alongside the leg and departure.

The interview with Abu Iyad had been agreed on ("VJESNIK is known to me," he tells our interpreter) and in the first instance it seems to us almost strange to be talking about the destiny of the Palestinians, about the Middle East, Sadat, Begin and the treaty ... about everything so important at this point in the world's politics, in a room with a few chairs, with a dozen

captured Israeli rockets of various sizes and calibers, in a room where pictures of Arafat, Khomeini, Ho Chi Min and any number of others look down at us from the walls ... creating an atmosphere more like the room of the leader of a work brigade than the official office of a minister for internal affairs. But a week among the Palestinians is enough for a man to understand how each of them individually is able in his thoughts to rise above the conditions in which he lives. For them, they say it themselves, it is the only way to survive.

"They Would Like Us To Give Way to Despair"

Question: How do you evaluate the Lebanese political and social crisis in the light of relations in the Arab world following the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel? To what extent does the crisis here reflect the struggle of the great powers and certain Arab countries to gain decisive influence?

Answer: For years now we have been waging war against Israel, the right here in Lebanon and American imperialism. But I don't believe that that war has ever been so fierce as since the treaty between Egypt and Israel. Since the signing of the treaty we have been involved in a showdown and war with Israel such as has not been seen before. You yourselves have seen that the Israeli air force and naval vessels are every day bombing and shelling villages in the south of Lebanon and even the immediate environs of Beirut. Israel is not concealing this. Begin, Weizman and the rest are saying this openly and publicly, and I am amazed that the world is simply taking this without reacting. One of the most vulgar statements is the one recently made by the chief of the Israeli General Staff, who literally said: "We will always wage war against the Palestinians at any time and in any country, and we will not stop at anything!" But Begin's and Weizman's statements have not been any milder. So the ordinary man here naturally gets the impression that here in Lebanon he must pay for every step Sadat takes down there in Egypt. Logically the question is asked in this connection: What is the point of these strikes, of these actions, what is their objective? First, they are aimed at creating a smokescreen around the Sadat-Begin treaty, that is, at creating the impression that the Arab world is incapable of acting without Egypt even when open warfare is being waged against the Palestinians. Second, their aim is to drive a wedge between the Lebanese and us, especially down there in the south, creating the impression that the Lebanese must put up with all of this because of us. They are thus confronting us with two things at the same time: first, they would like us to give way to despair, that is, to Israeli logic, because of the difficulties we are suffering in moving to the south. And second, they would like us to open up a front against the Arab countries. A front, that is, against Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

We acknowledge that the Israeli acts of war are creating difficulties for us. But in our everyday contact with our own masses we play them down. Nevertheless, it should be said that on our own we cannot withstand all the consequences of this conflict, that our forces are not in and of themselves

sufficient for that. Arab and international solidarity therefore is indispensable. I will give you just one example: when we count the casualties of the bombing in the south, it is easier on us if we find that there are more Palestinians or even that they are the only victims. This also applies to houses and other property belonging to people in the south. This is not because we like to die, but because we feel that if someone has to die, it is better that we be the ones. For example, the compensation which the PLO pays for houses and property destroyed is much greater in the case of the Lebanese than the Palestinians.

Clearly none of this would have happened if the treaty had not been signed. Without that this kind of Israeli terrorism would have been impossible. But the battle for Lebanon is not yet over, there are still many acts on which the curtain must rise in this drama. Here we are in conversation, when just 2 km away is that other Lebanon (eastern Beirut, the part of the city under the control of the right-wing Falange--authors' note). Even here in our quarter there are Israeli agents. If we leave out Egypt, as far as the rest of the Arabs are concerned, I personally believe that they could do a great deal to ease the burden which Lebanon is now bearing on its own. After all, they hold the keys of the political stance that is taken. They can furnish financial and material aid. But the political activity of certain Arab countries is still bound up with American interests.

I will be frank with you: Syria and Iraq could relieve the pressure on Lebanon. As for friends from the rest of the world--either in Europe or elsewhere, especially among the nonaligned countries--they could make our burden easier through synchronized political action at international meetings. To put it more clearly, friendly countries should ask what kind of peace it is when women, children and old people are dying every day and they might reveal the true face of that peace by so doing. In any case, the cause-and-effect connection between the Egypt-Israeli treaty and the south of Lebanon is inevitable. Before the treaty Egypt was condemning the Israeli actions in the south, and now it seems not to care at all, or perhaps it does not dare to. When Damour and the south of Lebanon were bombed, Sadat was kissing Begin and talking to him about peace. That is deplorable. As if we, too, did not have the right to live in peace.

So, that is what our friends could do for us. Emphasize the dangers which have come from the treaty.

"Battles With Arabs Are Not a Hobby With Us"

Question: What is the PLO doing to oppose escalation of the fighting in south Lebanon? Will there be an expansion of the military conflicts with Israel and in what way?

Answer: We stand in Israel's way with our faith, not with our capabilities. Actually our people in the occupied lands are offering able opposition. Moreover, we are also relying on the possibility of again activating the

so-called eastern and northern fronts, that is, the borders with Jordan and Syria. The pressure of still another force beside the Syrian force on the Golan will make it easier for us to act militarily and will make our position easier.

Outside those theaters we do not intend to undertake anything else. After all, those so-called external actions become a two-edged sword, which frequently inflicts damage on our entire movement and revolution. To be sure, if it is a question of supporting the progressive forces in the Arab world, then it should be said that we regard this as constructive. But as for violence, what the West by and large describes as terrorism, it should be said that there is one portion which is not subject to our control. Many actions in the world are not under PLO control, but the result of the despair and impatience of certain young people and on the other hand of misunderstanding on the part of a large portion of the international public. We hope that the present difficult situation will not drive some people to undertake violent actions in the world against the interests of the United States. Yet this does not mean a "cease fire" either, since we hold the United States accountable for everything that has been happening here recently, since it was a direct participant in conclusion of the treaty.

I will tell you, for example, that I was surprised today when I heard that an agent had been eliminated (the reference is to the imam Huzandar in Gaza, who was supporting President Sadat and the separate treaty and who wanted to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, but he was killed by George Habbash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--authors' note). But that does not mean that I do not agree with it, nor that I am gratified. I want to say that people are expressing their attitude toward the treaty in this way. Moreover, you yourselves know that since 1917, I emphasize that this is more than 6 decades, our people have not given up the revolution and will fight with every means to continue it. This people, whose fallen warriors never even saw their own Palestine, that people will never surrender.

Question: What at best, in your opinion, could come from the present negotiations concerning "local autonomy" of the Palestinians, and does there exist any sort of possibility that the PLO could be involved in some form of negotiation concerning the destiny of the Palestinians?

Answer: First, it should be said that the treaty that was signed is based on the agreements at Camp David, and they offer our people some sort of deformed autonomy. However, we are not the Kurds in Iraq or Iran, we are entitled to a country. And then, even the Kurds are not satisfied with autonomy. We are therefore opposed to any process of negotiation which is based on Camp David.

On the other hand, all the Arabs who met in Bagdad do not hate the same attitude toward the United States, or, to put it another way, they do not hate it equally. Nevertheless, they all rejected the treaty. So what is there for us to say?

However, this has not stopped us, this is not the end of our efforts. We are striving for a just and complete solution, we want the Palestinians to have peace and their rights, we want our own state and homeland. Unfortunately, we are the only people which recognizes its murderer, a murderer which does not acknowledge even our existence. We are seeking, then, a state covering only 19 percent of the area of the former Palestine, though the 1948 UN resolution entitled us to 51 percent of the area which once was ours entirely. Nevertheless, Israel denounces our rights in toto. It seems that they have built up complexes like those which the whites in Africa display through racism or white-minority rule. The United States of America, in spite of all the resolutions, also denies our rights. This is clearly bound up with relations toward the Arab countries. But everyone should know that it is not our hobby to open up battles against the Arabs. This can be seen from our statements, from many interviews, and indeed from many which I myself have given. In any case, we ourselves have done quite a bit to "save Sadat from losing power." Unfortunately, he sold us out for a handful of sand in the Sinai. And then today a high Israeli official declared that Israel is keeping its army in the middle of the Sinai and that it is "prepared to take it again if necessary." This concerns the opposition in Egypt, that statement was for its benefit.

In short, we reject the treaty, since it is based on the death of our people.

"We Want To Preserve the Unity of the Nonaligned Movement"

Question: Don't you suspect, nevertheless, in view of the complicated relations in the Arab world, that Sadat might "return to the Arab ranks"? We are thinking here of the possibility that the process of negotiation on the basis of the treaty could nevertheless crack open the door through which some Arab countries might gradually peak through.

Answer: No, I do not anticipate that Sadat could return again to the ranks of the Arabs. As for negotiations concerning the Palestinians, we feel that he has already lost his political tongue. He has nothing more to seek. Our experience with him is now abundant enough. In any case, after everything he has recently said, after all the words he has addressed to the heads of the Arab states, no, I do not believe in the possibility of his "return."

Question: How can the present events in the Mid-East and the redistribution of power in the Arab world--especially in the light of the "search" for a new leading power--affect the destiny of nonalignment in this area?

Answer: Contacts with the Arab countries give both us and them a clear role in consolidating the unity of the policy of nonalignment. Our relations and influence with the Arab and certain African and Islamic countries give us a special role in that consolidation. We have been acting in that direction for a long time already, in an effort to make the Sixth Summit Meeting of Nonaligned Countries a success.

Our comrades and friends in Yugoslavia are aware of our efforts. The chief of the PLO political department Farouk Kadumi went to Colombo with instructions to direct his actions toward calming people down and reestablishing the balance between the so-called moderates and radicals in the nonaligned movement. But the problem of Egypt is very, very difficult, since the treaty is de facto a very, very difficult problem. But we are convinced that the Sixth Summit of the Nonaligned will overcome all the difficulties. I say this because there are many people who would like to weaken the movement. For us this is an incentive to defend it, to preserve its unity.

Question: How in this light do you evaluate the PLO's relations with Yugoslavia?

Answer: Our relations with Yugoslavia are stable and deep because your country was the first to recognize us and the first to support us. We feel toward President Tito an exceptionally great love, as we do also toward the Yugoslav nationalities and ethnic minorities, which have been furnishing our just struggle everything that lay in their power. Since President Nasser introduced President Tito to Comrade Arafat in 1958, that relation has been ever better and broader. In the political domain, Yugoslavia's position on the Palestinian question is clear and well known, and we repeatedly emphasize that. Concerning details and various aspects we are constantly consulting and very gladly listen to the advice of our Yugoslav comrades. In the cultural domain our mutual cooperation has also been very good, and in this connection I would like to emphasize that the Yugoslav universities have always been open to our students, which is an exceptionally important help to us. In the domain of information, that cooperation is also very good. We follow very carefully what your press writes about the Palestinian question and general relations in the Mid-East, and I can say that in our judgment your press has really been doing a good job.

In conclusion I would like to send sincere greetings to the Yugoslav comrades and peoples, along with the desire that our relations become still more fruitful and broader.

7045
CSO: 2800

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB VIEW OF VATICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD JERUSALEM AIRED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 5 May 79 pp 6, 7

[Editorial by Nasir-al-Din al-Nashashibi: "After the Recent Contacts Between the Vatican and Israel: Is Jerusalem an Arab Islamic Responsibility Only? Or Do We Have To Expect the True Word From the New Pope?"]

[Text] First of all let me congratulate the new pope on his 59th birthday, which falls these days every year....

Let me then say that I always felt that there was a hidden thread that pulls me toward the man who sits on the papal chair in the Vatican. It is the bond of Jerusalem. Both of us love Jerusalem. Both of us have our belongings in Jerusalem. Both of us suffer for its suffering and knows its history well. Both of us derive the meaning of strength, patience, life and pride from the soil of Jerusalem. Both of us want Jerusalem to be free, clean, generous and scintillating, away from greed, domination, prejudice, falsification of history, and misleading of the world and God! I do not recall throughout my long years as a newspaperman that I ever forgot to mention Jerusalem at Christmas time, or that I ever forgot to mention the Pope at Easter, or to mention the story of the visit of Pope Paul VI as a pilgrim to my country in 1964 when women welcomed him with cries of joy, and children with songs, and even the stones of Bethlehem, its walls and olive trees welcomed him with happiness, elation and love.

From this emotional and intellectual perspective I was deeply hurt when Zionism, and the Jewish CHRONICLE magazine in particular, attempted in the fall of 1978 to imply that the deceased Pope John Paul I, whose reign did not last more than weeks, was a Jew-lover on the pretense that his mother used to work for a Jewish family in Italy which treated her well.

I was also very concerned when the present pope, John Paul II, the former Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, sat on the papal throne, some Zionist circles in Europe tried to repeat with him the same cheap conspiracy by claiming that he liked the Jews because previously in 1956 he condemned the defacing of some Jewish tombstones in Poland, and that he--the new pope--had previously allowed the COMMON WEEKLY newspaper which he supervised in his country to commemorate the anniversary of the victory of the Jews over the Nazi regime in Poland.

All this happened within the past few months.

For the record only:

In 1951, King 'Abdallah ibn-al-Hussain declared the formation of a special Arab administration to oversee the Holy places in the city of Jerusalem, headed by an elder of the city holding the rank of minister, as well as the rank of King's Deputy and Supreme Guard of the holy places.

A great official celebration was held on that occasion in the assembly hall of the "al-Rawdah" college, to which was invited the ministers, the consuls of the foreign countries in the city, as well as a large number of guests. Its program was broadcast live from the Jordan broadcasting station.

I remember being present at this special celebration when someone came to tell us that the French consul in the Arab section of Jerusalem would not attend the celebration, and that the papal representative had also declined to attend for reasons of health. When we asked about the real reason, we were told that the French consul had boycotted the festivities because he claimed that he could not agree that anyone other than the French consul could hold the title of Guard of the holy places, since that title belonged to France under what is called historical sequence and fait accompli. As to the papal representative, he declined to attend so that his attendance would not be interpreted as a recognition of the division of Jerusalem on the part of the Vatican.

Very well...

The celebration, however, was held at the set date and was a success. It attracted the attention of the entire world. I recall visiting the French consul in his office later on, and asking him about what was required to guarantee his cooperation with the Jordan Arab authorities to preserve the holy sites. He replied: "There is no other solution but the internationalization of the city. For if we recognized Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem now we might have to acknowledge Israeli sovereignty over it if circumstances change in the future, and that is what we do not want to do!"

When I asked him about the official position of the Vatican on the subject, he replied: "The Vatican is still demanding the internationalization of all Jerusalem, and refuses to recognize any particular sovereignty over it. The Vatican will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel unless the demanded solution for the city of Jerusalem in particular is met."

The years went by....

When the present Pope took over the responsibilities of the Holy See, Israel, as I mentioned, immediately proceeded to flirt with him, and when it did not receive a response from him it began to criticize and threaten, claiming that the existence of a Polish pope at the helm of the Catholic Church causes the Jews to have some concern and fear, because the Polish church had taken a

non-sympathetic position toward the Jews during the World War II massacres, and that Israel consequently is demanding that the new pope issue a statement explaining his position on that subject.

But the new pope did not respond.

Then Moshe Dayan came to visit the Vatican, anxious and reprimanding.

Israeli winking began to turn to criticism. And criticism began to turn to attacks. And then Israel realized that the issue of Jerusalem will remain the rock on which all Zionist hopes regarding an unconditional peace with the Arabs would break, and that Saudi Arabia and behind it 600 million Moslems would not abandon Jerusalem, and that the biggest mistake made by Jimmy Carter was to omit mentioning Jerusalem in the conspiratory Camp David accords and the unilateral peace treaty with Egypt. Jerusalem is an Islamic Arab responsibility, and neither Sadat, nor Butros Ghali, nor Sayyid Mar'i, nor the Shaykh of al-Azhar nor any other such persons could belittle Jerusalem's importance and value, and the isolation of Sadat by the Arabs is but the simple preliminary to isolating Sadat at the Islamic and international level. We will meet on that at the Islamic summit in Morocco which will be held in 2 day's time. I say that after Israel realized that the fate of Jerusalem cannot be decided by a speech made by Menahem Begin, nor by a prayer from the rabbi of the Israeli army, nor by the antics or demonstrations of the Gush Emunim group, it went knocking again on the Vatican's door, showering the pope with visits, and inviting officials of the Catholic Church to visit Jerusalem.

The director of foreign affairs, Joseph Seshanover, who is of Polish descent, was sent to that effect to meet Pope John Paul II a week ago, having in his briefcase an official invitation from Isaac Navon, the president of Israel, asking the pope to visit Jerusalem. The statement issued after the meeting did not fail to mention "the desire of both parties--i.e. the Vatican and Israel--to continue to cultivate meetings and discussions between them."

The statement did not fail also to mention that some of the issues pertaining to human rights were raised during the meeting, and that the director of Israeli foreign affairs had met with Cardinal Casaroli, minister of foreign affairs of the Vatican, for an entire hour.

Twelve years ago, and only a few days after the Six-Day War, the director of the office of the prime minister, Jacob Herzog went to meet the pope and the cardinals in the Vatican to seek recognition of the Israeli fait accompli in general, and for Jerusalem in particular.

Twelve years later the same operation was repeated with the new pope through another director of the office of the prime minister.

The two meetings and the two discussions have marginal implications which explain the secrets and intricacies related to each of them.

For example: Inasmuch as there is a cunning exploitation by the Zionists of the known accusation that the Church, as it was publicized, had collaborated with the Nazis during World War II, there is a sincere desire on the part of the Vatican to deny that accusation and to definitively put it to rest.

For example: Inasmuch as there is no love lost between the Church and the Soviets, especially from the new pope in particular who has an honorable history of fighting communism, there is a Zionist plan to exploit such a feeling against the Soviets to pressure the Soviet Union to open the doors for emigration of the Jews from Russia to Israel.

For example: The attempt to exploit the Catholic religious current with its hold over the countries of Latin America, to help the United States solve its problems with those countries against increased American support for the well-known Israeli policies.

For example: Continuous Jewish attempts--both on the financial and commercial levels--to create opportunities for cooperation between Jewish financiers and large land-owners in America--especially New York--and the holdings, stocks, bonds, real estate and buildings which the Vatican owns in the American money markets. For example, the Vatican is the sole owner of all Watergate buildings in Washington.

For example: Careful official Israeli attempts to seek and guarantee any support for Israel in preparation for any political surprises in America that might bring Teddy Kennedy, the Catholic of Irish descent to the presidency of the United States.

And finally...

Jerusalem! Jerusalem! Jerusalem!

Israel's wild attempts to obtain the pope's support for the fait accompli of the Israeli sovereignty on Jerusalem with all its land, stones and inhabitants.

Before we wonder what was the answer of the pope of Rome to the new Israeli invitation, we must predict the following:

First: That the present pope, who had previously fought injustice in his country and in the world, will not agree to visit Jerusalem before the light of truth in Palestine appears, and before the injustice of the tyrants disappears from the land of religions and prophets.

Second: That the present pope is well aware of the number of Arab Christians who were forced to emigrate from Jerusalem, Bethlehem, the West Bank, Nazareth, and West Galilee as a result of official Israeli persecution, such as was planned by the Israeli authorities to rid the country of its Arab inhabitants, both Christians and Moslems.

Third: That the present pope is fully aware of the significance of Jerusalem for millions of Moslem people throughout the world. This fact was clearly

demonstrated in the decisive, final Islamic and Arab position toward Egypt and Anwar al-Sadat after the unilateral peace treaty. Consequently, to give Israel the right to dispose of the fate of Jerusalem would mean a continuation of the destructive dangers that surround not only the life of the city and its inhabitants, but also the life of the entire area of the Middle East.

Fourth: The present pope knows full well all the civil engineering, geographic, and urban projects which have been carried out in the past 10 years by Israel with the objective of Jewishizing Jerusalem and changing its features.

Fifth: The present pope knows well the situation of the city of Nazareth--the town of the Nazarian--and the condition of our people and its people these days at the hands of Israel. The head of its municipality, who is a Christian Arab, can tell the inside story.

Sixth: The present pope realizes exactly the extent of Israel's responsibility and its crime in stirring up situations, inciting dissention, and pitting the various religious denominations in Lebanon against each other. The honest people of Lebanon and its officials did not hide these facts from the ears of the pope.

Seventh: The present pope is fully cognizant of the seriousness of the political, religious, social relations which link the Vatican to the various Arab countries, which are directly and deeply affected by the positions which the pope takes regarding the issue of Jerusalem in the present and in the future also. The new pope realizes that the position of the Vatican toward Israel does not derive from the religious difference between them as much as it derives from the political and ideological difference in Israel. It is the same difference between Israel and the Arabs. And it is the same difference between Israel and the Third World. The Church cannot tolerate the expansionist Zionist principles. The new pope realizes that the Arabs, who clearly understood the decisions of the second meeting of the Vatican in 1965, especially those under the title "In This Era" or in English [sic] "Nostra Aetate," and the Arabs who understood the decisions of the Church in 1974 about the relation between the Church and the Jews, also understood that all these decisions--despite their seriousness--did not comprise a single word which conveyed the meaning of a Catholic Papal acknowledgement of Jewish occupation of Jerusalem or of their declaring it as their capital. That has been the situation, and that is how it should remain.

One more word...

The Bible says literally: "Be sure that your sins will find you out," and Israel will not be saved from the punishment of destiny for what it has committed against the non-Jews and against the city of Jerusalem in particular. And if the representative of the Vatican in East Jerusalem has refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of Jordan over the city in 1951, it is the right of the Vatican in 1979 to declare its position by rejecting the occupation

of the city of Resurrection of Christ by the Jews, and to renew its deploring of any unnatural situation that does not guarantee equal rights to all religions to have joint sovereignty over the city and its holy places. The Polish Menahem Begin felt that he was capable of playing his hand with a Polish pope, through a Polish director of foreign affairs, during the office of the Polish Brzezinski, and in the footsteps of the Polish Kissinger. But he erred. The pope knows the meaning of the German Nazi word "Lebensraum" which Adolph Hitler invoked to occupy Poland with the idea of finding room for expansionism. And the pope knows that when Hitler called for the idea of annexing Poland and the countries of Eastern Europe to the Third Reich, he did not forget also to praise the international human rights just as the victims of Hitler are doing these days. We are confident that the present pope will be more compassionate toward Jerusalem, more truthful with its people, and more honest with its history and its present than the Moslem Arab President Anwar al-Sadat. The pictures of the good land--the land of Jerusalem--have not changed in the mind of the present pope and in his eyes, just as it was seen hundreds of years ago by the Empress Helen, mother of the Emperor Constantine in her dreams, and became the source of her spiritual, philosophical and poetic [words illegible]. It is the same city which was sung to the world by Thomas Fuller in 1650, and which was sung to humanity by the poet William Blake. It is this jewel about which Israel today is attempting to claim to the world that it is of no interest to the Vatican to have possession of it, as much as it has interest in placating those who possess it.

The present pope will not visit Jerusalem under the Israeli bayonets, let Israel be assured of that.

Happy birthday O happy pope in the world of the Vatican.

2760

CS 4802

MUSLIMS URGED TO FACE THREAT FROM RADIATION, NEUTRON BOMBS

London ISLAMIC DEFENCE REVIEW in English Vol 2, 1979 pp 42-46

[Excerpts]

The development of the enhanced radiation bomb, commonly known as the Neutron Bomb, poses a serious threat to the Muslim world in general and to the oil producing Arab countries in particular. There is no denying that the oilfields of the Arab countries constitute extremely lucrative and tempting targets to several unscrupulous oil hungry countries. Any one of these countries or a gang of them could, by use of this weapon, capture intact the Arab oilfields, their industrial centres and the bulk of their defence equipment within a matter of hours without suffering any loss themselves. On explosion, the neutron bomb releases extensive doses of lethal radiation and all living beings within a 500 metre radius of point-zero of explosion of a bomb equivalent to 2000-ton TNT power would die within 10 minutes to 24 hours. There would be no damage to buildings and property, etc. The radiation is short-lived and the enemy would be able to land parachute regiments to take over the unguarded positions without even firing a shot. Conceived in the early 50's in the U.S.A., the first experimental neutron bomb was detonated in 1963 at Nevada Testing Grounds of the now defunct Atomic Energy Commission of the U.S.A. Nevertheless, the actual administration authorised production of the neutron bomb started in 1973 and took about three years to materialise.

In March 1978, 12 Syrian citizens died due to exposure to radiation released by explosion of an "Atomic Mine". The United States has manufactured small atomic cells and Israel has a large number of them in her possession. These atomic cells are like

small neutron bombs and can be placed in mines with a detonator, replacing dynamite. It was the detonation of such a mine which Israelis laid inside the Syrian territory on the Israel-Syrian border. It would not be surprising if many more "Atomic Mines" are discovered in due course on the Arab side of the Israeli-Arab borders.

The work is in progress in certain countries on the development of atomic hand-grenades, atomic artillery shells and short-distance atomic missiles which would kill by radiation. The U.S.S.R. has already developed a laser shield to protect her cities against incoming missiles. The radiation released by the explosion of a neutron bomb and other atomic weapons mentioned above is termed as electromagnetic radiation and is the most familiar form of energy. The research to investigate the response of constituents of the living matter (humans, animals, plants, sea life, etc.) to radiation damage has gained sudden momentum in the United States and Soviet Union and this reflects the trends of future conflicts. The application of radiation in industry and in medicine for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes is well known. Nevertheless, the possible use of nuclear and now of radiation bombs makes extremely important the research in effects of radiation on living matter.

However, are the Muslim countries equipped even to locate a radioactive source not to mention to face the threat of radiation bombs? A Russian spy satellite Cosmos 954 dropped in Yellowknife in Canada's Northwest Territories due to a malfunction. It was powered from uranium-235 and crashed at 4.56 a.m. on 24th January 1978. It took 4773 flying hours at about \$1750 an hour to finally collect the remains of the shattered satellite and to examine the possibly contaminated area of atmosphere and the ground using ultra-modern and highly sensitive equipment. What if any Muslim country faces such an emergency and the help is too slow to arrive? The disturbances in Iran have created a power vacuum in the oil-rich Muslim Gulf and the weak Gulf States offer irresistible temptation to oil-starved Israel and the super-powers. How can these resources be captured intact. **THIS IS THE THEME OF THE NEXT MIDDLE-EAST WAR** which perhaps has already surpassed the planning stages and could be attempted in not too distant a future. Countries like Libya and Algeria

are more vulnerable to this threat who might be under the illusion of distance from the main middle-eastern battlegrounds and thus in a state of relaxation and minimum alertness.

More than 60 Universities and Colleges in the United States offer educational programmes in Nuclear Engineering. Is there any Muslim country with a comparable educational programme? These are the questions which have to be answered by Muslim countries and the only answer is act now or perish.

A modern fighter aircraft costs \$5- 8 million and can be brought down by a single missile before even dropping its load of bombs on enemy positions, as happened in the first week of the 1973 Arab- Israeli war. Israel lost 90 planes in the first two days of war and an imminent defeat was averted only by the massive American airlift of tanks, guns, missiles, arms and ammunition, etc. At one stage there were only 90 tanks between the Suez Canal and mainland Israel, and at one such moment General Dayan declared to the late Mrs Meier: "This is the end of the Third Temple." Nevertheless, the end of the Third Temple was to bring in its wake a real "Holocaust" as a result of the 13 atom bombs which Israel possessed in 1973 and which were loaded to be dropped on the Arab world with Aswan, Cairo and Damascus as the main targets.

The U.S.A. has spent about a million dollars on development of the two neutron bombs authorised by the administration in 1975. This is nothing in comparison with the huge resources possessed by certain Muslim countries but before a final million dollars can be spent, a higher amount would be required to establish a research programme. But even if the initial expenditure is 10 or even 50 million dollars, is it more than the natural resources, industrial installations and defence equipment of the Muslim countries in general and Arab countries in particular? Has the time not yet arrived to stop thinking only and start working?

The author of this article urges the governments of Muslim countries especially with adequate financial resources to take the following steps without delay, individually or collectively, if the survival of the Muslim nation is required and if the safety of their existing or future natural resources has to be guaranteed.

1. As a first step set up ministries of Science and Technology with sufficient funds at their disposal. These funds should be given in annual grants to individual research workers to hire research assistants/associates/fellows, and to buy necessary equipment and chemicals, etc. for their research projects. These research workers may already be working at the Universities, Colleges and Scientific Institutions. The research may be oriented to defence related projects. This is the normal practice in advanced countries.

2. Establish Radiation Research Laboratories equipped with ultramodern apparatus and radiation sources available. Their function should be both research and development. These laboratories should be located in cities with direct air and road access to the outside world.

3. Employ sincere Muslim scientists to work in these laboratories with adequate financial compensation and pleasant working conditions.

4. Establish at least one National Library of Science and Technology in each country which must receive all the scientific journals, magazines, books and documents, etc. published anywhere in the world. These National Libraries should also provide satisfactory translation, photocopying and lending services.

5. The Radiation Research Laboratories and other Laboratories must allocate funds to enable their scientists to participate regularly in scientific conferences abroad. This, in fact, should be encouraged since personal presence at a conference not only gives first-hand and immediate knowledge of a new development in any scientific field, it also enables a scientist to establish useful contacts.

6. Open "Scientific Cells" in their Embassies abroad particularly in the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Canada, France, West Germany, U.K. and Sweden. These Cells should be run by highly qualified scientists. Their job should be to inform the research laboratories of any new developments in any particular field, without delay. An example is the Chinese Embassy in Canada established in 1970. Since there was no official contact between the U.S.A. and the People's Republic of China prior to President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, all the scientific and technical literature published in the U.S.A. was acquired by the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa and sent

to China. The American scientists visiting China since then were astonished by up-to-date knowledge of their Chinese counterparts even on research projects of the individual American scientists.

7. Improve the postal system in general to enable the scientists to obtain any information from any where in the world with the minimum possibility of delay or loss of mail.

It is satisfactory that some Muslim countries are awakening to this new danger and at least one such country has approached the author for advice and guidance in establishing a programme in the field of Radiation Research and Development.

CSO: 4820

GDR SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH UGTA GENERAL SECRETARY REVIEWED

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 2 Jun 79 p 15

[Text] Mr Beyreuter, GDR secretary of state for Labor, on Wednesday 23 May 1979 paid a courtesy visit to Brother Abdallah Demene Debbih, member of the Central Committee and general secretary of the UGTA. The interview took place in the presence of Brothers Ali Lasfer, Central Committee member and national secretary, of the UGTA in charge of information, and Mohamed Chaa, national secretary in charge of foreign relations. The secretary of state for Labor and the UGTA general secretary reviewed methods of further strengthening the multiform cooperation between the two countries, in the mutual respect and natural solidarity existing between two socialist countries that are anti-imperialist and devoted to justice and peace.

Mr Beyreuter informed the UGTA of the great appreciation held by the authorities of his country and the people of the GDR for our workers in the GDR. "We must always cooperate," he added, "in order to further consolidate that factor." Mentioning, for his part, the heavy task of national building following the centuries of colonial occupation and devastation, Brother Abdallah Demene Debbih emphasized the similarity between our efforts to build a developed country and those deployed by the people of the GDR, who have succeeded in erasing the ruins of the war, to make their country one of the world's top industrialized countries.

"The word *enigme*," he emphasized, "is not the proper word to use in referring to our workers in the GDR, because when one examines the situation and the circumstances they are living under in France and in the GDR, there is no possible comparison. Our workers in the GDR are a concrete illustration of the relation between two socialist countries."

Mr Beyreuter and Abdallah Demene Debbih then proceeded to exchange views on the various areas of cooperation, especially at the level of the training of those who will do the training. They also mentioned the next meeting of the International Labor Organization, which is to examine--among other things--the question of the new international economic order.

ALGERIA

UGTA-FDGB DISCUSSIONS REPORTED

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 2 Jun 79 pp 13, 14

[Text] Joint Communique

At the invitation of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), an important delegation from the Federation of Free German Unions (FDGB), led by Comrade Harry Tisch, chairman of the FDGB's National Confederal Committee, visited the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria from 18 to 22 May 1979.

During its stay in Algeria the delegation was received by:

President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Republic and general secretary of the National Liberation Front Party (FLN).

Brother Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, a member of the Political and Coordinating Bureau of the FLN.

Brother Mouloud Oumeziane, member of the Central Committee and minister of Labor and Professional Training.

The delegation from the National Confederal Committee of the FDGB talked with a delegation from the Union Federation of the UGTA, led by the general secretary, Comrade Demene Debbih Abdellah.

The discussions took place in an atmosphere of fraternity and reciprocal understanding, and dealt with the various aspects of the relations between the two union federations. Both delegations were pleased with the depth of the friendly relations and sincere cooperation that exists between the two countries. They agreed to consolidate them further in the interest of the workers and peoples of both countries, for the common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, for the support of just causes in the world and the peoples' fight for their national independence and for peace in the world.

The FDGB delegation informed the UGTA of the successes achieved by the workers of the GDR since the application of the decisions taken by the Ninth Congress of the SED [Socialist Unity Party] and the Ninth FDGB Congress for the purpose of stable development of the national economy, raising the material and

cultural standard and consolidating socialist democracy. They spoke of the great creative initiatives deployed by the working class and the whole population in honor of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the GDR.

The UGTA delegation informed the FDGB delegation that state institutions had been put in place, strengthened by the National Charter, and informed them of the decisions of the FLN Fourth Congress for Consolidation of the Socialist Revolution. They emphasized the importance the FLN attaches to organizing the social forces of the revolution and indicated the new achievements recorded by Algerian workers since the UGTA's Fifth Congress.

The FDGB delegation visited various economic developments.

They held talks with union and management officials.

Thus they evaluated the results and successes gained by Algerian workers and unions in the battle for development and production, as well as in improving their living and working conditions.

The UGTA delegation was pleased with the welcome and the working conditions offered Algerians in the GDR, within the framework of the cooperation agreements for temporary employment of Algerian workers, including teaching by professional experience, which constitutes an example of effective solidarity between the two peoples.

The UGTA delegation informed the FDGB delegation of the grave threats that the French government reform plan is causing to hang over the living and working conditions of the immigrants in France, leading to their leaving en masse. They emphasized that such a plan is a flagrant violation of the bilateral accords between the Algerian and French governments.

Both delegations appreciate the positive actions conducted jointly by the unions of the countries of emigration and those of the receiving countries in defense of the rights of workers immigrating into France. They are agreed on developing joint actions with other unions, especially within the OIT [International Labor Organization] and the international institutions, to protect totally the rights of emigrating workers.

The two delegations confirmed with satisfaction the agreement of their points of view on the current international questions of the struggle for the dignity of man, democracy, social progress and peace.

They brought to light imperialism's new strategy, characterized in particular by the blocking of the resolutions of the extraordinary UN meeting concerning the establishing of a new international economic order, the development of new weapons for massive extermination, especially the neutron bomb, and the permanent creation of new foci of tension in the world.

They discussed the methods to be set up by the international union movement, especially those having to do with the struggle for cessation of the arms

race imposed by imperialism, for concrete action toward disarmament and the ultimate strengthening of the detente process, for the establishment of a new international economic order and for peace in the world.

The FDGB and the UGTA condemn all forms of oppression and repression that are the object of union organizations in countries subject to regimes that are enemies of the aspirations of the working class.

Both delegations are convinced that the struggle to protect the peace is an important task for unions in defending the workers' interests.

They stress the necessity for unifying the unions' international actions and strengthen the solidarity between all progressive and democratic forces, with a view to making an important contribution to peace. Thus, the FDGB and the UGTA support the organizing of an International Labor Union Conference on Development, to establish a new just international economic order, the preferred framework of a real solidarity between the workers of the world. They also considered the proposal of the FSM [World Federation of Trade Unions] with regard to the necessity for a world labor union conference concerned with the social and economic aspects of disarmament; they felt this proposal was a way of giving effective support to the struggle of all the forces devoted to peace.

They salute the next meeting of the Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Cuba by hoping that important meeting will make possible the strengthening of the anti-imperialist front, of the defense of just causes in the world and the establishment of peace.

With regard to the dangerous development of the situation in the Near East and the treason against the Arab cause, particularly that of the people of Palestine, through the regime of al-Sadat,

The UGTA and the FDGB believe that no just and permanent peace can occur in the region without realization of the national and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

They vigorously condemn the imperialist-Zionist accord initiated by the United States and executed by al-Sadat.

They reaffirm their support for the struggle of the people of Palestine under its sole and legitimate representative, the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], and express their complete solidarity with the Arab peoples' struggle to recover their plundered territories. They support the decisions taken by the Firmness Front and the Resistance Front, as well as those taken by the summit meeting of the Arab chiefs of state, followed by the Foreign Affairs Ministers, meeting in Baghdad.

Both parties declared themselves in favor of consolidating and strengthening relations of friendship and cooperation between the states of the socialist community and Arab progressive forces, to further the success of the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and the Arab reaction.

The UGTA delegation informed the FDGB delegation of the situation in the Arab Maghrib, which is characterized by the just struggle of the Saharan people, under the direction of the Polisario Front, for its national independence, and by the threats directed against the Algerian revolution.

In accordance with the pertinent resolutions of the UN and the OAU, the two delegations declare themselves in favor of the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence.

The two delegations salute the victory of the Popular Revolution of Iran, which has enabled that country to get rid of the yoke of imperialism that was using it as a gendarme for the region.

Greatly concerned by the very serious events in the Asiatic Southeast, recently characterized by an armed conflict on Vietnamese territory, in which Chinese armed forces were opposing the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,

The UGTA and the FDGB are convinced that any armed conflict between China and Vietnam serves only the interests of world imperialism and that to safeguard the peace it is necessary to settle conflicts between states in a peaceful way, with respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and peoples.

The two delegations believe that only negotiation can settle the Sino-Vietnamese problems, and not the force of arms, as international imperialism would have it.

Greatly worried by the situation prevailing in South Africa, which is dominated by the multiform and shameful aid contributed by world imperialism and the NATO countries to the odious apartheid system imposed by the white minorities,

The two delegations declare themselves bound up with the struggle of the workers and people of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, and support the countries of the Front.

The FDGB and the UGTA declare themselves bound up with the struggle being waged by the democratic and progressive forces of Chile against the Pinochet fascist junta. They demand the release of all Chilean patriots who are in prison, as well as illumination on the fate of thousands who have disappeared.

Reaffirming their unfailing devotion to the principles of democratic freedom and the free exercise of the labor union right, the two delegations demand the release of the imprisoned Tunisian unionists and the reestablishment of their union rights.

They manifest their solidarity with the courageous patriots who are fighting persecution and oppression in Uruguay, Paraguay, Nicaragua and other countries.

In concluding their discussions, the two delegations signed a working agreement for cooperation in the coming years (1980-1981).

Thanking the UGTA for its warm welcome and the hospitality extended, the FDGB invited Comrade Abdellah Demene Debbih, general secretary of the UGTA, to visit the GDR in 1980. The invitation was accepted with pleasure.

Members of the UGTA Delegation

Abdallah Demene Debbih, general secretary of the UGTA.

Mohamed Chaa, national secretary for International Relations.

Ouameur Ait Abdelmalek, national secretary for Finance and Administration.

Abderrezak Daoui, national secretary for the Economy and Planning.

Mohamed Lakhdar Slimani, national secretary for Education and Training.

Youcef Briki, member of the National Executive Commission and secretary general of the Algiers Governorate Union.

Mohamed Salah Benhidjeb, member of the National Executive Commission and UGTA representative in the GDR.

Amar Hammad, member of the National Executive Commission and general secretary of the National Federation of Steel Workers.

Members of the FDGB Delegation

Harri Tisch, chairman of the Confederal Committee of the FDGB.

Heinz Neukrants, member of the Board of Directors and secretary of the Confederal Committee of the FDGB.

Rudolf Focke, member of the FDGB Confederal Committee.

Kurt Selbmann, deputy director of International Relations.

Dieter Behn, personnel adviser.

Doris Lehmann, interpreter.

Cooperation Agreement

Expressing their profound satisfaction with the fruitful cooperation relations that have long existed between the two union organizations;

Believing that this cooperation is based on a solidarity against imperialism, for peace, democracy and social progress, and on their joint efforts to build a socialist society;

The UGTA and the FDGB have agreed to continue and further consolidate their cooperation agreement for the years 1980-1981.

The present agreement deals with the following points:

1. Cooperation in the field of union training.

With the goal of developing and consolidating their mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of union training, the UGTA and the FDGB will proceed to exchange experiences in various areas and have agreed to pursue their cooperation in the matter of courses arranged by the high-school union, "Fritz Heckert."

The two delegations (UGTA and FDGB) decided to strengthen their cooperation in the area of economic and social studies, chiefly having to do with the exchange of experiences, documentation and study delegations.

The practical modalities of these exchanges will be jointly decided upon at a later date.

2. Cooperation in the field of information

The UGTA and the FDGB agreed to establish permanent cooperation in the information field,

By regular exchange of press organs and union publications.

By exchange of experiences between the union newspapers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL and TRIBUNE.

3. Contribution by the FDGB to the staffing and professional training of Algerian workers in the GDR.

Believing that the cooperation is fruitful and effective between the FDGB and the UGTA in the area of staffing and professional training of Algerian workers, the two organizations agree to develop and improve that cooperation even more, on the basis of the 5 August 1974 agreement.

To do this, the concerned departments of the two federations will jointly study the proper methods of applying this decision.

4. Cooperation in the international area

The UGTA and the FDGB agreed to work together on everything having to do with international questions of common interest; in particular, they will exchange points of view on the activities of the OIT before and during international labor conferences.

5. Delegation exchange

a. At the level of the professional federations

The two delegations realize the importance of exchanges of experience in the field of economic and social development and agree to continue and strengthen relations between professional branches on the basis of concrete objectives to be realized, especially between the following federations: Steel; Oil and Energy; Transportation; Lumber and Building; Leather and Textiles; Education and Culture.

b. Exchange relations in the area of recreation and medical care

In this area the two parties decide to continue their experiment by exchanging, every year, two unionists accompanied by their families, for a rest stay in the GDR and in Algeria.

The FDGB is disposed to receive, after preliminary agreement, leaders and rank-and-file members of the UGTA for medical treatment in the GDR.

Transportation costs are born by the sending organization, costs of the stay by the receiving organization.

8946

CSO: 4400

CGT DELEGATION DISCUSSES OBJECT AND RESULTS OF VISIT

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 2 Jun 79 p 14

[Interview in Algiers with members of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]; interviewer and individual members of delegation not identified; date of interview not given]

[Text] A delegation from the French CGT, composed of Edmond Amiable, Kader Merzoughi and Jacque Monique, who are, respectively, general secretary of the Ile de France Regional Union, secretary of the UD [Democratic Union] and local Yvelynes leader at Corbeille-Essone, have just spent six days in our country at the invitation of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] and the Algiers UW [Governorate Union].

The CGT delegation, accompanied by members of the Algiers UW, had an opportunity to visit various developments in our country and exchange points of view on the nature of the relations linking the two federations in general, and the immigration question in particular.

Among the places visited the CGT delegation went to the Olympic complex as soon as it arrived last Monday 14 May. It also visited the Ferhat area, a socialist village, SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] at Draria, the SNIC [expansion unknown] and the SNED [expansion unknown] in Reghaia, the CERI [expansion unknown] in El-Harrach.

Finally, on Thursday afternoon, an exchange of points of view at the Algiers UW headquarters ended the visit and the CGT delegation answered two questions posed by our organ.

[Question] Can you tell us in a few words the object of your visit and the results of your discussions with the leaders of the Algiers UW?

[Answer] The object of our visit to Algeria was to exchange points of view on the relations binding both of our union federations and to give them new vigor through a search for increased excellence.

That is why the results are more interesting. They allowed us a concrete approach to the Algerian reality through visits right on the spot. Also, we grasped to a great extent the role played by the UGTA on behalf of the working class, especially in applying the GSE [expansion unknown], which is one of the tasks of the moment.

Moreover, we are struck by the sincerity and frankness that animates the UGTA rank and file.

Finally, our first feeling is that the long-term socialist option will be in favor of Algerian workers, even beyond that.

For this reason: the wealth of Algerian youth makes your country a nation of the future. The achievements they have proved demonstrate a well-thought-out development and a spirit of initiative in union elections, in order to solve various problems of which they are aware, and the very fact of being aware and of saying so frankly enables them to correct errors.

[Question] Can you succinctly pinpoint the situation of the Algerian community in France and the action carried out by the CGT as to recent measures taken by the French government, which are counter to our emigration?

[Answer] We consider the immigration question one of our responsibilities. The CGT is acting to defend the interests of the Algerian community in France. It is our duty to fight for workers' rights, and to respect them. It is in fact a principle that we have proved and because of which we always respect dignity through a battle against racism. The French government considers racism a justification for the measures taken. To cite an example, the question of the residence permit, in which the CGT, with the UGTA, waged a fight. We can say that one step was accomplished in strengthening the bonds between Algerian workers and those of our country.

The CGT's action, so to speak, is characterized by an internationalist solidarity and a battle for all the interests of the working class; for this reason our position is consistent, despite the complex situation. Our motto is "You have to go there."

For his part, M. J. Monique stated that newspaper contacts took place. We will encounter certain difficulties, but our organization is trying and is deploying all its means to surmount them."

For his part, Kader Merzougui stated that "if the CGT does not take part in the battle it will be making a mistake, because the question itself is tied to that of the French workers; their fate will be compromised.

That is how the 1977 measures having to do with the pay of a million were beaten down. The same case was renewed in March 1979, with the French government's whole policy against Algerians in France. Its content is nothing but pressure on Algeria, in order to bend it and change its orientation.

Moreover, the CGT's activity in the area of making people aware is significant. This action is counter to the five draft laws signed by the French government. The five drafts, if they are applied, will put into question again the interests of the French workers, as well as those of the Algerian community in France. Thus, it is the CGT's duty to take the problems of the immigrants in hand.

8946

CSO: 4400

ALGERIA

SOVIET DELEGATION'S VISIT TO TEXTILES AND LEATHER FEDERATION DESCRIBED

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 2 Jun 79 p 14

[Text] From 19 to 26 May 1979 the Textiles and Leather Federation received a Soviet delegation led by Galina Leonchuk, the president of the Ukrainian Textiles and Light Industries Unions and a member of the Central Council of the Soviet Unions; he was accompanied by Comrade Siderov, a member of the federation's department of international relations.

The delegation held talks with their Algerian opposite numbers at Federation headquarters, First of May Square. The talks dealt with an exchange program at the level of the basic unions, for the purpose of mutual information on the realities and problems of the world of labor in both countries. The question of education and union training was also approached, in the light of an introductory report given by Brother Benmouffok Ichaled, the federal secretary. Within that framework Brother Benmouffok suggested a profitable exchange of documentation on developing countries in transition in the direction of socialism.

In the international area, the two delegations expressed their anxiety over the monopolistic penetration by the multinationals into leather and textiles in the Mediterranean Basin. The Algerian delegation indicated that it will take action to set up a real transfer of technology to the developing countries, by also organizing a flexible system for coordinating efforts to oppose imperialism's underhanded plots.

A joint communique was signed after the talks. We will return to it in our next edition.

8946

CSO: 4400

SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT IN ALGERIAN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE "Bilder und Zeiten" Section in German
2 Jun 79 p 3

[Article by Claus Gennrich: "Algeria After Boumedienne. Slowly but Persistently, Socialization Progresses."]

[Text] There sat the Frenchmen. "The four-cornered, sturdy tower stands on a ridge in the Algerian Atlas Mountains. It can be found everywhere throughout the country; it looks across the rich Blida Valleys, and is not even absent on the poor edge of the Sahara at Chardaiia, above the holy cities of the Mozabites. Algerians always point anew at the monument to French rule which they have not forgotten. They speak French and take it from second grade on in the schools of the "Democratic People's Republic of Algeria." The Algerians' Arabic is interspersed with flowery French expressions and in talking, sentences glide from one language into the other, without a break or pause. But the bilingual billboards have been disappearing in Algiers for a year; Arabization is progressing in a mixture of Berbers, Arabs and descendants of other Mediterranean people; and at many forks in the road in the gigantic land between snow-covered mountains on the sea and the central-African desert, only Arab-language signs point the way.

The student from Kabylia prefers to speak Arabic with his parents, who speak their own language with each other. By doing this, he does not convert them into Arabs: national sentiment is directed towards the consciousness of being Algerian, not Arab. The limit beyond which Arabization is felt as an affront by the light-haired Kabyls is fluid; in their schools Kabyl is not being taught. After Boumediennes' death, weapons have reportedly been collected in Kabylia just in case an autonomous rebellion should be attempted. Kabylia's freedom-fighting tradition, which dates back to colonial times, makes Kabyls also an admired national vanguard and thus promotes their integration into the state. People want to be Kabyls; many an Algerian, by type an Arab, proudly calls himself a Kabyl, as soon as he is able to establish a local point of contact.

Identity desires frequently overlap in Algeria; the various consciousness-strata among which the French is strong, heighten sensitivities. Algerian nationalism, the heart and soul of the political ideology and manner of conduct,

must always search anew for its subject. The more alive are anticolonial and anti-French emotions. They are directed against the West as a whole, against "capitalism." The socialism decreed by the National Charter and the constitution is to be the Algerian society, a one-party state organized along half-totalitarian lines, which does not simply accept Marxism--"a thing of Western industrialized countries"--and which deems itself Islamic. The alliance with Islam flourishes on the uncertainty of the Algerian definition of socialism and on the prostration of Islam, after 130 years of French rule in which the mosque was made into a Catholic church.

Algeria's large cities have remained European, and not only in their style of architecture; even in the dusty desert settlements Europe has a greater effect on the veiled individuals than in tradition-strong Morocco, and the prayer call from the minaret appears to be dampened by the prefabricated concrete walls of the high-rising, newly-built boxes that are shooting up everywhere. Khomeyni's Shiite radiation is hitting Algeria's Sunites only in a long, round-about way.

Everyone Is Called Upon To Plant a Tree

There is only an alliance, not a self-evident harmony, between the state administration and Islam: if on the holy Friday workers from the city work voluntarily, as they say, out in the country the Islamic traditionalists grumble. Banners and posters carry the slogan "18 million Algerians--18 million trees" made understandable even for illiterates, with pictures of the planting of trees in honor of the dead Boumedienne. Truck and tractor columns have been taking people out of the towns and villages into the barren area where each is supposed to plant a little tree for his former president so that the country may turn green. On Friday, the day of rest and prayer, traditionalists, left-wing progressives, and red dogmatists fight quietly and persistently under the umbrella of the unitary state and its unitary organizations for every inch of territory. Whoever wants to remain on top must master the game of eliminating diverse powers.

A right-wing Islamic opposition, the Moslem-Brotherhood, appears to be winning new adherents among young people. Some were sentenced to prison by military tribunals. Among the military also, there are emphatically Islamic forces. More vigorous, although hidden, is the opposition from the left. A bit of it came into the open when the newspaper REVOLUTION recently criticized the trade with the West and the increasing economic cooperation with Western firms. The blow, which, while using economic arguments, really aimed its guns at politics, was intended to hit the new President Chadli Bendjedid. A higher functionary whose ambitions got stuck mid-way, probably swung his arm for the blow--it is said--with the assistance of or incited by the Soviet Embassy in Algiers.

Moscow has not merely gathered encouraging experiences in Algiers. The supporting pillar of state power in Algeria is the army; the cement of power, the binding agent of the nation is anticolonialism. It is stronger than socialist ideology and keeps the Soviet Union at a distance. Twice, the supreme power

among socialist countries tried to induce socialist Algeria to let it have naval bases--twice in vain. Moscow made its last thrust in 1978, at the time of Boumedienne's visit to the Soviet Union. Brezhnev's foreign policy advisers have perhaps noted that Algeria joined in the chorus of outcries of the Arab rejection-front about Sadat's "betrayal" in his treaty with Israel, but that it has not led it. Algiers' voice sounds a trifle less aggressive than before.

Algeria's unity party NLF--the "National Liberation Front"--is under the control of a group of old fighters against the French, and President Bendjedid, until recently military commander of the Oran district, belongs to it as do the new Prime Minister Abdelghani and minister of foreign affairs Benjahla, former officers who participated in the peace negotiations at Evian. After Boumedienne, a military man, had tried to give the cadre party of old fighters a mass basis, the military did not like to see the party grow as a second center of power besides it, and found its anxieties verified when party member Jachjaui, esteemed in Moscow, assured himself of the support of the youth congress for his presidential aims. With Bendjedid's election, the military, which does not seem to concern itself too much with ideology and while proclaiming socialism seems to concentrate pragmatically on the economic development of the country, has apparently reinforced its control over the party.

The smoothness of the change of presidents was evidence of stability. The opposition whispers, but is apparently not organized. Members of the opposition take exception to the material advantages accruing to functionaries of the state and of its administration, economy, and labor unions who have allowed a new class system to evolve; at regionalism in the selection of people for leading positions, whereby one pulls the next one up to one's own position from the same area, mostly from the highly-developed coastal region around Annaba in East Algeria; and at the supremacy of the military and the police. Left-wing suspicion is watching to see whether the impenetrably compact colossus of the military conceals a toleration of private ownership and therewith of bourgeois structures in the socialist people's republic.

Bendjedid is in command of a power system of unity party and mass organizations without up to now having won in the consciousness of the general public the rank of Boumedienne, posthumously celebrated as a national hero. In the mass organizations of peasants, youths, women, engineers and journalists, and in the central office of the labor union UGTA, the party has a veto power in the nomination of candidates for election or functionaries. Control commissions of the unity party approve candidates for the national assembly and the regional parliaments. In a control commission of this kind there sits a representative each of the party apparatus, the military, and the mighty military security police. The regional governor, who holds power over his district, is nominated by the president, now therefore by Bendjedid. Official Algerians get excited when there is talk about appreciation for democracy. "Opposition? We have that within the party. If we permitted them to express themselves freely in public, national unity would be endangered. That's why this doesn't work."

The picture of France as an enemy appears in shadowy form. "France is trying to hurt us with all means, and is therefore stirring up the opposition in Algeria." The accusation is directed against French newspapers and the radio. Since everyone understands French, the influence of messages from France is powerful. Charges of intended arson emanate quickly from the uniformity of the one-party-state which is not used to openly presented diversity of opinions and breadth of information. Nevertheless, the culture of the discarded colonialists also encompasses the Algerian victors, who are not really sure of themselves yet, or already so far that they no longer need to fear or deny what is French: unabashed and as a matter of course, even simple people in the coastal regions listen to French broadcasts, laugh with the Paris studio audience, and sing along with French songs. Politics does not play the primary role.

Substantial worries determine everyday life. In 1977, they had consolidated into a railroad strike with political impact. Since then, the state has been trying to meet material complaints. For years, inflation had run ahead of wages, and living standards declined. To settle matters, wages were increased in 1978 by 30 percent, with an inflation officially designated as 13 to 15 percent, and probably above it. Now, the purchasing power of 1974 might have been regained. The guaranteed minimum wage is 800 dinars (about DM 400) per month. A mechanic earns 1,000 to 1,500 dinars per month, in academic professions, doctors for instance, income varies between 4,000 and, rarely, 6,000 dinars. Performance bonuses and wage supplements for work are customary in the hot South, where the oil industry needs workers. There, a worker makes 2,000 dinars, a technician with bonuses 6,000, and an engineer 10,000, with bonuses amounting to more than half of it. The guaranteed minimum wage is tax free; taxes for higher incomes come to between 10 and 30 percent. Lately, bonuses have also had to be taxed. Prices are high, like in Germany; families with several children find it difficult to get enough to eat. A kilogram of meat costs 20 to 30 dinars, a liter of gasoline in this oil-country costs the equivalent of 80 pfennigs--as does also an egg--and a meal in the enterprise canteen DM 2. Eating in a simple restaurant 4 years ago cost DM 5 and it now costs DM 20. Cars are three times as expensive as in Germany, a bottle of whiskey, because of prohibition, costs DM 150.

The Oppressive Housing Shortage

The housing shortage causes the greatest concern. The population is increasing rapidly by between 3 and 4 percent annually; over half of the people are less than 20 years old. True, now, after some standstill, buildings are going up everywhere--in desert oases and in the mountain and coastal cities the same prefabricated concrete slabs fit together into three- and four-story blocks with air-conditioning, spreading cool uniformity--but it is not enough. The housing shortage is oppressive. In the surroundings of the industrial city of Constantine, with its French visage, even families of employees and qualified technicians are crowded into miserable barracks. Only the coming four-year plan favors Constantine in housing construction. In many apartments in Algiers, more than 14 people are squeezed together. Young people cannot get

married because of the housing shortage. The housing office distributes apartments according to the following criteria: one must be able to raise money for the apartment, must be married, have children, and be able to prove that one has a job. Whoever is among the lucky ones to get a standard three-room apartment allocated pays 240 to 350 dinars a month for it. One room for an entire family in a community apartment with kitchen privileges costs 50 dinars. With the exception of a few state enterprises, there is no housing subsidy, just as there is no welfare or unemployment assistance. (The state counts on the social function of the extended family.) Housing construction is financed centrally by the state, occasionally in addition also by private savers who, according to income, receive between 3 and 6 percent interest.

A little private enterprise has been preserved in the state construction industry of the people's democracy. As is the case with most branches of the economy, there is a state monopoly company for the construction industry. But in the regions it awards contracts to private businessmen who, for instance, rent cranes, and make good money doing it. According to the doctrine, there are not supposed to be any private businessmen in Algeria with more than 5 or 10 employees. Nevertheless, some do not shun the daily risk of being shut down and maintain enterprises with occasionally 300 employees, for instance textile factories. The private sector shows its superiority primarily in agriculture. Because of agrarian revolution, in spite of the doubling of the population since the time of French rule, fewer foodstuffs are produced now so that more must be imported than before. The lion's share of the domestic grain, potato, and date production is harvested by the remaining private small peasants.

The agrarian revolution proceeded in three phases: the marking off of the land was followed by the expropriation of large landowners; now, private peasants are allowed to employ only their families. The sheep and camel herds are also to be divided up and the 20,000 nomads to be made sedentary. The owners of herds are looked upon as capitalists. But perhaps the state will in the end hesitate after all to destroy the living patterns of the nomads for ideological reasons. The goat-hide tents, tiny, flat, and in their isolation looking as if they were lost, are still stooping low in the brownish expansion of the desert. When a herd owner or a farmer divides his property among his family, private ownership is merely being concealed, grumble the ideologists in Algeria, for whom socialization is not progressing rapidly enough. They would like to see socialist villages everywhere. There, former inhabitants of clay-brick huts are brought together in regular houses, and with state investments the flight from rural areas is to be stopped and also more rational possibilities for political schooling of cadres are to be created. The clean facade of the socialist villages with beautiful schools barely conceals the economic misery of the many inhabitants who are burdened in the sale of their products by the prices dictated by the state.

The torches above the oil wells shine brightly in the desert night at Hassi Massaoud. As in the dream image of a surrealist, the small and the larger flame-spots provide shading and perspective distance to the silent ocean of the gentle, dark, mysterious Sahara-waves. At 400 drillings gas pressure

expels the oil without pumps from a depth of 3,500 meters, during the day, a mesh of pipe lines as well as gas compressing plants and a refinery can be seen covering the grounds. A pump station propels the oil to the harbors in the North. Half of it is processed in the country, in petrochemical complexes, and a part of it is exported as crude oil. The 70,000 tons of crude oil that are extracted daily at Hassi Massaoud constitutes half of the Algerian production. Two thousand people work here; 4 percent are foreign engineers, Americans, Englishmen, Italians, Egyptians, and Palestinians. The man in the hard hat urging caution on the platform for an experimental drilling operation speaks Russian. The mild green of Australian eucalyptus trees, which have shot up in the middle of the desert in 7 years, casts its shadow over the residential center. Birds twitter. On a board hangs the schedule for the shift change; one catches one's breath in the cooler North. The director of the school for oil technicians, where young women are also trained, studied in East Berlin. The oil reserves of Hassi Massaoud will last for 10 to 12 years.

The socialized oil industry accounts for 32 percent of the gross national product. Crude oil, gas, and oil products yield annually almost the entire export value; in 1977, that came to almost 25 billion dinars. In spite of this, Algeria's international trade is in deficit, and indebtedness is large. The springs beneath the desert and the natural gas near the Libyan border that some day is to be transported over Tunisia and the bottom of the sea to Italy and Germany, can be themselves not assure Algeria's future. A steel plant at the naval base of Annaba which now contributes only 450,000 tons to Algeria's annual need for 2.5 million tons is being expanded; soon, a works farther to the East near the coast is to process iron ore which a new railroad line will transport there from the southerly Tindouf on the Morocco border. The country has raw materials and energy. Around the glistening, faceless desert city of Ouargla, electrotechnical enterprises and plants for the processing of metal and oil products have been established under a regional development plan. At the edge of the holy city of Ghardeia, wrapped in century-old Islamic sect-tradition, an industrial zone is being erected. Regional politics is also the driving force behind the highly profitable state transportation company which with 2,500 buses transports annually 210 million riders over a road-net of 108,000 kilometers. The 600-kilometer trip from Ghardeia to the capital costs only DM 20. Nevertheless, the arrangement doesn't work out: there is talk of 800,000 unemployed, but in Ouargla, the crossing point between oil and gas fields, and on the fertile fields and plantations in the valleys at Annaba, there is a labor shortage. Unemployed above all are young people who drop out of school at age 15, but who are drafted for military service at age 19, and who can only find work after that.

Against France and Any Kind of Colonialism

The hatred for the French and the fear of dependence makes Algeria deal with as many partners as possible. Two percent of Algerian exports and 5 percent of imports in 1977 were transacted with the communist countries, 15 percent on the other hand with the FRG. France is being pushed into the background. Until 1973, the Berliet Automobile Works were able to send 60 percent of their output to Algeria. Now, Algeria prefers to have trucks and buses delivered by Mercedes and MAN. Once cooperation has stood the test, as has been the

case with Daimler Benz, Algeria signs big orders, as now for the speedy delivery of 400 buses for DM 65 million. The goal of an Algerian assembly plant and later of a licensed factory in the country are becoming visible. The FRG is an increasingly popular economic partner for Algeria. Future decades will show what is to become of an insinuation by Boumedienne that some day Algeria could use German assistance in the erection of a nuclear industry with Algerian uranium, when oil supplies are getting exhausted. Other countries' atomic power debates reinforce for the time being Algeria's eagerness to search rather for further oil and gas sources.

Every fifth teacher in an Algerian high school is a foreigner. In the six universities, most of the lecturers are foreigners. Physicians come from Romania and the GDR. On the lecture schedule of a student in Algeria it says: "The Relationship Between the Soviet Union and the Arab Countries"--and the professor is a Russian. "Nonalignment" is taught by a man from the GDR. A Frenchman teaches about the "Phenomenon of Nationalism." The Soviet and the East German professors are paid in dollars. Whether the anticolonial distrust of young Algerians, whose memories of foreign rule prior to 1962 are getting ever weaker, will remain alert vis-a-vis the Arab-nonalignment camouflage of communist desires to influence--the student now smiles disbelievingly when the existence of Soviet imperialism is mentioned--will be the deciding factor about Algeria's future place in the world.

9011

CSO: 4403

KHOMAYNI'S POLITICAL/CULTURAL OUTLOOK EXAMINED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 12 May 79 pp 1, 3

[Article by Khalid Jamai: "Is Khomeyni's Revolution Political or Cultural?"]

[Text] Tehran--Is Khomeyni's revolution only a revolution with economic and social objectives? Is it only the revolution of the disinherited? Or a proletarian revolution? One is tempted to believe so, in this country pillaged by imperialism and corrupt leaders.

Is the Iranian revolution only a revolution by religious visionaries whose aim is to take Iran back 14 centuries?

Finally, is the Iranian revolution only a revolution like those which the Third World ceaselessly experiences and the model for which would be the installation either of a liberal regime or of a socialist regime, inspired by capitalism or communism, with adaptation--more or less successful--to the specific conditions of the country?

If we grant that it is a proletarian revolution, we must grant that Iran has crossed over into industrialization, which has given rise to a proletariat and a bourgeoisie, the latter possessing the means of production. But the only industries created by the shah were mainly assembly industries. No basic industry or transformation industry exists. Therefore it is not possible, in view of the nonexistence of a proletariat and a bourgeoisie, that a true class struggle is involved, one that would end in a proletarian revolution as predicted by the Marxist model.

To assert that the Iranian revolution is a revolution by religious visionaries is to assume a regime which would exclude all 20th-century relationships and assume the establishment of a society living in autarchy and cut off from the entire world.

To grant that the Iranian revolution is similar to those which the Third World ceaselessly experiences is to grant the installation of a regime more or less affiliated with one of the two blocks that dominate the world today.

The distinguishing characteristic of the Iranian revolution is that it is the work neither of a specific political party nor of a specific class. It is the work of an entire people, and goes beyond any class division. This too gives it a character unique in the 20th century. It has taken place in the name of a religion and within the framework of a religious movement, Shiism. It has succeeded, by means of its own revolutionary strategy, in triumphing over a regime which neither the action of the Iranian Communist Party nor the urban guerilla warfare carried on by avant-garde organizations managed to shake.

Thus, as we have pointed out in our preceding articles, the use of Western concepts for analyzing this revolution would be inoperative.

What is striking in the Moslem religion is that it is not only a religion but also a culture and a civilization. Thus we are dealing with a revolution which proclaims its identity and its authenticity. It opposes and challenges a cultural, political and economic model, that of the West. It is also a rejection of alienation. Finally, it is an attempt to establish a sociopolitical and cultural system independent of the communist and capitalist systems. In short, it is the expression of the desire to establish a regime in which the individual enjoys liberty without the society in which he lives suffering from him--that is, a system that gives primacy neither to the individual nor to society, but establishes a complementarity between the one and the other. This is what, in the first phase, resulted, and in a second phase, went awry.

Can the Iranian revolution be accused of being a reactionary revolution? From the beginning, it has declared against imperialism, and in its practice today, it constantly demonstrates that that was not a mere slogan.

Can it be accused of being a communist revolution? It has been carried out in the name of a religion.

It is the first revolution of the 20th century which introduces the sacred into politics.

It constitutes the first attempt in the history of the contemporary Moslem world to put into practice the precepts of Islam in a world that bears no resemblance to the centuries in which this religion was born. Is Islam capable of solving the problems with which the Moslem world is faced in the 20th century? Knowing that neither capitalism nor Marxism have been able to solve the problems of the Moslem world. A terrible and vital experience for Islam and for the future of the Moslems. Islam finds itself today facing itself and its future.

We cannot end this series of articles on the Iranian revolution without asking ourselves--but without wanting to get into any kind of polemics--what the reasons are that have led the West to show such hostility to this revolution, a hostility that breaks out on page one of almost all the newspapers of the

West: "the man (Khomeyni) who makes the West tremble," "Homo Islamiens," "the wave that breaks," the "war of the Ayatollahs," "Talkani the red Ayatollah," "from Algeria to Iran, Israel encircled by Islam," "the Ayatollah's revenge," "the Ayatollah's anathemas," "the great fever of Islam."

First of all--and the West is not mistaken in this--the revolution of Iran is the revolution of Islam. It is the outburst of the name of Moslem. Josette Allia has written that he has the numbers, he has the power, he has the oil, he has the money. And she goes on: "The Moslems have the space, the men, the dynamism, the power, the energy and the money. The space: they occupy an immense zone that covers half of Africa, the Near East, the Persian Gulf, southern Europe, Iran and central Asia, part of the USSR, a bit of China, all the southern part of Southeast Asia! The men: they have 600 million, with the highest birth rates in the world. The dynamism: Islam is the only religion that is making progress today, and with what speed!... Finally, they possess energy, money and power, since they have furnished each year half of the crude oil extracted in the world and since two-thirds of world oil exports depend on them. On the other hand, their petrodollars, it is maintained, could ruin the stock exchanges of London, Paris and New York...."

In short, they strike fear, because the Western world depends on them economically, financially, and for power.

They strike fear because through the Iranian revolution, Islam and the Moslems, challenging the West, push it to question itself. The West is discovering today that its political, cultural and economic model is not universal.

They strike fear because the West does not understand, because what is happening cannot be analyzed by the traditional pattern: class struggle, proletariat, bourgeoisie, rationalism.

They strike fear because they proclaim their right to be different.

And finally, as Micham Dfait remarks: "The medieval prejudices about Islam are so solidly implanted in the European unconscious that they can arise again as conspicuously as 6 centuries ago."

These are a few reasons which may explain this hostility but do not justify it. For while the Moslem world knows the culture, the philosophy, the economic system, the values of the Western world, the latter knows about the Moslem world only its reserves of raw materials, the number of its inhabitants and the capacity of its markets.

Tomorrow--the Embassy of Israel in Tehran: Linchpin of Israeli Espionage

* NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, No 748, 12-18 March 1979.

ROLE OF ISRAELI EMBASSY IN TEHRAN REVEALED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 13 May 79 pp 1, 3

[Article by Khalid Jamai: "The Embassy of Israel, Linchpin of Israeli Espionage"]

[Text] 1--Israel and the Shah: Same Interests, Same Objectives

Tehran--The relations between the former regime of the shah and Israel do not date from yesterday. They were initiated in 1947, suspended during the Mossadegh period (1951-1953), and resumed with greater force after the return of the shah. Of course, the latter did not legally recognize the Zionist "state," but there was de facto recognition. It was explained by:

- the shah's admiration for the Israeli achievements and for the Zionist chiefs;
- the necessity of the Israeli markets for distribution of Iranian oil;
- the necessity of importing manufactured products;
- the fact that Iran and Israel had the same aim: to thwart any Arab unity;
- Israel's need to get out of, by means of Iran, the isolation in which it found itself in the region;
- Iran's need for weapons for equipping the Kurdish insurgents.

Thus Iranian-Israeli relations encompassed all areas.

In the economic domain, the Israelis imported \$300 million worth of Iranian oil, and the Iranian company was the principal user of the Israeli pipeline that links the port of Eilat on the Red Sea with that of Ashdoud on the Mediterranean.

In the military domain, Israel supplied weapons to Iran and was authorized to use Iranian air space and military bases in case of conflict with the Arab countries.

At the nuclear level, close collaboration linked Iran, South Africa and Israel.

At the level of the intelligence services, MOSSAD and SAVAK worked together. Within the latter, the seventh bureau worked on exchanges of information with the Zionist state and monitored the execution of a security pact established between the two countries. To this must be added the fact that MOSSAD instructed and trained the Iranian agents of SAVAK and gave them technical assistance in Iran itself. The embassy of Israel in Tehran served as the linchpin of Israeli espionage in the countries of the Gulf, in Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

On the strategic level: the USA made the Tehran-Tel Aviv axis the essential axis in its policy in the Middle East for guaranteeing its economic, military and political interests there. The commitment to supply Iranian oil to Israel played a decisive role in the signing of the second agreement on Israeli-Egyptian disengagement.

Finally, the Israeli-Arab conflict was beneficial to Iran because:

- in case of an Arab oil embargo, Tehran became the Middle East's principal supplier of oil to the West;

- the conflict occupying Iraq enabled the shah to conduct his expansionist policy satisfactorily, to the detriment of the countries of the Gulf.

The defeat of the shah's regime was thus a catastrophe for the Zionist regime. At a stroke, it lost:

- a source of oil supplies that it had considered reliable;

- use of the Eilat-Askelon (Ashdod) pipeline, which provided for distribution of Iranian oil to Europe;

- a very important customer for Israeli agricultural and industrial products;

- a strategic ally in its struggle against Arab control of the Red Sea;

- one of the few countries capable of supporting Sadat's policy.

But all these losses are as nothing in comparison with the gains achieved by the PLO through the success of the Iranian revolution.

All the preceding demonstrates the importance assigned by Israel to Iran--whence the decisive role played by the Zionist embassy in Tehran.

--Israel's Embassy in Tehran; or, When Fiction Outstrips Reality

Khayaban Khakh has become Khayaban Palestine. So have the people decided; so has the revolution decided.

I asked the cab to take me to the office of the PLO. Great was his surprise, and so was mine. For the Iranian cab driver, there is no office of the PLO in Tehran; but he did tell me: "I can take you to Sefarati Palestine." It is Palestine's first embassy in the world. However, when questioned, Hani El Hassani replied that it is the Iranian people who have proclaimed the Israeli embassy the embassy of Palestine. We tried our best to tell them that Palestine has only PLO offices. But in vain. It is the Iranian people who have decided this.

Arrived at our destination, the driver refused to accept payment. He had taken me for a Palestinian.

I am on Palestine Street, formerly Khakh Street.

It is an average-size building with a large garden. It is on the corner. Officially, there has never been an Israeli embassy in Tehran; the Iran of the shah did not recognize Israel. There was only a liaison center.

In reality, it was indeed an embassy, and an embassy whose role was of the highest importance, as proven by its structure, its role and the documents that were found there.

Visiting it one more time, I observed that reality often outstrips fiction. I found myself on a set--but a real one--which surpassed those on which 007 worked.

The Israeli "liaison center" in Tehran consisted of at least 165 rooms.

The number of employees was on the order of 400--a figure arrived at on the basis of the size of the work tables (130 of them), which were easily big enough for a minimum of three persons each.

The office of the chief of the delegation--in reality, the ambassador--is equipped with several television screens that received the pictures transmitted by the television cameras located in the various offices, as well as those aimed along the streets leading to the embassy.

--An ultramodern photo lab could develop and print black-and-white and color photos;

--a big file and documentation room housing thousands of fiches and files;

--an El Al office;

--a secret listening center capable of monitoring 1,500 telephone lines in Tehran;

--an ultramodern telephone switchboard made it possible to contact any part of the world;

- study and research offices where the information gathered was processed,
- a room for preparing special operations;
- a vault;
- interrogation rooms;
- a soundproof torture room;
- cells for holding prisoners, equipped with hidden microphones;
- lounges and guest rooms;
- all doors were controlled electronically;
- secret passages and camouflaged stations;
- a large kitchen, bathrooms;
- a shooting gallery for silenced pistols, with moving targets;
- a sports room;
- on the roof, a steel gangway, mounted to slide on a rail, was used as a bridge between the embassy and the adjoining building, where the Israelis had all leased apartments. This electronically actuated ladder served in case of danger or hasty flight;
- the embassy's outside walls are all electrified;
- kennels for three police dogs.

Such, in brief, is the structure of the former Israeli "liaison center" in Tehran.

The number and nature of the documents found in this "center" are astounding, to say the least. They show that there was coordination at the highest level between the Zionist state and the former regime of the shah, evidenced also by the close relations between MUKESH and SAVAK.

These documents have also made it possible to pinpoint the essential task assigned to the center: to organize espionage activities in the countries of the Gulf and Iraq, and to organize special operations against the Palestinian chiefs and leaders. Thus, a special file section on Palestinian personalities was discovered, composed of their photos and very detailed information. All of it was in Hebrew and in Farsi. Of course, the espionage activities included Iran too: the opposition parties, economic, political, religious, sociological, and geographical data (topographical and other kinds of maps).

The Israeli "liaison center" was invaded by the Iranian masses, who proclaimed it the embassy of Palestine. It is the first time that the Israelis have left a place and the Palestinians have entered it.

On the wall of the embassy an Iranian has written: "Long Live Palestine."

Tomorrow: In the Prisons of SAVAK

11267

CSO: 4900

ALGERIAN WRITER PORTRAYS IRANIAN SCENE

Algiers ACTUALITE in French No 711, 31 May-6 Jun 79 pp 2-6

[Article by Hocine Abdedou: "Iran: The Revolution at an Impasse?"]

[Text] By virtue of its fervor, generosity, seething ideas and contradictory orders, the Iran of today somewhat resembles the Algeria of 1962. For 2 weeks, Hocine Abdedou has been engaged in the difficult and passionately interesting task of listening, observing, and reading in order to try to understand the significance of one of the most formidable general revolts against tyranny of our time. As one might suspect, it is not an easy undertaking. Nor is it any easier to make absolute judgments: Iran does not fit into any of the usual categories. One thing is certain, however: Iran will be what the old man (79) from Qom, Ayatollah Khomeini, wants it to be. Long a fighter against injustice, the implacable adversary of the Pahlavi dynasty, Khomeini is not an unknown factor. Following the report by Hocine Abdedou, Abdelkader Bensalah recalls, through texts of the imam written in Iraq during his exile in the desert, the political dimensions of the man whom some view as nothing but a religious leader [not reproduced].

The evening of our arrival in Teheran, a Pakistani newsman reflected: "You wouldn't think that Khomeini had gone through there." "There" was the cafeteria hall of a big hotel in the Iranian capital, where the latest Parisian creations vied with the country's famous roses. It was the stuff of everyday life: the golden-haired youths -- some not all that young -- of a bourgeoisie which one could scarcely believe was still occupying center stage following the tremendous upheavals that have shaken the country, upheavals caused by ascetic mullahs whose sole weapon was the word of God and their renowned ability to wield it.

And yet, there it was: background music played by a talented pianist, endless chatter that could not be muffled by the dozens of rich and sumptuous Persian rugs laid right on the floor, and an army of waiter bustling around

low tables where from time to time there would ring out the crystalline laughter of a girl who could have come straight out of an ornate Rostam miniature decorating an Omar Khayyam quatrain.

There was no mullah in sight; nor was there any tchador [translation unknown]. Actually, advertisements for the Intercontinental Hotel would be better advised to announce "Discover America in Teheran!" or something similar. There was no alcohol either, but there was a portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini, whose intense glance seemed to give off an air of disapproval of the gathering in the midst of a revolution that forced one of the last monarchs of our time to choose the path of exile, defeated the largest and certainly the bloodiest political force in the world and brought the fifth military power in the world to its knees.

Four armed men entered the room, their machine guns loaded. One of them walked to the receptionist. There was a discussion punctuated by a brief look at the guest register, a few nods and a faint smile by the doorkeeper, who arranged his book and cards and watched the departure of those he undoubtedly considered to be troublemakers. The four men were definitely not agents of the SAVAK, whose members not already in prison are in hiding and being sought. Rather, they were four members of the Khomeini committees in charge of "maintaining order." Their general headquarters are the mosques scattered throughout Teheran, just as a few months ago, garrisons and police stations were systematically positioned in the Iranian capital.

The arrival of the committee members was but a simple interlude which did not even interrupt conversations and which apparently went unnoticed by nearly all the Intercontinental Hotel guests, who in nearly 4 months have most likely grown accustomed to these young men who erect barricades at night in order to stop vehicles and ask for identification cards.

Refreshments and tea steadily file past, as do beautiful gowns, fine jewels and lovely girls on the arms of youths their age, all under the watchful gaze of stout, elderly gentlemen who seem to wish they could find a way to erase the signs of advancing age. Still no mullahs, nor were we ever to see any there.

Outside, the weather was unusual for the season, but traffic was the same as it is every day: In the midst of total anarchy, a million vehicles, four-fifths of the nation's fleet, fight to get past one another on the broad streets that cut through the sprawling capital in a completely military manner. Elbours, a mountain range at the foot of which the last construction is found, towers over Teheran with its imposing mass and 4,000-meter altitude.

It is quite simple to see the layout of Teheran society, imposed by the original construction of the city, which was designed by a uniformed city planner (Reza Shah, the father of Mohamed Reza Pahlavi), and its uncontrolled development: the south and the north.

In the south is the bazaar: the heart of Iran, as the hallowed formula goes, the crossroads of everything that is bought or sold in the country. It is a gigantic souk [marketplace] where one can buy -- on the strength of one's word and without signing a single document -- the rice production of an entire region of Iran, a marketplace where, based on a few brief, discreet meetings, one can sell the cargo carried by ships that are still hundreds of miles from the Iranian coasts, before it has reached any European port, not to mention cases of crops not yet harvested in South America.

This is but one of the images of the "thousand and one nights" of this Iranian spring.

There are other images, but they verge on the incredible. Perhaps the shantytown adjoining the bazaar is the largest in the world. It is here that one finds the largest concentration of unemployed workers in the country, a lumpen proletariat shaped by the "white revolution" and made up of peasants driven away from the rural areas by the most irrational decisions, decisions that turned Iran, once a country that exported agricultural products, into one of the largest importers of consumer goods.

The northern section of the city is indescribable, lush with greenery but above all, the background for houses comparable to those preserved forever on film by the Hollywood studios, houses that surround Niavaran Palace, the last residence of the Shah and whose doors are now guarded, day and night, by the "guardians of the Revolution," the new army that is theoretically to gradually replace the Pahlavis' formidable war machine.

At about 1,200 meters, the people in the north rub elbows with the bazaar, the shantytowns, and the lumpen proletariat of the southern district reveals a contrast that is unique in the world -- perhaps it is also visible in Rio de Janeiro -- where overwhelming wealth and the most abject poverty provide the reasons for the upheaval in Iran.

There are no visible traces of the battle in Teheran, or if there are, they are scarcely noticeable: the burned facades of what was once a theater, night club or bank; here and there, bullet holes or broken windows. But the walls of Teheran, like the walls of any capital emerging from a revolution or a phase of revolution, contain this veritable epic or at least propose a reading of it which, while it may not be exhaustive, is nevertheless much more complete than the caricature painted abroad of an upheaval that is said to have been based on subjective factors.

It is a long and serious undertaking to try to come close to, understand and analyze the many factors that contributed to the Iranian Revolution, an undertaking that one could not honestly try to complete in the confines of this article.

Iranian religious circles situate the beginning of the revolution in January 1978, when an article signed by the then minister of information (executed

during the first days after the triumph of the revolution) and inspired, it is said, by the minister to the Court, Abbas Howeida (who was also executed), appeared in the Teheran press. The article was a direct and violent attack on Ayatollah Khomeini, who was then in exile in Iraq. There were protests and demonstrations in Qom, which were savagely put down by machine guns. The cycle of demonstrations and repression began, in Qom and then in the other large cities in the country, subsequently spreading throughout Iran before it reached Teheran in an ebb and flow movement. One day in Tabriz, in Mehed the next, then on to Abadan or Teheran....

The Iranians buried their dead and, in keeping with Shi'ite tradition, met every third, seventh and fortieth day at the cemeteries, where the freshly dug graves bore witness to the murderous violence of the repression.

It was the birth, or rather, the rediscovery, of an ideological doctrine: Islam, which comes into contact with an actual, objective situation and naturally adopts it.

Opposition to the Pahlavi regime is not recent. It has long existed and in the country's history, had previously reached a climax in the action of Mohammed Mossadegh, the man of whom it is now said that he arrived too soon. He not only shook the throne of the Shah of Iran, but made the United States and the regional power at the time, Great Britain, tremble.

The 1953 coup d'etat, promoted by the CIA, and its many vicissitudes which help to provide an understanding of Iran today, left the concept of national independence and of the Iranian identity strongly implanted. It also left the real existence of an aversion -- long contained but widespread -- to the foreign hold over national resources and to the idea of the type of society that the Shah wanted to impose on the Iranian people. Against this background, one must consider that the monarchical nature of the Iranian Government and its declared alliance with the imperialist powers, particularly with respect to the accumulation of capital and its reinjection into a restricted circle (close to the Court), led to unequal development whose victims were the peasants driven from the country by the "white revolution," the Bazaris dominated by foreign capital and the intellectuals decimated by the SAVAK.

In addition to the latter, there is the emergence of a working class, particularly in the industrial oil zone of Abadan and in the industrial mountain areas surrounding the big cities, mainly Teheran. An essentially urban guerrilla movement existed, but its actions were minimized or quite simply concealed by the Shah's regime. However, it was not long before they became known to the people and exaggerated by rumors.

By way of historical reference, one can say -- paying proper heed to relativity -- that the Iranian revolution contained the germs that were at the root of the English, French and Soviet revolutions: a peasant class in the case of the first, a merchant bourgeoisie in the case of the second, and finally, a working class in the case of the third. However, whether taken

separately or combined, these factors -- to which one must add the urban guerrillas, born of the harsh repression -- could not alone have shaken the profound structure of the regime. Because of the development of multi-faceted protest and as the result of reaction, these factors would certainly have brought increasingly savage repression and intervention by outside forces. Moreover, this is what happened with the first massacres at the beginning of 1978. A smokescreen of liberalization provided various political groupings with the possibility of making their voices heard and therefore, of activating the explosion. But indisputably, the different social classes that were a leaven of the Iranian revolution, all the victims of the same decision-making center, could not have constituted a real, united force capable of changing the course of history without the sudden and unexpected awakening of the formidable power which Islam is. Nor could they have without the intransigence of an old man, who by means of messages spread on cassettes, battered down all the schemes for a power takeover: Ayatollah Khomeini.

Neither the solution advanced straight off during a time of disarray, a solution that was to lead to a Napoleonic-type bourgeois regime and that would have been the strict minimum of the struggle of the Iranian people, nor the threat of military power made the exiled Ayatollah back down.

The Iranian Army joined the popular thrust of its own accord. Thus, the Air Force that opposed the Shah's Pretorian guard -- "the Immortals" -- found itself much closer to the workers from the industrial belt of Teheran, perhaps because of their technical training, but especially due to their social origins. Furthermore, the Bakhtiari solution disappeared by itself through the decay of the government and the sharing of power with the rebellious, uprising people and finally, the thin fabric of the upper Iranian bourgeoisie.

Without any major hitch, the departure of the Shah on 16 January, the arrival of Khomeini on 1 February, the veritable uprising in Teheran and the euphoria of the days of triumph made it possible to proclaim the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

One diplomat in Teheran said: "Bringing down the dictatorship of the Shah was relatively easy. The despotism of the Pahlavi regime brought everyone into agreement. However, achieving a national consensus now in order to solve immediate questions appears to be more difficult."

Two years during the "time of the Shah," the observation of the revolution -- from behind the windows of his residence, naturally, but also through a network of relations involved in all the Iranian movements, organizations and parties -- make this diplomat a man whom newspaper jargon would label as a "seasoned observer."

The total absence of a national consensus at present and the impossibility of achieving one in the near future are confirmed by the many discussions we have had and the information supplied to us in the Iranian capital.

At the top of the ladder, first of all, a certain confusion (deliberately maintained?) presides over the overall progress of the Islamic Republic. One cannot quite understand who truly holds the reins of power, the prevailing impression being that there are two decision-making centers: that of Ayatollah Khomeini, who from Qom dictates the main lines to be followed by the revolution, and that of Prime Minister Bazargan, who is in charge of translating them into action in the capital, which is not always the case. One example: Ayatollah Khomeini decided to provide free electricity to the poorest strata of the Iranian population, which were plunged into total poverty by the 6-month strike (during the revolution) and the failure to resume economic activity. This decision is not being applied by the administration, inasmuch as the government deems it to be completely irrational.

Another example: The breaking off of diplomatic relations between Teheran and Cairo was decided upon and announced in Qom by Ayatollah Khomeini, when at the same time in the Iranian capital, the Egyptian ambassador was being received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was assured "of the continuity of relations between Egypt and the Islamic Republic."

The third example concerns the conduct of the trials instituted by the revolutionary tribunal and the results, mainly the death penalties (some 250 persons have been executed in Teheran since the triumph of the revolution, while over 4,000 accused persons were released after being tried). Everything is being done in Teheran to moderate what some call "the revolutionary fervor" of Ayatollah Khomeini, the presiding magistrate of the revolutionary tribunal, who, reacting to attacks from the high administration, presented his resignation to Ayatollah Khomeini, but the resignation was not accepted.

This contradiction, or at any rate, this apparent lack of unity between Qom and Teheran, is generally viewed as a concerted practice between the religious leader and the head of the government.

The first, who makes decisions sometimes deemed to be "extremist" and therefore difficult to apply, has the role of remaining, in the eyes of the Iranian people, the pure, hard man without whom nothing could be done and therefore, with whom everything can be done. It is up to Prime Minister Bazargan to be considered by the Iranian masses as a brake on the revolutionary process.

A second hypothesis, which is considered scarcely valid in Teheran, is that there is a basic divergence between the Ayatollah and Bazargan. The handful of observers who follow this hypothesis believe that it is supported by the improvisation of Ayatollah Khomeini, whose political action is not as coherent as it was when he was in exile, where he was surrounded by competent advisers, while today in Qom, the Imam's entourage is essentially family-oriented and religious.

It is said that while the Qom decisions are generally not in principle in keeping with the profound nature of the Iranian revolution, they are not all, for reasons of timeliness, necessarily of top priority. So much for the responsibility -- if such responsibility exists -- of the Ayatollah in this lack of unity. Certain Khomeini supporters -- everyone in Iran claims to be one -- who are joining the Iranian left believe that the majority of the members of Bazargan's government are essentially bourgeois and that the difficult phase Iran is now experiencing enable him, by indirectly or subtly opposing the man from Qom, to rally around him that section of Iranian society (Bazaris, technical-merchant bourgeoisie, upper- and intermediate-level personnel, the oil caste) which, while it did enter into a tactical alliance with the Iranian masses in order to fight against the Shah's regime, is now discovering that its concerns and future are not necessarily those of the majority. Even certain strata of Iranian society that are far from having any privileges to defend are now reportedly disenchanted with the course of events.

It is not that Ayatollah Khomeini has lost its grandiose following: Qom has become a place of pilgrimage and the people who go there every day from the most remote corners of Iran often spend several hours, with religious fervor and innocent good faith, waiting for the appearance and words of the old imam. It is therefore scarcely likely that a party or organization from either extreme of the Iranian political spectrum would directly attack the Ayatollah, since the result could only be an uncontrollable reaction on the part of the people and in any case, with a contrary effect. That is why, if the person of the imam is never the target, the attacks are aimed at three personages considered to be the grey eminences of the Iranian revolutionary process: Ebrahim Yazdi, minister of foreign affairs, formerly minister in charge of revolutionary affairs, accused of pro-Americanism; then he is not named as a CIA agent because he lived in the United States for some 20 years; Banisadr, economic adviser to the Ayatollah and responsible for the strategy to be adopted in order to bring the Iranian economy out of the stagnation in which it is sinking, who brings about a protest every time the terms "economic independence" and "nationalization" are pronounced; and finally, Sadek Ghotabdeh, director of the Voice of the Revolution (radio and television) who is in charge of the ideological field and accused of not giving an objective account of the national situation.

But the questions that are asked in Teheran about this two-headed government or this distribution of roles between Ayatollah Khomeini and Bazargan are not enough, even if they do help one to come close to the Iranian situation, to provide an understanding of Iran at the present time.

The many facets of this muted and sometimes violent struggle being waged in country in turmoil and the confrontation of ideas that exists in the political machinery but also in the streets often escape analysis since nearly all the parties claim to follow Islam and its liberating contents. At the present time, Iran is a rather hazy mosaic in which the color green is naturally dominant, even if at times it is claimed with a cheekiness which reveals an opportunism that does not stand up to the slightest argument.

"There is one single Islam, but in Iran and elsewhere, there is one or several interpretations of Islam. One can distinguish different trends in the country. Let us not forget that the Shah himself claimed to follow the Holy Book. It was Islam being claimed for oppression, the Islam of the feudal reactionaries. There is also an interpretation of the message given by the liberal bourgeoisie, the interpretation of a middle class, and finally, the one that seems to us to be the most just and the one for which we are fighting: the interpretation of the ideas of progress, liberation and social justice that are contained in the Koran."

These remarks were made by Messaoud Radjavi, leader of the Moudjahidine Khalq (Moudjahidine of the people), who added: "No third path or Muslim brothers. We believe in revolutionary Islam, the Islam of the liberation of exploited peoples, an Islam with the prospect of a classless, united society. If Iran becomes a second Saudi Arabia, then why did we bring down the Shah's dictatorship?"

The organization of the Moudjahidine Khalq was formed in 1964 and has waged essentially urban guerrilla warfare.

Radjavi is the only survivor of the group of founders, some having fallen in battle and some having been tortured to death. Radjavi himself was arrested and was only saved thanks to international action. This organization is without any doubt one of the ones that best express the sociocultural fabric of the Iranian people and their aspirations, for beyond its long-term objective, which is described by many people in Teheran as "idealistic," its minimum program states that "American imperialism is the main enemy" and contains a series of proposals aimed straight at economic independence.

Officially speaking and beyond the umbilical cord of the ideology that has sustained the Iranian revolutionary movement, Islam, it is an organization that has no ties with the Shi'ite "hierarchy." Certain religious leaders in the Ayatollah's entourage consider the organization to be on a par with the Fidayine Tehaly (Marxists), but in the Iranian capital, it is said semi-officially that Ayatollah Taleghani has very strong feelings of sympathy for the Moudjahidine.

In general, the Iranian religious movement is no longer as homogeneous as it was when it was a question of mobilizing the masses to fight the Shah's dictatorship. Even if the contradictions are not clearly or precisely apparent in the light of day or veiled by the presence of Ayatollah Khomeini, the existence of two major Islamic parties: the Party of the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Rafsandjani (recently the victim of an active attempt by the Forghan group, the terrorist organization about which little is known and which has claimed credit for the assassination of Ayatollah Moutahari, president of the Council of the Revolution) and the Democratic Party of the Islamic Republic, created, it is said, at the prompting of Ayatollah Shariat Madari, illustrates the contradictions that exist within the leadership of the religious movement or at least, a latent conflict that could emerge with respect to choices to be made.

Whatever the case, the minimum program of the Moudjahidine does not seem to bring the Islamic parties into agreement. Like nearly all Iranian parties and movements, it has a very limited conception of national independence that is presented by those close to the religious leaders. It is a conception based on old factors and totally uninformed about the foundations for a modern independence, an independence with economic dimensions. It mobilizes supporters on the sole basis of the militant rank and file and political alliances, elements completely outdated in the Iranian situation.

Actually, the concept of national independence and the matter of the main enemy are without a doubt the two factors that reveal the real position of the different parties and thereby make it possible to understand the analysis of the situation made by the Moudjahidine Khalq on the political hue of Islam when diversely interpreted. With regard to the so-called "lay" movements, the National Front of Karim Sanjabi, former minister of foreign affairs, and the National Democratic Front of Nafin Daftari, grandson of Dr Mossadegh, and the moderation and advanced liberal bent which they proclaim, clearly situate them on the political spectrum. Their current concerns, at least those openly stated, particularly involve democratic freedoms and the so-called independent press, which has incurred the wrath of the religious movement by overly emphasizing the negative aspects of the Iranian process, considered to be an act directed against the revolution as a whole.

The Fidayine Khalq, the second guerrilla organization which along with the Moudjahidine Khalq entered the armed struggle against the Shah, are also well-known. They claim to be Marxist and did not participate in the referendum on the Islamic Republic, thereby expressing their disagreement with the proposed wording, deeming it to be limiting and undemocratic. They have gone back underground, as the Moudjahidine could do, out of their fear of being disarmed and because of the violent attacks directed against them in religious circles but also from the Toudeh, the Iranian Communist Party.

This party, the Toudeh, has achieved the unwanted feat of finding itself practically in the position of the Shah in 1978. All of Iran's difficulties are attributed to it.

The debate that could have clarified all positions has vanished in thin air and instead of considering the current position of the Toudeh, people are content, from one end of the political spectrum to the other -- except for the Moudjahidine -- to recall the action of the Iranian Communist Party in 1953.

In fact, one interpretation of Iran's recent history would have one believe that the 1953 coup d'etat is "to be credited with the irresponsible outflanking of Dr Mossadegh by the Toudeh."

Consequently, it is the consolidation of a veritable 1953 syndrome that one is seeing in Teheran, where the Toudeh, according to its secretary

general Kianouri, has nevertheless come out for an Islamic republic behind Khomeini and for socialism in Iran with "the Muslim people of Iran because one cannot import another people."

In other words, American imperialism is not the main enemy for everyone. Among Iranian officials, the theory of the "two imperialisms" is making progress and everything is being done to initiate among the masses an anti-communist feeling that is not solely aimed at the Leninist philosophy but is broadened to include all Iranian forces of progress, including the Moudjahidine Khalq, which with respect to religious beliefs and Islam do not seem to need any lessons.

Along with the struggle of ideas and being a natural part of it is the concept of economic independence. The movement of the Moudjahidine Khalq is not the only movement that defends the idea of a recovery of national resources and government appropriation of the many economic circuits.

Bani Sair, who is considered to be the theoretician of Islamic socialism, believes that "the fall of the old regime is a crisis of the system. Islam has its economy, a realistic economy on the condition that no time is lost rebuilding a system that has already been destroyed." Clearly, this man, who is said to be very close to Ayatollah Khomeini, reveals that in the country, there are those who want to make fundamental changes in the economic structures versus those who want to keep them as they are.

Any any rate, the government has no program. We asked Deputy Prime Minister Abas Amir Entezam whether nationalizations were included in the program, but he replied merely that "specialists are studying the question" and that he could not give all the details required by such a subject.

At the same time, Bazargan's government is trying, as one Iranian university professor put it, "to take care of an economy eaten away by a virus." Some 500 million rials (1 rial = 5.5 centimes) were allocated to try to get some industries in the private sector back on their feet, most of them being assembly industries which, with the exception of oil, the petrochemical industry and the big Isfahan steelmill, make up the essential portion of Iranian factories. During a televised broadcast, the prime minister even made an appeal to the manufacturers who have left the country, some with billions, to come back to the country with the assurance of receiving loans. It is true that the Iranian economy is in rather a serious situation. Oil production -- meaning foreign exchange revenue -- has resumed a rate of 4 million barrels per day, but on the whole, the economy is operating at only 50 to 60 percent of its real capacity.

It should also be added that while an exceptional grain crop is expected and that while Iran, with a population of 40 million, is capable, according to experts, to feed as many as 100 million inhabitants, the state of agriculture is catastrophic. A major exporter a few years ago, Iran now produces 2 million tons of grain and is forced to import 4 million tons in order to meet its total needs. But once again, while the government coffers are far

from empty and while oil revenue causes Iranians to look to the future with optimism, the present has reached the point of alarm: Actual unemployment has gone up to 2.5 to 3 million persons and "invisible" unemployment affects over 1 million.

Another subject for concern is the fact that the weakness of the central government has resulted in an autonomistic push that has gone beyond the framework of the ethnic groups and now even involves certain tribes. Consequently, in addition to the Kurd, the Turkmens, the Arabs and the Baluchis, who are demanding autonomy which the Iranian constitution being drafted could grant in a way that would preserve the country's unity, one now has the demand for special status of major tribes such as the Bakhtiari in the central region of the country. It would seem that this type of problem, while it is currently very real and sometimes requires that Ayatollah Taleghani to travel in the interior "in order to calm people down," will not pose a major threat to the unity of Iran, obviously if the central government soon regains its power that was damaged in several areas by the shakeup of the Iranian superstructure.

Actually, the danger that could stem from this autonomistic movement could be international in scope. Due to the human geography of these ethnic groups, which straddle borders, numerous observers say that concrete autonomy would not fail to snowball and in certain countries bordering on Iran, constitute a real factor of destabilization. This could then bring about international complications endangering peace and stability in the region. But the immediate danger is elsewhere: in the Forghan group, a terrorist movement that aims at the most visible elements of the religious movement and about which little is known other than that these crimes help the rightist faction in Iran due to the accusations leveled against the Tudeh and the Fidayine Khalq, accusations that were naturally denied by the highest religious authorities, but that helped to heighten even further the intolerance that has so far characterized the progressive Islamic movement of the Moudjahidine Khalq.

One must also recall that out of the 3,500 SAVAK agents, only a few hundred have been arrested. Nearly 3,000 SAVAK agents are still at large and many Iranians believe that a large number of them have infiltrated the new regime, even gaining seats on the committees credited with several incidents.

Can it be said that the picture painted here is a pessimistic image of Iran? No. Rather, it is a rather faithful reproduction of the Iranian situation, which on the whole is normal at this stage of the revolutionary process. If a comparison is permitted, it is somewhat like the early months after Algeria gained its independence, with a much more complex fight for power.

In Teheran, we saw 100,000 persons, who could scarcely be contained on the immense university campus, turn toward Mecca and utter the oft repeated "Allah Ouakbar." We heard 100,000 persons chant a verse from the Koran, led by a young mullah.

We saw 100,000 persons raise their arms to the heavens, shouting the name of Ayatollah Khomeini and applauding a speech which denounced "those who are

trying to seize the revolution." We also read a graffiti in the Iranian capital: "The Shah has left; now it is the Americans' turn." But above all, we were profoundly impressed by the formidable power of a human mass that is roused and stirs at the very mention of the name of Ayatollah Khomeini. This is certainly the truest image of Iran. Everything therefore depends on this 79-year-old man, who must bring the Iranian revolution out of the impasse toward which it is headed.

[Boxed text]

The goal assigned to the "white revolution" by the former Shah was quite simply to make Iran an agriculturally dependent nation. It was Ali Azafian, editor in chief of the JOURNAL DE LA REVOLUTION ISLAMIQUE and a university professor, who made the comment. And in fact, Iran, a country that exported wheat, onions and other commodities, has now become an importer.

First of all, the Iranian peasants were driven from the rural areas by the introduction of excessive mechanization and by outright eviction. Next, Iranian wealth brought about the drop in prices of the country's products by the frantic importation of anything presented as a foreign, particularly Israeli, product. Consequently, since the revolution and the closing of the Iranian market, Israeli products have been dumped on the European markets at the lowest prices.

Main Forces Now in Iran

The Party of the Islamic Republic (religious); the National Party of the Islamic Republic (religious); the National Front ("lay," centrist); the National Democratic Front ("lay," follower of Mossadegh); the Moudjahidine Khalq (Islamic progressives); the Tude [sic] (communist); the Fidayine Khalq (Marxist); the Moudjahidine of Islam (religious extremists); the Forghan (extreme right terrorists); and the Savak agents still at large.

[Corporations, Investments]

Some 196 foreign companies, 48 of them American, are prospering in Iran. These are companies in which the majority is foreign capital. These investments are mainly concentrated in agroindustry, mining and chemical and pharmaceutical products.

In addition, there are foreign investments in 215 Iranian companies set up as partnerships. These figures do not include investments in partnership with the government.

11,464
CSO: 4900

OFFICIAL DETAILS REGIME'S DIVESTMENT PROGRAM

Quetta BALUCHISTAN TIMES in English 14 Jun 79 p 3

[Article by William Branigin]

[Text]

TEHRAN —

After canceling nearly all the Shah's arms deals with the United States and other foreign countries, Iran is now on the verge of scrapping at least \$34 billion worth of its civil projects — including four nuclear power stations — that are already under way or on the drawing board.

In the latest move to dismantle the deposed monarch's grandiose development plans and turn the country's economic priorities around, the new head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has called for the cancellation of two nuclear power plants that are more than three-quarters complete near Bushehr on the Gulf.

Though the government has not yet officially terminated the contracts, the statement by Fereidun Sahabi appears to doom prospects that construction work on the plants will resume. The work ground to a halt during the revolutionary turmoil last winter when hundreds of foreign engineers left the country.

The two 1,200-megawatt units were being built by West Germany's Kraftwerk Union under a 1976 contract. They were to have been the first of some 20 nuclear power stations to be installed in Iran by 1994.

The rest of the program, including two French plants under construction at a site on the Karun River in south-western Iran, has already been scrubbed.

So have other multibillion-dollar projects ranging from an entire "city center" in Tehran, a new Tehran airport and a steel mill near Isfahan — all in various stages of planning or site preparation. Other major projects on which construction already had begun are still technically "under study" by the provisional revolutionary government, but several of them are now considered dead.

These include a \$1 billion gas pipeline from the Gulf to the Soviet Union, a \$2.4 billion six-lane highway from Tehran to the Gulf port of Bandar-abbaspour and a \$1.3 billion subway system for the capital.

Iran has already spent several billion dollars on these and other projects likely to be written off and stands to see huge investments come to nothing. To push them through, however, would entail even greater spending, the return of legions of foreign experts and renewed emphasis on big remote projects — all politically unacceptable under the new government.

While dismantling Iran's nuclear power plant program, the authorities will have to decide what to do with some of the Shah's other atomic energy investments aimed at guaranteeing fuel supplies for Iranian reactors. Iran has purchased about 28,000 tons of uranium that it now cannot use.

One aspect of the Shah's nuclear program that officials intend to pursue, however, is exploration for uranium in Iran.

"Uranium is one of the resources we have to evaluate," said Mansour Rabi, executive of the Iranian Atomic Agency. "If we don't use it ourselves, we can always market it abroad."

Two years ago Iran launched a \$300 million, 10-year exploration program using aerial surveys with sophisticated detection equipment. A French, Australian and West German consortium was awarded the contract.

With a few major exceptions, the new regime seems determined to finish non-nuclear projects on which massive amounts of money have already been spent and whose construction is well along. Most of these projects are for conventional power plants, roads, railways, or port facilities, and the contracts are generally smaller.

The biggest project on this list is the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Co. complex at Bandarabepour on the Gulf. Despite cost runups, it has been given the go-ahead by Ayatollah Khomeini largely because it is 85 per cent complete.

Costs are up to \$1.8 billion while it was originally supposed to cost \$1.5 billion. The complex will probably end up costing 3.2 billion before it is finished.

Another large project facing much the same problem with its eventual production is the Sardrud copper mining and processing complex in southeastern Iran.

In the final stages of construction by a consortium that includes Anaconda and Parsons-Jardine of the United States, the project stopped during the revolution as did most others, and it is expected to exceed its \$1.6 billion price tag at completion.

A \$400 million housing project, in which Starrett Corp. of the United States was building 15,000 apartment units west of Tehran in partnership with French and Israeli firms, is likely to be completed with new contractors, government sources said.

Construction of a steel mill with capacity of 825 million tons per year is to go ahead with the same contractors, which include Kaiser and Grindall-Dresser of the United States.

In addition to the four nuclear power stations, major projects suspended and facing cancellation include:

- A \$2.4 billion highway from Tehran to Bandarabepour, sections of which have been awarded to Italy's Moriconi-Kandiani and a French firm.

- A \$1.2 billion airport 25 miles south of Tehran designed by the New York architectural firm, Tamm.

- A \$1.4 billion electrified railway from Tehran to Tabriz designed by Britain's Transmark.

- A \$2.6 billion "Shahr-e Pahlavi" Tehran city center planned by Britain's Llewellyn-Davies.

- A \$1 billion-plus telecommunications project awarded to American Bell International.

- A one million tons per year steel mill near Isfahan contracted to British Steel Corp. and worth \$1.1 billion.

- The \$3 billion gas pipeline to deliver natural gas to the Soviet Union.

'CARAVANS' FILM DRAMATIZES IRANIAN DILEMMA

Brussels SPECIAL in French 31 May 79 pp 57-60

[Article: "Cinema: the Iran of the Mullahs as Seen by the Shah"]

[Text] The irony of fate, shortly before his fall the shah financed a spectacular film to illustrate the excesses of traditional Iran--the Iran of the mullahs and Islamic justice. "Caravans"--that is the name of this super-production--demonstrates that fiction joins reality, or even surpasses it. Here, exclusively, are the best photos from this prophetic work.

A best seller, \$12,000,000, 10,000 walk-ons, 200 technicians, six months of being sidetracked in Iran, six months assembling in Germany, 10 stars, including Anthony Quinn, Jennifer O'Neil, Michael Sarrazin, Christopher Lee, Barry Sullivan, Joseph Cotten. The full London Philharmonic Orchestra, conducted by the young composer Mike Batt, was assembled just a few months ago for the first--and no doubt the last--American-Iranian super coproduction, "Caravans," taken from the famous James Michener novel and staged by James Fargo, the producer of Clint Eastwood's main films. And this film which was to show the savagery of Iran before the advent of the shah, in fact describes, with strange premonition, Iran as it is today in the hands of the mullahs.

Faithful to his policy in this field as in so many others, the shah of Iran had desired for his country a triumphal entry into the film industry. There, too, Iran should properly be counted among the biggest. Disparaging, critical, dishonored but inarguably "modern", the shah had a large outlook. He wanted Iran to jump several centuries in a few years. In the sovereign's mind the methods, the imperfections were not very important. At the beginning of the 21st century Iran was to be one of the world's five great powers.

This idyllic scheme, which was to make his fellow citizens happy, no doubt went through a Westernization for the shah which is rejected today, but in particular went through an all-out industrialization in all fields, including the audio-visual field--and therefore, the cinema.

To Reza Pahlavi, if America--which he believed to be his preferred ally--had been able to impose its predominance on the world, if it had been able to solve some of its internal problems, such as the black problem, this was mostly because it knew how to create for itself a strong cinematographic industry that not only was profitable, but turned out to be one of the most powerful means of disseminating America's "official" opinions, economic principles and what is properly called "the American way of life."

"Caravans" was the ideal novel. It described an imaginary Middle Eastern country near Iran and Afghanistan in 1948, when Islamic justice still prevailed, presided over by the mullahs, with its floggings, its summary executions and its horrible law of retaliation.

About 20 scenarios were written and finally the version created by Tom McMahon and Nancy Voyles Crawford was kept. The young authors conceived the scenario in such a way that the final production presents, in fascinating, lively and constantly-changing scenes, an exciting and extremely colorful adventure. The danger of producing a travelogue was avoided. They made a success of an astonishing--explosive--mixture of authentic personalities and specific scenes of that country which is unique in its conception of nature, in its conception of freedom and in its amazing fanaticism.

"Caravans" was to be a big epic film, a thrilling and colorful film, combining at the same time romance, adventure, eroticism, exoticism, action, drama and realism, all in addition to actuality, while staying within contemporary history. An incredible irony of fate: several weeks ago, when "Caravans" had just had its successful opening in a world premiere at New York's Radio City--reopened for the occasion--images were strangely made factual, adding to its realism; these images have been Iranian actuality for three months.

Reality surpasses fiction. The Iranian regime has been swept away. The shah is leaving Iran. Religious fanaticism, like a tidal wave, rises again out of the past with its medieval laws and its trail of barbarism. The mullahs seize the power. The Islamic tribunals are established, with their summary executions.

What Michener described in 1948, what the shah wanted to show as a completed past, is there today, as if "Caravans" had ended several weeks ago. "Caravans", which was financed for the most part by Iran with the shah's approval, was to show the world, among other things, what Iran was like before the reign of the Pahlavis: a divided country without authority in which only the mullahs had any power; a country with its autonomous tribes, its arms traffic with its abuses of all kinds; a country in which insecurity was general.

Transposing to the cinema this extraordinary James Michener novel, which had been translated into more than 20 languages, was to show the world the splendors of Iran, its monuments, its palaces, its scenery--now desert, now mountainous, but always infinitely beautiful. It is all there on the screen, nothing is changed, the film is a pleasure for the eyes. Adventure is present, but today it is in addition the sad reflection of the actuality.

No one could have imagined in December 1978 that "Caravans", which would come out in a few weeks on the screens of all Europe, would become a film of burning reality in which Iran would be seen to live with horror through the period that Miller (Michael Sarrazin), through the talent of James Michener and the magic of James Fargo, would discover, first skeptical, then horrified, finally revolted.

A sad irony of fate, as we said before, that the shah, in financing this super-production, demanded only one thing: that a short film showing today's Iran, "his Iran", should precede showings of "Caravans." That 12-minute film, put out by the "Caravans" team, will never be shown. A nonetheless extraordinary spectacle lasting two hours makes you relive the adventure of Miller (Michael Sarrazin) in his search for Ellen (Jennifer O'Neil). A film intended to bear fictional witness to a past that was over, a film that no one could imagine was premonitory.

1948, Kashkan, the capital of Zadastan, an imaginary country of the Middle East. Mark Miller, an attache at the American Embassy, is given the mission of finding a young, pretty compatriot, Ellen Jaspar, the daughter of an influential senator, whose parents have had no news of her since her marriage to a certain Col Nazrullah, and her departure for Kashkan.

From the moment of his arrival in that country, which is unknown to him, Miller discovers the reality of Islamic intransigence. Two American soldiers are walking in a marketplace; they meet two young girls whose faces are hidden by chadors, evidently they have an appointment. Together, they are disappearing into an alley, when suddenly a mullah notices them and calls upon Allah and the crowd to immediately condemn the "double crime" about to be committed. The world's oldest profession is forbidden by Islam--at least by the mullahs--and is even more condemnable when it involves young Muslims and "pagans." After saving his countrymen from being lynched, Miller meets Sardar Khan (Christopher Lee), who is both prime minister and Nazrullah's uncle, a man who lives in luxury but has little power.

In 1948 power belonged to the tribes the army was trying to control; today, not much imagination is needed to transpose. The power is in the street and the tribes, which are partly sedentary, have become autonomists.

With the prime minister's "authorization" Miller then takes the difficult desert road to Badek, where he is arrested by the local "police."

Searching for Ellen, from adventure to adventure, Miller discovers everything that separates this country from Western civilization: its principles, its organization and the ways and customs of a thousand-year-old country whose laws have evolved very little with time (no one could imagine how little), but which nevertheless desired to modernize. Mystery, hostility, the conflict of civilizations merely complicate Miller's mission.

He is shown the door by Col Nazrullah, who will refuse Miller the right to meet his wife, Ellen, but will introduce to him his second wife and his son. "When she married me, Ellen married the customs of my country. Her life,

what she has become, does not concern you; you do not have to meet her, I alone have the right to speak in her name," affirms Col Nazrullah. Meanwhile, equality of men and women was proclaimed by the shah, equality in everything, including torture.

On the basis of some succinct information from a doctor, Miller resumes his journey and his search. Having broken down deep in the desert, he is awakened with a start by two camel-drivers with hangdog looks, who lead him under threat of their weapons to a nomad camp. A new similarity: in that period, as today, weapons are in the street and in the hands of everyone.

To his great surprise Miller discovers Ellen there; she has chosen "freedom", which meant to abandon everything to live the simple life of the nomads, but also to follow their chief, Kochi Zulfiqar (Anthony Quinn).

Forced to accompany the caravan, Miller ends up appreciating this world that was hostile at the outset; he even takes up their defense against the army's extortions. He tries unsuccessfully to save from death a young boy sentenced by an Islamic tribunal to be publicly slaughtered for a history of bad morals.

Miller reacts vigorously against the law of retaliation, according to which the violator is disfigured, his face burned with a torch; he finally revolts against Col Nazrullah, who, carrying out an order--no one knows from whom--causes the army to intervene, with its cannons, its tanks and its whole murderous arsenal against the members of the Kochi tribe, who only desire freedom, autonomy, even at the price of some trading.

One thinks one is dreaming, looking at these images, so close to the reality of the Kurdistan confrontations last April.

Here--thanks to the shah's dollars--fiction surpasses reality. Of course, the Ayatollah Khomeyni does not appear in the credits of "Caravans"--not really, for he is everywhere in this Pahlavi super-production.

8946

CSO: 4900

EXPORTS FOR 1978 SHOW GROWTH

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 12 Jun 79 p 5

[Text]

The State Organisation of Export continued its efforts during 1978 to expand non-oil export as well as attaining the other objectives of changing the structure of exports by increasing the share of manufactured goods in total non-oil exports.

The exports that are handled through the State Organisation of Exports (SOE) reached about ID. 33.4 m in 1978 compared with ID. 20.9 m in 1977 i.e. an increase of 60%. The exports by the (S.O.E) constituted about half the total of Iraq's non-oil exports in 1977.

Exports are carried directly or indirectly by the State Organisation of Export by issuing export licences to private exporters. The direct exports reached ID. 30.4 millions in 1978 exceeding those of the previous year by 76%. They are handled mainly by the Iraqi Dates Administration (I.D.A) and the Iraqi Co. for Exports (I.C.E). The exports by the (I.D.A) reached about ID. 14.0 m in 1978 compared with about ID. 11.0 m in 1977 while the exports by the (I.C.E) increased from ID. 9.6 m in 1977 to ID. 18.0 m in 1978, i.e. an expansion of 91%. The exports by these two establishments accounted for about 90% of the total exports of the State Organisation.

As for the indirect exports they reached about ID. 2.9 m in 1978 which are lower than those of 1977 by about 20%.

Considering the commodity pattern of exports food-stuff and live animals accounted for about 47% of total exports by the State Organization and out of this group dates make about ID. 15 m or 95%. The chemical products reached ID. 11.0 m in 1978 or about one third of total exports. About 90% of these products are accounted for by chemical fertilizers.

The exports of non-food raw materials reached ID. 2.2 m in 1978 which are about 6.7% of total exports. Wool makes about 40% of the total exports of this group. As for the machinery and equipments, their exports were also ID. 2.2 m, like those of raw materials. Trucks make about 77% of the total exports of this group, the rest includes of fluorescent lights, television sets, radios, cars, tractors, bicycles etc.

The exports of other manufactured goods reached ID. 1.4 m which is about 4.3% of total exports of the State Organisation. These include leather, blankets, asbestos products, cement etc.

As for the geographical distribution of exports, the socialist countries imported about a third of total exports by the State Organisation or ID. 10.9 m in 1978 compared with ID. 7.1 m in 1977, i.e. an increase of over 50%. China had the biggest share of our exports which reached a total of ID. 6.7 m followed by the Soviet Union which imported about ID. 2.8 m. In the third place came Cuba with less than half a million Iraqi Dinars.

The Asian (non-socialist) countries imported 27% of the State Organisation's exports which were about ID. 9.0 m in 1978 compared with only ID. 2.6 m in 1977. Among this group Pakistan comes in the first place followed by India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Iran and Indonesia.

The Arab countries come in the third place in terms of importance as markets for Iraqi exports. Dates make about 17.5% of the total exports to this group. About 72% of exports to this group were handled by the Iraqi Co. for Exports.

The exports to North America reached ID. 2.3 m or about 8.3% of the total of exports by the Organisation. These exports are made up mainly of dates. The West European countries also imported ID. 2.3 m of the State Organisation's exports in 1978 and this exceeds those of 1977 by one third. The U.K. is the largest market for our exports within this group followed by Italy, France etc.

FIRST QUARTER EXPORTS SHOW INCREASE OVER LAST YEAR

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 11 Jun 79 p 4, 7

[Text] During the first quarter of this year exports from Iraq rose by 23 percent of the overall value of exports of the same period of 1978. The value of these exports was 8,061,055 Iraqi dinars. They comprised dates, tractors, electrical components, blankets, fertilizers, trucks, wool, oil and gas heaters, medicines, detergents, and folk crafts in addition to animal and agricultural products. Dates represented the most important exported item for the period as their value attained nearly 4.4 million dinars and were exported to 16 Arab and foreign countries. Next in importance was fertilizers, the exported value of which reached 853,000 dinars, followed next in order of importance, industrial parts, agricultural and animal products, and construction materials. The overall value of industrial exports during the first quarter of 1979 was nearly 1.5 million dinars.

A reliable source in the Ministry of Commerce revealed that the bulk of exports went to other Arab countries, 32 percent of all Iraqi exports. He said further that the value exported to Syrian was 656,536 dinars and that this was in keeping with the goals of the joint working agreement for the two countries for safeguarding the market needs of both countries' wholesale and commodities commerce. Jordan was the next most important export partner, having purchased exports worth 164,000 dinars.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

RURAL ROAD PROJECT--Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH 11 Jun 79--The Directorate of Roads of the Ta'mim governorate will complete during the second half of the present year nine primary roads whose length will reach 244 kilometers at a cost of more than 13.7 million dinars. The director said that these roads which would be paved in half their length would be divided amongst the governorates of Ta'mim, Salah al-Din, Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil. He explained that the directorate had implemented to date a wide network incorporating 21 principle routes reaching a length of 766 kilometers at a cost of 54.7 million dinars, and which included the South Kirkuk bridge and its approaches. [Text] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 11 Jun 79 p 3]

ELECTRICITY SHORTAGES--Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH 11 Jun--[Complaint from the owner of a flour mill in the 'Uwayrij industrial district outside of Baghdad reporting] Continuing interruptions of electrical current in that district, a condition that has begun to reflect in the damage done to industrial plants and outfits located there due to the suspension of operations and and additional use electrical generators which have caused fires. He indicated that the period of interruptions during the previous month had exceeded 70 hours, as has been officially confirmed by the Public Society for Grain. The Public Electric Utility said in reply to a public complaint that electricity had been restored to the Abu Hayan district in al-Anbar governorate. It had been cut to the district at the beginning of May. [Excerpts] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 11 Jun 79 p 3]

HYDROELECTRIC POWER STATION--Baghdad, 14 Jun--In the middle of July one quarter of the Dukan hydroelectric station in the Sulaymaniyah governorate will go into operation with a capacity of 80 megawatts which is one-fifth of the total projected plant capacity of 400 megawatts. The first unit of the installation was completed for operation in May of 1977, the second in July 1978, while the third was completed in February of this year. The station, the construction of which began in 1975 is tied into five high power lines; amongst which are two lines to Irbil, another two to al-Ta'mim governorate and the remaining line to Sulaymaniyah. The station is scheduled to be completed at the end of the current year. [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 14 Jun 79 p 5]

MEETING OF JOINT COMPANY--Iraq has called for holding an extraordinary meeting of the Arab Company for Drug Industries and Medical Appliances in Tunisia earlier next month. The call came in a telegram sent by Mr. Hassan Ali, RCC Member Minister of Trade, and Iraq's Representative at the Company, to the Chairman of its Board of Directors yesterday. The Minister explained the importance of holding meetings of the Company's Constituent Assembly without the Egyptian Regime, in accordance with the objectives of the Arab Foreign and Economy Ministers Meeting. Mr. Ali also called for agreement on the place and date for the proposed meeting, and inviting members of the Company's General Assembly and Board of Directors to attend the meeting. The Company was founded in 1975 with a capital of fifty million Kuwaiti Dinars. Its Board of Directors includes Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Qatar, the Egyptian Regime, the Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Arab Republic of Yemen. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 11 Jun 79 p 3]

CONTRACTS WITH ITALY--Baghdad, 26 Jun--Iraq signed two contracts with an Italian company here this evening to establish two projects for the production of bricks in Salah ad-Din Governorate, north of Baghdad, and in al-Qadisiyah Governorate, south of Baghdad, at a cost of 27 million Iraqi dinars. Iraqi Revolution Command Council member and Minister of Industry and Minerals Muhammad 'Ayish signed the contracts for Iraq and the Italian company's authorized director signed for the company. The production capacity of the two projects, which will be completed within 19 months, will be 240 million bricks per year. The two projects will employ 400 technical and administrative workers. [Text] [Baghdad INA in Arabic 1845 GMT 26 Jun 79 JN]

CSO: 4802

FINANCE MINISTER'S ECONOMIC PLAN UNDER FIRE

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 May 79 p 15

[Article by David Lipkin: "One Plan Chasing Another"]

[Text] Still under the influence of the index "shock" a number of ministers who had participated in the Government meeting on Sunday came out with severe criticism of the new economic plan which the finance minister has proposed. They have demanded an economic plan with more drastic cuts, which will be able to slow spiraling inflation. For that reason the finance minister was requested to come up with new proposals for additional economic steps. Not 24 hours had passed since the end of the Government meeting, and the finance minister brought the good news that in his sack there was already an additional economic plan, sharper, more meaningful, and even deviating from the accepted.

Whereas the first economic plan that had been proposed about 2 weeks ago required extended deliberations with the Finance Ministry, including investigation of various alternatives, and was modest in that it cut 3.3 billion pounds, the new plan is far more ambitious. A cut has been proposed of about 3 percent of the budgets of all of the Government ministries--while each ministry will decide on implementation of the cuts necessary to save between 4 and 4.5 billion pounds. The plan advocates combining the collection of National Insurance premiums with income taxes, cancellation of commitments of tie-in with the exchange rate and laying off of temporary workers. The new plan has not yet passed through all the stages of approval required, but rather has been dragged out of the drawer of the finance chief and is reminiscent of various sections that have appeared in previous economic plans of the Finance Ministry that never came to the point of implementation. The finance minister is attempting to place into the test of implementation the proclamations of the ministers who are demanding more moderate steps.

The new ambitious economic plan should have generated overall rebellion on the part of all those who will be adversely affected by it, including the Government ministries, the federation of the country's workers, the Manufacturers Federation, etc. But they are relating to this plan with equanimity, confident that its fate will be that of previous economic plans and at most, that this or that section in it will be implemented while all the rest will be stored away in the end.

Without a doubt, the new economic plan in its economic lines aims to hit hard at services for the citizenry and assumes massive layoffs, this in contrast to the previous economic plan which had been proposed 2 weeks ago. In its first stage it will cause a continuation of the acceleration of the high cost of living, and over the long range it will bring a considerable cut in government expenditures for funding services, a step which has been demanded for quite some time.

It is worthwhile to examine the implications of sections of the plan and the opposition which they have evoked:

Cutting of the Budget: A cut at the rate of 3 percent has been proposed in the budgets of the ministries. The meaning of this will be that the ministries will be required to cut their budgets which were designed to provide services to the public, something which will be followed by an increase in the cost of living. But the extent of the cuts will tend to cause cancellation of specific services and their operation at a minimal scale.

In the system of proposed cuts, the suspicion has been created that most of the burden will fall upon the services provided for the needy public and not to those of means. This will be a recognizable shift from the proclaimed policy not to harm the weak.

Layoff of Temporary Workers: Opposition to the idea of the proposed layoffs is voiced within the structure of the Finance Ministry by the civil service commissioner. This section was included in the overall new plan without consultation with him. He unequivocally expressed the view that the competent and talented workers who make possible the functioning of agencies and services are for the most part temporary workers. Their layoffs would shake the foundations. Therefore, it will be possible to lay off only a limited number of temporary workers at most, and this will be of small help to the country's budget.

It is perhaps worthy of mention that even previous proclamations of the Government that new workers would not be hired for the Government apparatus were not honored. Last year the Government apparatus had an increase of over 1,000 workers. And this year too new workers are being hired despite the pronouncements of the Finance Ministry on this matter.

Combining Collection of Income Tax With National Insurance: It is unclear how far the prime minister and the finance minister are prepared to struggle for implementation of combined collection, an idea which was brought up previously by other administrations and which never came to fruition. It would appear that the heads of the Democratic Party are prepared for a struggle on this issue, even including precipitation of a government crisis. There is even public opposition to the proposed combination. At the Finance Ministry they point out that while this idea is being raised once more, they have yet to succeed in administering Government income to achieve an

integration of the machinery for the collection of MA'M with income tax, which undoubtedly would make collection more efficient at a far greater saving than combining collection of National Insurance with income tax. But the test on this issue is fundamental. If this section of the plan is withdrawn, then the entire proposed economic plan is likely to be shelved.

Cancellation of the Guarantee of Tie-In and Exchange: There is wide support for cancellation of the guarantee of tie-in and exchange even in the Finance Committee of the Knesset. These guarantees have become onerous to the Government treasury. However, while this step is accompanied by a significant increase in the cost of loans and development, there exists the threat of the manufacturers to cease new investments in manufacturing and to stop the growth of manufacture?

The impression has been created that cancellation of the guarantee of tie-in and exchange will be one of the few sections in the economic plan to be approved, because the welfare ministers will not oppose it, while the minister of manufacture, commerce and tourism is holding his peace, for it is quite possible that he does not perceive the economic implications stemming from this step. It is not yet clear why the president of the Manufacturers' Federation Avraham (Buma) Shavit, has not come out with sharp criticism of steps which adversely affect investments in manufacturing and is not shouting foul as he has done in the past. His behavior is a puzzle. There are those who believe that the Finance Ministry will compensate the manufacturers on these steps through considerable benefits afforded to them in other forms.

On a similar scale, the Finance Ministry has already acted in the recent period. Following previous economic measures which had adversely affected manufacturing, it provided significant tax concessions for manufacturing projects. The inevitable result was that many enterprises closed out the current year with a much greater profit thanks to the reduced tax rates on inventory, but the operational profits from the manufacture were eroded, whereas the overall burden of tax dropped last year owing to tax abatements for particular groups in the population.

The fate of the new economic plan is now hanging in the balance. It is impractical, in that it is a solution under pressure. Even if the finance minister presses the prime minister to approve it despite the opposition of a number of ministers, it is difficult to assume that it will reach the stage of implementation without imposition of new regulations on the public through increasing the cost of services.

Finance has been forced to seek fruitless solutions to problems of the economy because it stops short of confronting the various pressure groups in the economy. There is room for additional cutting in the Government budget, but it must be considered and well thought-out and must include the cessation of operations which have become superfluous and without an expansion of services. The Government cannot permit itself to disregard imposition of an appropriate tax on large speculative profits which are

rampant, and which encourage great numbers of people to wheel and deal. If this is a period of emergency, why not increase the rates of the income tax by 5 percent on the high-income people particularly in the economy, as proposed by the governor of the Bank of Israel?

Everyone agrees that the construction field is one of the causes of inflation, but dealing with this issue borders on national omission. Everyone knows the situation. Everyone screams and yet everyone fails to implement the proper steps. And years have already gone by since the present Government has proclaimed its justified intent to sell Government lands to contractors and entrepreneurs who would be prepared to combine with construction for dwellings. There are hundreds of thousands of dwellings short, and the economy is screaming out for additional land. Until now they have not yet succeeded in the decisions putting up for sale Government lands designated for construction. This action might have absorbed several billion pounds from the public and might have lessened the dwelling crunch. Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon rejects all applications of entrepreneurs and contractors, and repeatedly proclaims that he will not sell Government lands for the purpose of construction. His opposition countermands the economic plan which was approved by the Government and glaringly undermines a particularly effective step in absorption which would hasten the recovery from the rate of inflation and make possible a solution to the dwelling problem for many families. But even such an issue, which is within the exclusive control of the Government, cannot be solved by the prime minister and the ministers.

This example is evidence of the inability of the Government to implement its economic policy. The result is that one economic plan displaces another, and only isolated sections of any plan ever rise to the level of implementation.

8090

CSO: 4805

BANK OF ISRAEL SCORES GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 May 79 p 3

[Article by Yosef Priel, DAVAR correspondent: "Bank of Israel Storms at the Government"]

[Text] In the annual report about to be released next week the Bank of Israel sharply and harshly criticizes the wage and employment policy of the Government of Israel. In sharp terms unprecedented in previous reports the Bank of Israel attacks the helplessness of the Government in this area.

The report of the Bank of Israel states that "The increase of employment in public services proves how devoid of substance and how valueless are the proclamations regarding the freeze on service lists when these are not accompanied by a budget cut and by direct supervision over the number who are employed in the public agencies."

Furthermore, in the area of wages, the report states that "the wage policy of the Government for the 2 years 1978 and 1979 was apparently based upon a total underestimate of the rate of anticipated inflation, and the dragging out of the negotiations between the workers and the employers added fuel to the flames. Thus the policy became irrelevant even before the agreements were signed. Pressures, promises, strikes, and partial settlements, those were what finally dictated the wage agreements, and the official policy was dragged in after them.

Fifty-Eight Percent of Additional Workers Absorbed in Public Services

Economists of the Bank of Israel state in the report that the goal of recovery in the labor market was increasingly stronger in 1978, when most of the increase was in the public services. At the same time a recognizable increase took place last year in job offers which were not filled. Together with that it turned out that the increase in productivity was slower.

Some 58 percent of the increase in the Israeli work force was absorbed as wage earners in public services, and some 70 percent of those are women. Side by side with the obvious increase in public services there was also an increase in the number of locally employed in the business sector by

about 30,000 persons (3.6 percent) of which about 24,000 were Israelis, and the others were workers in the Territories. The increase among the latter was entirely in the business sector. In the business, too, the number of employed women increased at an accelerated rate, whereas the number of employed males increased by some 1.5 percent only. In 1978 the employment and job placement in branches associated with construction increased, while the flight by Israeli workers continued from the construction branch itself. Parallel to this the branch absorbed workers from the Territories, but their number was lower than the number of Israelis who left the field.

Job placement in construction increased by 0.2 percent only.

The report states that the increase in the number of employees in public services is in direct contradiction to the position of the Government and to its policy. This increase was chalked up to educational and welfare services and administration of local jurisdictions.

Auxiliary services also increased greatly. This broadening in the jurisdictions indicates the increase in the sources available to the jurisdiction as a result of the elections, and affording the possibility of gathering funds overseas following the liberalization.

Damage of the Growth Goal

The economists of the Bank write that the increase in the number employed and placement of labor in the public services against the background of the broadening of the demand for labor in the business sector during a period of recovery, is a phenomenon which arouses amazement during a period of economic slowdown. It is possible that the increase in employment in public services does not affect the possibilities of output in the business sector, but during a period of recovery and within the manpower limitations required by the productive sector, this type of expansion adversely affects the growth goal.

The rate of unemployed in the Israeli work force dropped in 1978 at first by some 0.3 percent. The rate of unemployed among men reached 2.9 percent. The rate of joblessness among women was different between the years 1977 and 1978: in 1977 the increase in the rate of employment was accompanied among women by an increase in joblessness, whereas in 1978 the increase in employment at an even greater rate continued while the joblessness declined.

Sharp Fluctuations in the Real Wage

The Bank of Israel believes that preservation of the real wage which occurred in public services was not the result of a calculated wage policy which tied itself to the acceleration of inflation, but rather was a result of an accumulation of events in the wage area which resulted in much damage, such as: strikes, contract forfeits, sharp fluctuations in the real wage, the reinforcement of uncertainty regarding future wages, etc.

These events include prepaying of the cost-of-living supplement in January, in addition to the regular payments in April and October; granting of a high wage increase to workers in the Airfield Authority, which then became (at a slightly lower rate) the lot of the workers in public services generally, following a promise of parity in the past and the ruling of an arbitrator in the present; the granting of salary increases to most workers in public services, to a portion of the term of the new agreement: signing part of the wage agreements in public services toward the end of the year, and partial implementation to the end of 1978, and responding to the demands of priority worker groups. Wage figures for 1978 also reflected updating of benefits, and partially, too, the decision to establish an educational fund for workers on the uniform scale.

"Donation" of the Wage Agreement in the Local Jurisdictions

In September 1978, the local jurisdictions and the national agencies signed a wage agreement for workers on the uniform scale without participation of the Government. Although this agreement deviated from the Government wage policy, the Government in the end encouraged it, and it served as a model for signing an overall wage agreement with workers in the public sector (an agreement which also broadened the projections of the increase for the postal workers to all workers). Up to the end of 1978, only the technicians scale and the MAH'AR scale were included within the framework of the agreement for workers in the uniform scale. At the beginning of 1979 higher wage agreements were signed with part of the workers in the public services, and this brought about a demand for opening of wage agreement for workers in the uniform scale, in addition to the overall demand for payment of a high cost of living increment which is being paid now.

Government Bargaining Power Weakened

Response of the Government to wage demands which deviate from the official policy are explained by the Bank of Israel as weakening the bargaining power which stems from a number of factors: signing wage agreements in the business sector at a rate higher than the official policy, an attempt to avoid a general confrontation with the Histadrut, yielding to local jurisdictions, granting deviating wage increases to priority worker groups, extended negotiations during a period of accelerating inflation which resulted from too low an "opening position" of the Government relative to the anticipated inflation.

Rabinowitz: Policy Bound To Cause Joblessness

The correspondent of DAVAR in Natania reports that Knesset Member Yehoshua Rabinowitz, former finance minister, said this week during a meeting of the Labor Party Council in Natania that in the administration of the Likud there is an economic and social deterioration taking place in the country. Government policy, he added, increases inflation, reduces the inventory of foreign currency, limits exports, increases imports and is likely to bring about a disaster of joblessness in the country.

Rabinowitz forcefully pointed to the severe situation caused by the Likud government in the area of housing. The Alinement left 20,000 dwellings in the public agencies for those eligible for housing, but the Likud government removed these for sale in the free market for purposes of speculation, so that now there is a lag of tens of thousands of dwellings. He stressed that during 3 years of government under the aegis of the Alinement the price of dwellings was low and below the price index, whereas at present there is a spiraling increase in dwelling prices far above the overall cost of living, which in itself is exceedingly high, so that for young couples there is no possibility of acquiring living quarters.

Rabinowitz expressed the hope that the Alinement will return to power, and according to him this is the public attitude at the moment, and surveys also attest to it.

La'am Secretariat Demands Emergency Economic Plan

The Secretariat of La'am which assembled yesterday under the leadership of Knesset Member Zalman Shuval, placed upon the movement faction in the general Histadrut a demand that at an early meeting of the executive committee the Histadrut and the Government take joint measures for an emergency economic plan for the next 2 years.

The secretariat supported the stand of the La'am faction in the Knesset during the most recent economic discussion, at the end of which La'am did not participate in the vote as a protest against the current economic policy of the Government. The La'am faction in the Histadrut will also advocate this position in the executive committee.

8090

CSO: 4805

INTERVIEW WITH CHIEF OF STAFF OF NATIONAL LIBERAL MILITIA

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 25 Jun-1 Jul 79 pp 17-19

[Interview with Georges Jean Aarages, chief of staff of National Liberal Militia, by Claude Khoury; date and place not given]

[Text]

The Kojak I met last week didn't have a gleaming scalp. He had a full head of hair, with a beard to boot.

He wasn't a middle-aged Greek-American with a lollipop. He was a 28-year-old Beirut-born Lebanese with a limp, which I discovered was due to the fact that he lost his leg in the Lebanese war.

He wasn't a police lieutenant. He was the chief of staff of former President Camille Chamoun's National Liberal Party militia, the "Tigers" — second in command after the former President's younger son, Dany Chamoun.

He didn't ask me "who loves ya, baby," either, so I asked him who on earth gave him the "Kojak" nickname and why.

The question took the young man, who is known to his parents as Georges Jean Aarage, three years back, to the early months of 1976, when he was still a regular "Tigers" militiaman.

TELEVISION

"I was stationed at the St. Georges Hotel, and there was a lull in the battle of the hotels," he said. "We had time to watch television, and we were watching

Kojak. The manager of the St. Georges was with us. During the program, he called me Kojak. All my friends have been calling me Kojak since then."

He added: "According to the St. Georges manager, I think like Kojak, and I have the same method of work."

Is that a compliment?

Of course it is.

"I'm a great admirer of Kojak," Georges Kojak Aarage told me. "I watch him every Sunday, or at least I try to. Even when I was in Germany to take care of my amputated leg, I watched him on TV.

"I like his way of reasoning, his way of working. I like the way he's tough with his people, and his popularity with everyone. I identify with him. He's excellent."

Does that mean, I asked, that the chief of staff of the "Tigers" uses Kojak's methods in his work?

He laughed: "My methods are a bit different, I guess."

So is his background.

The Lebanese Kojak has a degree in French literature from the Lebanese University and a P.S.O. (Panel System Operator) from an aviation school in Scotland.

He was already flying as a P.S.O. for Middle East Airlines (MEA) when the event which was to turn him into a fighting machine happened.

KIDNAPED

"It was March 11, 1976," he recalled. "I was on my way to my job at the airport with six other colleagues in a small bus. We were stopped near Tayyouneh. They let the other six go, but they kidnaped me."

"Who were they?" I asked.

"Palestinian and progressive forces."

"Why did they choose you?"

"Some people had been kidnaped in Ain Remmaneh, where I live. I was supposed to be a hostage. I escaped, but it was just luck. One of the kidnapers was a cleaner at MEA. I used to be good to him — give him tips occasionally, that sort of thing. He recognized me, and he told me to beat it. That's what saved me. I haven't been back to MEA since then."

"Is that when you joined the NLP?"

"That's when I decided to take an active part in the NLP militia, but I was already an NLP member. I joined in 1968, as a member of the NLP student group. We did have some military training in those days — in Saadiyat, the former residence of President Chamoun, near Damour. There were just a few of us then, and we were trained by Naim Berdaane, President Chamoun's chief bodyguard, who was killed during the war. He trained us as bodyguards for the President. We didn't have the intensive training we got later..."

"I was living in Furn esh-Shebbak when the war started, so a group of Saadiyat trainees and myself were assigned to protect Ain Remmaneh. It was still an on-and-off war in those days."

"Then came the battle of Tel Zaatar — June, 1976. Freddy Nasrallah, who also used to be an MEA pilot and who was later killed, and I were appointed military commanders of the Naim Berdaane barracks in Ain Remmaneh. We started out

with 16 men. Then we became 350. We defended Ain Remmaneh and participated in the Tel Zaatar battle.

"During this time, I was also in charge of political affairs in Ain Remmaneh and Furn esh-Shebbak."

DANY

"It was not until 1978 that the NLP command appointed me chief of staff. My first battle as chief of staff was in July of that year, up in the mountains, while the battles were raging in Ashrafiyeh. I fought side by side with Dany Chamoun. We made a good team."

Dany Chamoun? Does Dany usually fight?

"He's secretary of defense at NLP, so he fights to set an example. For instance, in the Akoura (Byblos district) battle a few days ago, Dany was there, in military uniform. He fought in Akoura. Dany is a true fighter. He's just like the other men, a brother in arms. Those who don't know him think he's a simple fighter, with his helmet and rifle."

He and Dany, Kojak told me, are in constant touch with the "Tigers" everywhere — either personally or by walkie-talkie. It's their job to "execute political orders through military means," to issue the military orders and see to it that they are implemented.

A violent life, which contrasts sharply with the life Georges Jean Aarage once led at MEA. Does he miss those days?

"It's only natural that I should miss normal life," he said. "When I was a pilot, I was always on the move, discovering new countries, meeting new people. But now, I have forgotten I was ever a pilot, because I am convinced that what I am doing is the right thing."

"It's true we've lost a lot, but what consoles us is our conviction that despite all the difficulties we are encountering, we will some day reach our goal."

INDEPENDENCE

"Exactly what is this goal?" I asked.

"Our aim is true Lebanese independence," he told me. "I know this is difficult to achieve, because Lebanon has always been dependent, and needs to be dependent on other countries. Okay, so we will always have a dependent Lebanon, but what we're asking for is dependence within limits. Our aim is to live with dignity, as free Lebanese, and a lot of blood has been shed for that aim."

"You say you've lost a lot. What have you lost?"

"A lot of people, a lot of fighters, years of education and the so-called 'civilization' we used to have. We have lost Lebanese principles, Lebanese traditions."

"The years of fighting have changed the Lebanese mentality. Our fighters have become cruel, bloodthirsty. They didn't use to be. But you must understand: when your brother gets killed in a battle, it makes you want revenge, it makes you cruel."

"Before the war, the men of the Kataeb (Phalangist Party, led by Pierre Gemayel) and the NLP used to be called 'Toto' and 'Timo.' People used to think of them as soft playboys. But they proved to be ferocious when it came to their friends and relatives being killed."

"We reached a point when we were having funerals daily. There was a time when the whole area went into mourning when one person died. Today, if several fighters are killed in one day, no one reacts; it's regarded as normal."

"All these things have changed us. I think it will take a fighter years to readapt to a normal life. They say the Lebanese forgets quickly. Believe me, he will not forget quickly this time."

"What about Kojak, chief of staff? Will he forget quickly? Can he readapt to a normal life?"

He considered the question carefully and said: "I will definitely need time. Of course, to have a normal life, I will need a job. That should come first."

"Assume that the war has ended. Will you quit the party?"

"I will resume a normal life, but I will not leave the party, because I believe in it and what it is working for. I admit that we have made mistakes, but after all, we're living in a rotten country, and you can't expect a political party not to be influenced by the atmosphere of the country."

"What kind of job will you look for? Do you want to be a pilot again?"

"No. That would be difficult, if only because I have lost a leg. Maybe I'll become an aviation instructor. I will certainly have to work, because one needs money to live."

"It will take me time to readapt. I'll need time to improve my health, to reacquire the will to work, to learn to enjoy working again."

"But all this is in the future. As long as the Syrians remain in Lebanon, I will go on fighting. I don't expect peace in Lebanon now. You have seen for yourself: whenever one front calms down, another is detonated."

FIANCEE

I asked Kojak if he was married. He said he was engaged to a girl from Ain Remmaneh who is also a French literature graduate.

She too would like a normal life, he said.

"But although she's not a fighter, she has lived through so many battles that she's accustomed to all this..."

"Her house was destroyed by a bomb, so now she spends her time either at our house or at her brother's. She's not working, but she does help the people of Ain Remmaneh in the social and medical fields."

"Oh yes, she sometimes envies the girls whose boyfriends lead a more normal life, but she complains only about my absence when I'm away from home. Like me, she is convinced that I'm working for a just cause."

"Our life varies with the developments. When it's quiet, I take her to movies and to dinner. When it isn't, she doesn't see much of me."

I asked Kojak to tell me about his experiences during the periods when his fiancée didn't see much of him. He mentioned a number of battles in which he was involved, including one in Kahhaleh in which he said he and his men engaged in hand-to-hand combat with a group of Palestinians.

What, I wondered, does a French literature major who was once a pilot feel when he is engaged in such battles?

"I had only one feeling," he said. "I wanted to remain alive. We fought fiercely, because we knew that if we didn't kill them, they would kill us. It was a question of life or death."

KILL

"Have you ever premeditatedly, cold-bloodedly killed anyone?"

His answer came promptly: "Never. I am against such behavior. I have killed people, but I have done so in battle, in self-defense. I don't allow my men to kill in cold blood. If some did it, they did it against my orders and without my knowledge. After all, we are human beings."

"But in hand-to-hand combat, when you kill someone..."

"That is self-defense. If I don't kill him, he'll kill me."

"What do you feel after you have killed?"

"I feel that I'm still alive."

"How many people have you killed?"

"I don't know. All I know is that I'm still alive."

"Are you more nervous, more on edge now than you were before the war?"

"Yes, definitely. In fact, I feel my nerves are overburdened."

"You're fed up with fighting?"

"For the Lebanese cause? Never!"

"We're talking on a personal level. Are you personally fed up with fighting?"

"No, never. I want to go on fighting until our aim is achieved: the liberation of Lebanon."

"Are you being totally frank with me?"

"Well, let's say that after the last clashes in Ain Remmaneh (between the NLP and the Phalangists).. yes, I would like to go back to a normal life, but you see, my duty..."

"Leave duty out of it for a while. You, as a man — don't you feel like going back to a normal life, enjoying life again? Or is it that you have come to like a fighter's life?"

"One has to be frank with oneself. We can't go on living like this. No one can live on the battlefield for years. No one can live through years of instability. Every war must have an end. One must think of the way back."

"Sooner or later, I will have to go back to a normal life. So I'd better start getting used to it right now, and I'm trying to. I'm trying to combine the two: normal life and my life as a fighter. It isn't easy, believe me."

"With all this fighting in the back of your mind, can you still be tender with your fiancée?"

"I'm always tender. I have a tender character."

"What do you seek when you're with her?"

"I try to forget everything that's going on around me. I try to make use of my moments with her to get a taste of normal life."

FAMILY

"How does your family feel about the life you're leading?"

"At first, my whole family was against me fighting. When I had my leg amputated, everyone in the family told me: 'If you had listened to us, this wouldn't have

happened.' But now, my family is convinced. They've stopped asking me to quit. They just tell me to take care."

"How many brothers and sisters do you have?"

"One sister, one brother. They used to fight."

"Why did they stop?"

He hesitated, then said: "My brother left the country. He's working outside Lebanon. In the final analysis, you can't sacrifice all the children. We have to live. Apart from my father, no one in the family was earning a salary."

"Don't you get a salary as a fighter?"

"No, we're not paid."

"So how does a militiaman live? Doesn't the party help him materially?"

"When we need something, we ask for it, and the party gives it to us. If we ask for money, they give it to us. If we go to hospital, they pay the bill. Where I'm concerned, my family gets rents for apartments. We make do. Anyway, we're not in this for money; we're doing it out of conviction."

"When will you and your men lay down your arms?"

"When the Lebanese Army takes control of the whole country. Look at Ain Remmaneh. The Army came in, and we laid down our arms there. Look at every area where the Army has been deployed: you don't see a single armed man."

"What comments do you have on reports that some militiamen are using their weapons to engage in criminal activities?"

"It's normal. No one in the world is perfect. Things of that sort happen whenever there is a war, even in the most civilized countries."

"What about militiamen involved in protection rackets?"

"These are in the minority. And the protection racket exists even in the United States."

"So you consider it normal?"

"Very normal. But we are trying to control these things. This is nothing new. It existed in Lebanon before the war."

"How are you trying to control it?"

"We really try to catch these people, to allow the Lebanese to live in peace. When we do catch one of them we put him in jail. Yes, we do have jails in NLP barracks, and we use them to punish undisciplined elements."

"What is your definition of an undisciplined element?"

"Anyone who steals, insults his superior, shoots at his colleagues... Yes, these things do happen. They're not nice things, but at least I'm admitting them."

DRUGS

"There are a lot of reports that militiamen are on drugs."

"Drugs have always existed in Lebanon. They did not appear because of the war. Naturally, the war didn't improve things. People try to get rid of their anxieties with drugs, and militiamen are among the Lebanese who suffer from anxiety. Unfortunately, when the battles are raging, we're too busy fighting to handle that kind of problem. But when things calm down, we try to deal with it through our internal police, and our medical and social sections. Sometimes we succeed in persuading our men to drop drugs; sometimes we find we're too late. But combatting drugs is definitely one of our main aims now. I don't consider those who are on drugs true militiamen. A militiaman fights for a cause, not for drugs."

The thought carried him into a subject which was obviously bothering him. He said: "Unfortunately, many people identify thieves and drug addicts with militiamen, and I will not accept this. It's not fair to treat a militiaman that way. A militiaman's job is an honorable one. His job is to defend Lebanon."

"You know, you're not well received everywhere. When one of us goes to a

restaurant, he is sometimes regarded as a thief. It's not fair. And if people continue to disrespect us, they'll see what will happen; they will not be happy.

"I will not accept the people's attitude toward us. After all, most of us are educated. We are intellectuals, graduates, engineers. We are respectable people defending Lebanon against its enemies."

I asked him who Lebanon's enemies were.

"The Palestinians," he said, "and the pro-Syrians."

"Including the Lebanese?"

"Every Lebanese who fights against us is pro-Syrian and an enemy of Lebanon."

"Are you a Maronite?"

"I'm Greek Catholic."

"Do you have any Moslem militiamen?"

"A lot of them. We have Sunnites, Shiites, Druze... They're at Tahwita, Sodaco, Ain Remmaneh, all fronts. They are true Lebanese fighters, and they're treated as equals; they're even treated better than the others."

"How many men do you have?"

"I don't have the right to tell you, but let me just say that we have enough fighters to go on for four more years. They're well-equipped and on all fronts."

KATAEB

"Why did you choose the NLP, not the Kataeb?"

"First because I admire President Chamoun, and second because I had friends in the NLP, so I automatically followed them. Anyway, there's no difference between the NLP and the Kataeb. Both are Lebanese parties working for the Lebanese cause."

"What about the NLP-Kataeb clashes?"

"I'm disappointed and disgusted. Being a fighter who fought for four years on the same front with the Kataeb, it is difficult for me to shoot at a Kataeb. To me, a Kataeb is an NLP man, and an NLP man is a Kataeb. Both are true Lebanese

fighters for the same cause. Many say that the end of the war is approaching. It's a pity that two parties that fought side by side for four years should end up killing each other."

"But you did kill each other. Why?"

"Look, you do have brothers who fight and kill each other. This is the case with us. But to tell you the truth, I can't find the exact reason for those clashes."

"The people of Ain Remmaneh are fed up. It is the only area of Lebanon which has lived through the war daily since 1975. One has to live in Ain Remmaneh to understand. There are no lights at night there, for fear of bombardment. People don't go out. There are daily funerals. It has become a morbid routine. The people of Ain Remmaneh are dying of routine, four years of sniping, four years of fighting, four years of death."

"The people of Dora, Kesrwan, Ashrafiyeh — they're different. They can't imagine what life in Ain Remmaneh is like. The people of Ain Remmaneh have been driven to extremes by their way of life. The slightest spark is enough to start a fire. This is what happened."

"With Sheikh Beshir (Gemayel, commander of the Phalangist militia and the united militias of the Lebanese Front) and other Kataeb officials, we tried to defuse the situation, but it was useless."

"Who was responsible? I will not say."

"At any rate, I would like to take the opportunity of this interview to mention with great respect the sacrifices that the people of Ain Remmaneh have made for their country, and the wisdom and courage that both Dany and Sheikh Beshir demonstrated in their handling of the situation."

DREAM

I steered away from Ain Remmaneh and the war to ask him what his fondest dream was.

He took his time about answering.

"My dream," he said finally, "is the dream of every Lebanese fighter: to

achieve the aim we have sacrificed so much for and to live, to resume a normal life."

"As an aviation instructor?"

"Yes, if I have the luck and the opportunity."

"Do you feel you may not have the opportunity?"

"I think I have the opportunity to go back to MEA. But to work, my mind must be at peace. And for my mind to be at peace, Lebanon must be at peace."



Georges Aarages

CSO: 4820

LEBANON

FEARS ABOUT BLEAK FUTURE OF SOUTH LEBANON EXPRESSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 8 Jun 79 pp 18-20

[Article by Raymond 'Atallah: "There Is Danger That Between the Hammer of Israel and the Anvil of the Resistance, South Lebanon May Be Destroyed; Weizman Threatened To Bombard the Ministry of Defense if Lebanese Airplanes Bombarded Sa'd Haddad's Positions in South Lebanon; Khomeyni Was Not Able To Keep the Promise He Made to the Shi'ites of South Lebanon That He Would Restrain the Resistance, and Israel Succeeded in Turning the Battle into One Between the Lebanese and the Palestinians; Musa al-Sadr Knew That Any Clash Between the South Lebanese and the Palestinians Would Make the Shi'ites Side with Haddad and Israel"]

[Text] Not more than a few days had gone by after Yasir 'Arafat and the delegation that accompanied him to Iran left Tehran Airport on their way to some of the Gulf states, when officials in the Iranian capital welcomed a Lebanese delegation representing the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council and other Islamic sects as well as a large number of the Amal [Hope] Movement which represents the military wing of the Shi'ite Council.

In the course of the congratulatory visits that were made by the delegation to Imam Khomeyni, to the chief of the Iranian government Mehdi Bazargan and to the rest of the leaders of the Iranian Revolution, quick and concentrated business meetings were held during which different aspects of the crisis of South Lebanon were discussed in general.

During these meetings the Lebanese delegation reviewed with Iranian officials in general but precise terms the details of the situation of the armed forces which are scattered in South Lebanon from the outskirts of Sidon in the north to the borders adjacent to Israel in the south. The delegation provided Iranian officials with a specific estimate of the volume of weapons and the number of armed men that were available to each faction. Delegation members also provided officials with information about the sources of arms and ammunition to each side and the fighters who provide those factions with what they need to maintain their positions and, consequently, to become more capable of confronting their enemies.

During the aforementioned meeting the members of the delegation stated that except for the common residents of South Lebanon all the forces that were armed were conducting themselves in South Lebanon as though they were the owners of the land and the masters of its destiny. Residents of South Lebanon found themselves adrift in an ocean of armed men amidst weapons of strife without the ability to preserve their lives or to resist the current and without the weapons that would have made them more capable of withstanding and opposing this war. As a result, they found that their only choices were either to abandon the land and to immigrate to more secure areas or to submit to the will of the armed people and resign themselves to the resolutions that were made by artillery which bombarded homes, lands and children indiscriminately.

The Iranian leaders were provided with specific statistics about the percentages of people who were evacuated from South Lebanon. It was said at the end of the inquiry that unless a miracle were to take place and Lebanon could be saved from the dangers that were surrounding it, it would be inevitable that the future would bring South Lebanon close to permanent occupation, to partition or to settlement.

The preliminary discussions that took place ended in an agreement that was based on the principle of looking for a solution to the crisis of South Lebanon by bringing about agreement and coordination [of efforts] between the population of South Lebanon and the Palestinian Resistance. This is because any attempt to find a solution by any other means would signify that the Iranian Revolution had gone beyond its concern for the two factions: the faction of the population of South Lebanon and that of the Palestinian Resistance.

In the context of this inquiry an agreement was reached that further discussion of details would take place in business meetings that would be held in Tehran after the referendum of the 30th of March. Delegations representing the two factions would meet at that time, and these meetings would be preceded by direct bilateral meetings between the resistance and the spiritual and political leaders who represent the population of South Lebanon so as to determine what action was required.

The direct attempt to look for a solution to the problem of South Lebanon with the mediation of the Iranian government took place before this important part of Lebanon had entered into a new dark phase which harbored possibilities of an over all imminent explosion between some of the factions of the resistance and the population of South Lebanon.

Features of this aforementioned dark phase had begun to appear more than a year ago when the seriousness of the complaints of the population of South Lebanon became evident. They were calling for help and stating that their land and their country were slipping from their hands and were being taken over by others who were clearly not the enemy and were not, therefore, to be fought. They stated that their land was being taken over by armed groups of men, that each one of these groups constituted an organization and that South Lebanon had turned into a forest of armed organizations.

These numerous complaints have led to a state of despair, and this state of despair has generated extremist appeals based on the logic that complaints alone will be of no use in resisting arms and armed men and that the population of South Lebanon must be driven into a state of emergency so that they could be organized and forced to regain their rights before they are lost.

Chief among the despairing ones who were advocating an effort to organize the people of South Lebanon were groups of Lebanese from the South who had lived in exile and had amassed vast or moderate fortunes from their difficult commercial activities in foreign lands. They had build in their villages in South Lebanon homes and interests to which they could go back; they could spend the rest of their lives in their own country.

Preliminary secret meetings were held in Paris and in some European capitals between representatives of these groups for the purpose of studying the projects of forming the armed organizations in South Lebanon to resist the dangers that threaten the area. Members of these organizations were to be selected, and the budgets that were required for them were to be prepared.

Some of those organizers went to Beirut and asked for an appointment with Imam Musa al-Sadr at his office in the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council in the area of al-Hazimiyah. Imam al-Sadr listened to the point of view of the delegation from South Lebanon, and he acquainted himself with the preliminary plan for the project to arm the residents of South Lebanon.

Mid-way through the interview and after the dimensions of the idea became clear, Imam al-Sadr shuddered in anger and told his visitors as he began to stand up:

"I refuse to endorse such methods to deal with the problem of South Lebanon, and I refuse even to think about forcing the residents of South Lebanon to carry arms as you suggest because I do not want the Shi'ites to be the ones who, in front of our Arab brothers and of history, would bear the burden of dealing a blow to the Palestinian question or of annihilating the Arab people of Palestine who are fighting to regain their rights. I believe there are ways other than bearing arms to fight the excesses."

But this primary talk and the communications that followed to prevent such excesses did not achieve clear results and did not prevent the residents of the area from complaining. They did not stop the increase in the number of complaints, the rise in the clamor and the determination to search in a variety of ways for sources of protection.

Some representatives of South Lebanon spearheaded the appeal for sending the army into the area and for enforcing the agreements that had been concluded with the resistance. Speaker 'Adil Safwan warned President Elias Sarkis against the consequences of negligence and asked that weapons be distributed by the state to the residents of South Lebanon so they can defend their country and their land.

President Sarkis turned down this idea and said, "Giving the citizens weapons would only complicate the problem further and would give them the opportunity to fight among themselves because of political disputes. Accordingly, this would not check the Israeli threat to the area, for example."

The clamor subsided for a while, but then it turned into a dangerous beginning of an armed struggle after some armed men, who were not native to the area of South Lebanon resorted to the use of weapons "to discipline" those who were urging the residents of South Lebanon to oppose and to confront [those who were threatening them]. The threat turned into gunfire that was directed against supporters of this idea and critics of the situation, such as Isma'il al-Zayn who was shot by some armed men in the feet inside the municipality of al-Nabatiyah. Then this case was tied to the assassination of former Ambassador Hasib al-'Abdallah in front of his home in Beirut. Last but not least, there was an attempt to assassinate Minister Ja'far 'Araf al-Din.

Then Imam al-Sayyid Musa al-Sadr dropped out of sight, and many stories about his disappearance emerged. Some of these stories stated that before his disappearance he had intensified his pressure for the cessation of all military activity in South Lebanon and that this pressure had involved Libya in particular which furnishes munitions to some of the factions that may be found in Lebanon.

At that time Imam al-Sadr was thought to have said, "Those who think I am adopting a course against the Palestinians are making a big mistake. My mind, my heart and my efforts are with the Palestinians. I am only asking that these armed activities be curbed, that the excesses be prohibited and that the pursuit of useless activities cease so that we do not become the cause of more tragedies and so that we do not give Israel and its helpers new excuses for attacking innocent people. We have come to an agreement with Yasir 'Arafat about this matter, but it is not being implemented on this land as it should be because of the discrepancies in views and the multiplicity of leaders."

The tide of disgruntlement grew stronger after the disappearance of Imam al-Sadr until the Iranian Revolution created a new dimension in the relations between the population of South Lebanon and the Palestinian Resistance.

The strong relationship between the Iranian Revolution and the Palestinian Resistance moved the Shi'ite leaders in Lebanon to seek Imam Khomeyni and the new Iranian leaders with some urgency so they can mediate and arbitrate between them and guarantee the implementation of what would be agreed to. [Their purpose] was to avoid the inevitability of having the final hours of their despair turn into a conflict that the population of South Lebanon, as members of the Pan-Arab community, would reject in principle. However, they do find themselves being pulled in this direction if their point of view is not heeded.

This disgruntlement led a large group of armed Shi'ites to focus on the concerns of their area and to present them in the course of pursuing their partisan activity after they realized that all the factions that can be found in South Lebanon were serving every interest except that of the residents of the area.

Leaders of the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council recall how 40 armed men who were members of the National Movement had taken their arms and left their combat positions in al-Shayah. They went to the city of al-Zahra' where the headquarters of the temporary Supreme Shi'ite Council are located and placed themselves at the disposal of the council and South Lebanon. Council leaders remember that they made a concentrated effort before they were able to persuade those armed men to calm down, to be patient and to refrain from the language of force and weapons.

Recently, several suggestions have been made for the opposition. Among them is one which favors embarking upon a battle to liberate South Lebanon from all armed men by forcing the issue of the return of Imam Musa al-Sadr.

The mere realization of such an idea would signify a return to the dangerous realm of clashing with the factions of the resistance and giving Maj Sa'd Haddad and Israel an opportunity that would enable them to extend their control to the villages that are near the border strip.

Warnings about this danger were conveyed to the Iranian leaders in the context of urging them to interfere promptly to save the situation.

Iranian leaders were told that the fact that the Shah had ignored the crisis in South Lebanon was justified by the fact that he was tied to an international strategy and a U.S. course of action that made his agreement with Israel inevitable. But the Iranian revolution is an ally of the Palestinians and this alliance gives it the right to settle the situation so as to save South Lebanon and its population.

Iranian leaders responded by saying, "There is no doubt that South Lebanon, or rather Jabal 'Amil, is of concern to us just as much as the future of Iran and the future of the Palestinian question are. But all that we are asking for now is that we be given an adequate opportunity to deal with domestic questions. Afterwards we will be willing to make the necessary effort to settle relations between you and the Palestinians."

Representatives of the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council said, "We are willing to wait, and all that we are asking of you is that the Iranian position on the population of South Lebanon take priority over your position favoring the Palestinians and opposing Israel. We do not want the Iranian position to favor the Palestinians first, to oppose Israel second and then to side with the people of South Lebanon."

Yasir 'Arafat was actually contacted, and a clear proposition was presented to everybody. This proposition stated that if the situation were not to

be dealt with and if armed Palestinians were to remain in the cities and the villages of South Lebanon and a clash were to take place, it will be the Palestinians who will lose, even if they win the battle militarily. In this case the Iranian Revolution will find itself in a very disconcerting position. But if the Shi'ites were victorious--although this is highly unlikely--Israel would have won a victory. Neither the Palestinians nor the followers of Khomeyni can be envied for this position. We must not forget that half the Arab army of Lebanon are Shi'ites and that half the members of the National Movement are also Shi'ites.

The communications that were carried out stated that the Palestinian command was not to reduce the dangers of an explosion especially since there were extremist groups in the rejectionist organizations, in addition to a group of clients who were intensifying their extremism in order to conceal their ties [with the enemy]. Those groups did actually begin to carry out some assassinations under the slogan of "nipping the tide of complaint and disgruntlement in the bud." Lists that included the names of a number of prominent figures in South Lebanon were drawn up, and the plan was almost carried out had not senior Palestinian commanders, who learned of the details, rushed to interfere to stop this conspiracy and to avert its adverse consequences.

Every time the problem of South Lebanon was raised between Prime Minister Salim al-Huss and leaders of the Palestinian Resistance, the chief of the Lebanese government would say, "Healthy relations must be established between the people of South Lebanon and the organizations, especially since the absence of a legitimate authority in South Lebanon has given groups of armed men the opportunity to engage in unacceptable actions, and this has made the residents of South Lebanon quick to take offense."

In the course of this debate, most of which was conducted secretly, Palestinian leaders did acknowledge that the excesses which did take place were serious and that some of them, but not all, could have been avoided especially since agents of Israel and Sa'd Haddad were exaggerating in playing up Palestinian excesses. Is it possible to ask the Palestinian Revolution to take no action to oppose actions that Sa'd Haddad and Israel are taking to control South Lebanon? Is it not the duty of leaders of South Lebanon to return to their land, their villages and their homes and to take up arms to defend their land and their homes against the enemy who wants to occupy them rather than complain, grumble, exaggerate isolated events and cry over the homes and the lands that had been abandoned by their occupants?

All this took place before last March 30; this was the date that had been determined for the entry of the legitimate army into South Lebanon and the evacuation of the armed men from the cities and the villages so that the people of South Lebanon could return to their lands and their homes. But the entry of the Lebanese army floundered, and the hopes that residents of South Lebanon had entertained to put an end to their tragedy were dashed.

A responsible official in the Lebanese Ministry of Defense informed us that the military command had decided to use force in confronting Sa'd Haddad. Orders were in fact issued to two Lebanese air force planes to bomb the headquarters of the mutinous officer. But Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman contacted the U.S. ambassador to Israel and told him in an emotional tone, "Please convey to the Lebanese military command that if any Lebanese airplane took action to bombard Sa'd Haddad, we will not stop at shooting down this airplane. The Israeli air force will bomb the Lebanese military command at al-Yarzah."

Although the interval that the revolutionary command in Tehran had requested has expired and the referendum has taken place and Imam Khomeini has become capable of giving some of his attention to the destiny of South Lebanon, it seems that none of the attempts [to settle the problem of South Lebanon] have so far been successful. First, it is difficult to curb the armed platoons not all of which are Palestinian. In addition, these platoons entertain different ideas about operations against Israel originating from South Lebanon. Second, Israel wants to keep Lebanon a volatile area after having assured itself that no Arab or international force could control or curb the Palestinians. It has therefore decided to take action to expand the area which is controlled by the troops of Sa'd Haddad, thereby turning the battle between it and the Palestinians to a battle between Sa'd Haddad and the Palestinians. In other words, the battle would become a Palestinian military operations that originate from South Lebanon.

Recently Sa'd Haddad's command has been active; this activity has culminated in the participation of his command with the agencies of the Lebanese Front in the preparation of a media campaign to draw the residents back to the villages of South Lebanon. This media plan relies on two methods. The first one involves statistics about the number of homes that were destroyed in the South, the number of those who were killed in recent years and the number of families who were evacuated. Along with these statistics the question would be raised, "Could South Lebanon have undergone all these tragedies had it not been for the armed Palestinian presence? Is there any hope for a Palestinian victory that would justify the acquiescence of South Lebanon's residents in paying this exorbitant price alone?"

According to the second method residents of South Lebanon would be given the following options which would be presented to them in the form of a question: "The citizen of South Lebanon can only choose between Israel, the Palestinians or Sa'd Haddad. Which group do you choose? If you choose Israel, South Lebanon will go to Israel; if you choose the Palestinians, South Lebanon will become the alternative homeland; but if you choose Sa'd Haddad, you would be choosing a free, sovereign and an independent Lebanon."

The Lebanese Front did not stop at expanding its media support for Sa'd Haddad. Last month it sent him 800 armed persons to upgrade his military and combat capability, and it notified him that it was willing to help him further whenever he expanded the area of the "liberated" territory.

This is how South Lebanon is being threatened with destruction between the hammer of Sa'd Haddad and Israel and the anvil of the factions of the Palestinian Resistance, the Left and the Arab army of Lebanon.

It is not a secret that the latest action was taken by Imam Musa al-Sadr was taken to establish a way out of this crisis which Imam Khomeyni found himself confronting. This is the crisis of reconciling the safety of the Palestinian Movement with the survival of South Lebanon, the home of the Shi'ite sect, as Lebanese territory. Imam al-Sadr knew that the armed Palestinian presence in South Lebanon will not liberate Palestine and that it could turn into a de facto settlement of the Palestinians; but he also knew that any clash between the people of South Lebanon and the Palestinians will place the Shi'ites on the side of Sa'd Haddad and Israel. In order to avoid this outcome which was and still seems inevitable, he went to Algeria where he succeeded in persuading officials that the policy of settling the Palestinians in South Lebanon was erroneous and dangerous. Then he went to Libya where he dropped out of sight, and where he still is out of sight. What is important is that South Lebanon not disappear just as Imam Musa al-Sadr did.

8592

CSO: 4802

POTENTIAL OIL RESERVES DISCUSSED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 16 Jun 79 pp 3-4

[Text] Does Lebanon have oil reserves, and in commercial quantities. Reports on this matter have varied widely but none has so far ruled out the possibilities of the presence of huge oil bearing formations in Lebanon, onshore or offshore. The very likelihood that Lebanon could have hydrocarbon reserves follows naturally from its geographical location in an area, a region rather, known for its command of huge amounts of oil reserves, extending from Iran, to Syria to Sinai and Egypt. Recent Egyptian concern for oil prospection offshore on the Mediterranean coastline of the Sinai Peninsula and the clear and encouraging indications that major prospectors have come out with from the area, seem to indicate again that the Mediterranean coastline is an area of potential oil riches.

Although no wildcats have as yet been drilled, no thorough exploration operations conducted and most important no fields were found so that they be delineated in a first attempt to establish, at least by an estimate the possible size of Lebanon's oil reserves if they actually do exist, a recent report in the Kuwaiti weekly AL LIQA' said Lebanon's oil reserves are estimated at 225 billion bbls, which comes close to half the reserves of all the Arab countries put together.

The Kuwaiti weekly quoted informed sources in Lebanon, but there can be no source as reliable as common sense. In area, Lebanon is even far from 5 percent of the Arab countries put together. This is our first observation, the second observation is that if it were true that Lebanon holds half the Arab world's oil reserves where are these deposits located, after all oil does have physical dimension. If the oil existed in very deep formations deep drilling would be the only answer, but even that would make the oil commercially unexploitable, because of the high cost of deep drilling installations, at least at the current price of oil.

That there is oil in Lebanon has become a matter of general conviction, but to go about guessing the size of reserves that Lebanon holds is something totally different. That some oil deposits were found offshore in Lebanon was officially announced by the Minister of Oil and Industry

Mr Assaad Rizk. The announcement bears a lot of truth in it despite various attempts made after it to show Minister Rizk as an ill-informed official who has fallen prey to his illusions based on insufficient evidence. The truth of the matter is that the uproar that followed Minister Rizk's statement was a cover-up attempt, an unsuccessful hush, hush.

Many observers have wondered whether this unofficially confirmed discovery has been the cause of years of fierce fighting among Lebanese. The announcement by Minister Rizk of the discovery off the coast of Batroun and Chekka was viewed by the Kuwaiti AL LIQA' as the first move towards ending the 4 year strife. In a very optimistic tone the Kuwaiti weekly said, "if the Lebanese have so far succeeded in using Arab oil it is now high time that they start preparing to use their own oil.

Minister Rizk's announcement of the oil discovery was seen by the Kuwaiti weekly as not surprising. It said areas in the Beqaa have previously been said to have oil bearing formations, precisely Suhmor and Yuhmor. AL LIQA' said however that these reports were later proved to have been diffused by real estate companies that were after a quick profit. First indication that oil did exist offshore was made under President Charles Helou, but the matter again was kept secret by President Helou and his government.

Under President Franjieh the Lebanese government decreed that territorial waters be extended and it was thought at the time that extending territorial waters was meant to make better use of the fish resources along the coast of Lebanon. The creation of Protein, the well known fishing company which some still recall as the spark that started the war, came to confirm their speculations. But the matter was quite far from fish and fishing resources.

Also under Franjieh it was learned that a Japanese oil company approached the Lebanese government which put down the offer. The Japanese had offered to search for oil, all expenses paid and after oil is found the company will get 7.5 percent of the profits over a specific period.

Franjieh was in no hurry, his idea was that the foreign company would drill and prospect, gets its fair compensation and leave, but it will get no share of the profit. During the crisis Lebanese and foreign experts prospected for oil along the coastline (offshore) from Jounieh to Chekka and the area was found to be very rich in oil.

An official French team also studied the possibilities of Lebanon being an oil rich country. The team discovered that Lebanon holds half the Arab world's oil reserves most of it at 2 kilometers distance from the coast and in the north east. A U.S. Department of State report, again quoted by AL LIQA' confirmed the oil find and said the area is an extension of the Sannine mountain range and added that oil was discovered in this structure by a 17.5 rate. Over and above that the U.S. report said Lebanon's crude is one of the world's lightest and that crude varieties to be found in Lebanon are certainly superior to some that are found in the United States.

ARAB PEOPLE'S CONGRESS SECRETARIAT MEETS IN TRIPOLI

Preparations for Future Conferences

Tripoli JANA in English 1414 GMT 26 Jun 79 LD

[Text] Tripoli, 26 Jun JAMAHIRIYAH News Agency--Members of the Arab People's Congress Permanent Secretariat met yesterday evening in the People's Hall in Tripoli. Discussion centered on reports prepared for the Paris symposium. The symposium is organized by the preparatory secretariat of the world conference for solidarity with the Arab people and the Palestinian cause.

The permanent secretariat's reports are on methods of Zionist colonial settlement in the occupied Arab lands, and the economic, cultural and social policies revised by the enemy as a means of hitting the Palestinian Arab existence.

The reports will also be tabled to the world conference due to be held in Lisbon between the 4th and 5th of July in preparation for the Paris symposium.

On the other hand, the Palestine Liberation Organization will present several documents in which it will reveal to world public opinion the magnitude of the crime committed by the Zionist enemy against the Palestinian people inside and beyond the occupied lands. The PLO will also uncover the self-rule conspiracy which the imperialist-Zionist-Sadat alliance is trying to impose on the Palestinian people and Arab nations.

It is worth noting that the activities of the Arab people's congress permanent secretariat this year are in implementation of decisions taken by the congress for consolidation of relations with world public opinion in a bid to uncover the enemy's lies.

The preparatory secretariat was formed after a meeting held in Rome in February 1978. The meeting was attended by 98 world political organizations and resulted in a decision to call for a world conference for solidarity with the Arab people and Palestinian cause. This conference is due to be held in Lisbon between the 2d and 6th of November, 1979.

The Paris symposium, the Helsinki meeting and the Tripoli conference due to be held between the 28th and 31st of August, 1979 are all in preparation for the Lisbon conference.

Continue Work on Third Day

Tripoli JANA in English 1419 GMT 26 Jun 79 LD

[Excerpt] Tripoli, 26 Jun, JAMAHIRIYAH News Agency--Basic people's congresses throughout the Jamahiriya have continued the third day of uninterrupted meetings in [words indistinct] ordinary session in 1979.

The masses discussed during these meetings their scheduled agenda in an atmosphere of true and direct democracy. The masses air their ideas and opinions frankly and with responsibility after the transfer of authority to the people.

The congresses were heavily attended and responsible debate indicates that the unique democratic experiment applied in the socialist people's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has succeeded. The masses also indicated resolution in clinging to popular authority.

CSO: 4802

SCHOOL DISTURBANCES SEEN AS THREAT TO NATIONAL UNITY

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 11 May 79 pp 1, 8

[Excerpt] Following the calming statements recently made by the minister of secondary and basic education, the pupils who, in the last few days, had rushed into a futile and fruitless wave of unrest. As some of them had been disturbed after the recent reorganization of certain factors, the minister explained that their worry was no longer justified since [authorities] are ready to look into the case of all those who might encounter problems due to the implementation of the 20 April circular.

In any event there is a determination to take all necessary steps to see to it that no one will be wronged. Under those circumstances the atmosphere of unrest that benefits only the enemies of our nation must come to an end, and pupils must return to their classrooms in peace and discipline.

It should be pointed out that the atmosphere of suspicion and misunderstanding created in the last few days only plays into the hands of the enemies of our national unity. In fact, those enemies wasted no time in taking advantage of the discontent that some pupils felt, on a pedagogical level, and [attempted to] realize their wretched and sordid designs: to sow dissension among our people.

The proof lies in the inordinate stubbornness of certain dark forces that try to have us believe that nothing is going right among the various parts of our nation, and that the irreparable [rift] is inevitable. Those evil forces have attempted to aggravate the situation the last few days by perniciously and dishonestly taking advantage of the school unrest triggered by the announcement of the implementation of the 20 April circular.

They are trying to "prove" to us at any cost that our national unity is tenuous, that our nation is divided, and that the country is on the verge of an explosion...why?

For the simple reason that our enemies, ever looking for the slightest "affair" to turn it to their advantage, can find no other means than to poison the relationship between the various components of our nation, in order to create distrust and dissension. How else could one explain the relentless of certain birds of ill omen in using the slightest occurrence, even the discontent of a few students?

As a matter of fact, if there is a lesson to be learned from the unrest of the last few days, it is that enemies of our national unity are ready to stoop to any level, to any deception in order to achieve their objectives, and this is why we must be more watchful than ever.

11936

CSO: 4400

MEASURES TO SAVE DROUGHT-STRICKEN LIVESTOCK NOTED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 16 May 79 pp 1, 8

[Excerpts] The situation of our livestock has been judged critical this year, particularly regarding its poor physiological condition and damaged health.

Thus competent authorities have specified that 300,000 head of beef cattle are in constant danger as long as that condition is not checked.

In the face of that predicament, the Department of Rural Development has mobilized all material and human resources at its disposal to save the cattle. A special campaign to save the livestock was opened yesterday by Dr Ba Oumar, minister of rural development, and is supposed to last 2 months.

On that occasion Dr Ba Oumar made a major statement, with a pressing appeal to regional authorities as well as breeders, urging them to make an effective contribution to the success of that campaign of the utmost importance.

Here are some statements made by the minister of rural development:

"Our cattle are once again experiencing a critical situation characterized, among other factors, by a poor physiological condition and worsening state of health. A special campaign of protection for the cattle was decided during the last cabinet session. This campaign, planned for a duration of 2 months, is starting this very day and will involve the distribution of cattle feed, health assistance, and water supply for the parched grazing lands. The minimum men and equipment to be mobilized for this campaign will be:

--16 lightweight four-wheel drive vehicles,

--11 trucks and

--some 100 cadres and workers.

"The areas designated as diaster areas have been divided for this occasion into three zones of operation, each placed under the responsibility of a coordinating veterinarian. Thus Assaba and Guidimaka constitute Zone No 1, which Gorgol and Brakna corresponding to Zone No 2, while Trarza, the District, Inchiri and Adrar are included in Zone No 3. On the national level, a special organization led by the director of animal husbandry will coordinate this operation, whose scope might be extended as additional resources are found.

"But no matter what steps are being taken or what resources are mobilized centrally, it will still remain a fact that the success of the operation will depend, in the last analysis, on the help received from local authorities and on the collaboration of livestock owners.

"This is why I am asking the governors of the areas involved to give all possible assistance to coordinating veterinarians in the various zones, particularly in providing leadership to the people, defining the locations where action is required, and mobilizing the necessary personnel and resources.

"I am inviting the breeders to collaborate with the team operating in the field. They should understand that, as it is not possible to maintain all livestock with imported concentrates, they are being asked to save the reproductive females first, as they can insure the continuity of the species, or animals providing a particular service, such as helping to draw up water.

11936

CSO: 4400

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

WORLD IDEOLOGICAL SYMPOSIUM HELD IN ADEN

Yemeni Revolutionary Experiment Addressed

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 23 Apr 79 pp 42-45

[Text] From 9-13 April, at the invitation of the Ideological and Informational Department of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party, the "World Ideological Conference" was held in Aden. Its slogan was: "Let us reinforce the solidarity of the forces of the world revolutionary movement with the Yemeni people on behalf of freedom, progress, unity and peace." Delegations participating in the conference represented the Soviet Union, Democratic Germany, Bulgaria, Cuba, Vietnam, Japan, Britain, France and India, in addition to Arab delegations from Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen. During the 5 days of the conference, the political leaders of world and Arab progressive parties, thinkers and scholars offered oral and written reports on this distinctive and unique experiment in the Arab region, since it has not spread in the developing states in general.

Special Importance of the Symposium

The symposium was opened by 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, a member of the Political Office, vice chairman of the executive board of the Supreme People's Council and head of the Council of Ministers. It was closed by 'Abd-al-Fatah Isma'il, secretary-general of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party and chairman of the executive board of the Supreme People's Council, to reflect the importance which the party and government of the PDRY give to this symposium-demonstration. Indeed, the symposium was the most prominent event in all of the news magazines and in the press, radio and television. No efforts were spared to provide everything necessary to accomplish its mission.

The opening speech by 'Ali Nasir Muhammad summarized the core of the great interest in the symposium "because it represents intellectual participation to help our revolutionary experiment," and because it "aims at exchanging knowledge about our experience and discussing it. We consider it a position of solidarity on your part with our people and our revolution." Then he called for candor and critical evaluation by the delegates, saying: "We do

not need to say that critical evaluation and candor are our companions in this experiment which, we repeat, belongs to all of the revolutionaries in the world."

The Supreme Preparatory Committee's speech to the symposium, which was delivered by Zaki Barakat, deputy secretary of the Ideological Department, contained a direct invitation to take a look at the particular features of the Yemeni experience, "since our revolutionary experience in its creative application of scientific socialist ideas made use of and profited from world revolutionary experience, especially the experience of countries of the socialist rank, in addition to the general characteristics common to all revolutionary experience. Added to the progressive human balance, its special features make it necessary to stop and analyze them, define them, and expand them within the scope of the world revolutionary movement."

Then the symposium would derive its position of solidarity through penetration, analysis and criticism of the features of the experience in general and in particular in the stages of its development till it reached the formation of the party of the working class, the Yemeni Socialist Party. Did the symposium achieve that?

Written Presentations: Solidarity First

The executive board of the symposium, with the problem of six comrades from the host state, granted the chairmanship of the sessions to the heads of the participating delegations. The first session was chaired by Yasir 'Abd Rubbah, assistant secretary general of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The closing session was chaired by Fuwaz Tarablus, a member of the Political Office of the Communist Labor Organization in Lebanon. The other five sessions were chaired by the heads of the delegations from the Soviet Union, Democratic Germany, France, Britain and India.

On the basis of this custom, written presentations were delivered by the participating delegations and the Yemeni delegation throughout the sessions. Naturally the presentations varied, from words of greeting to comments, studies and articles, all of which dealt with aspects of the Yemeni experience.

Professor Hans (Jagenow), head of Democratic Germany's delegation, Professor Pham Huy Thong, head of the Vietnamese delegation, and Susumu Hoshin, head of the Japanese delegation, offered words of greeting on behalf of their parties, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Vietnamese Communist Party and the Japanese Communist Party.

The other presentations dealt with the following subjects:

1. The Yemeni revolution and the Indian response: (Subra Banirji), a member of the Indian Peace and Solidarity Movement and assistant editor of the newspaper THE ECONOMIC TIMES.

2. Some questions about the establishment of the vanguard party: Alexander Zhukov, the Soviet Union, candidate in historical science.
3. The socialist horizons of the Yemeni revolution, ideological activity and in fact: Professor (Tasnitata Silva), representative of the Bulgarian Communist Party in the symposium.
4. The importance of ideological activity and cultural changes at the present stage for building the new life: (Iskindar Farabyun), the Soviet Union.
5. Character, essential features and horizons of the current stage of the revolution in the PDRY: (Luzu Shimilqak), Democratic Germany.
6. Leadership role of the Yemeni Socialist Party, decisive condition for leadership and development of the revolution in Democratic Yemen: Denisov, Soviet Union.
7. About the unification operation in light of the presence of several revolutionary organizations and as a prior condition to building the vanguard party: Cuba's ambassador in 'Aden.
8. The democratic nationalist revolution and ideological development in Democratic Yemen: Constantine (Tardiftisov), the Soviet Union.
9. About Yemeni unity in ancient and modern history: Dr Claudia (Fayan), French delegation.
10. The importance of the 14 October Revolution: Dr Lydia (Falkov), the Soviet Union.

The Yemenis offered the following presentations:

1. The road to Yemeni unity, toward a united Democratic Yemen: Sultan Ahmad Zayd.
2. Historical look at the creation and development of the 14 October Revolution: 'Abd-al-Hafiz Qa'id.
3. Economic policy of the Yemeni Socialist Party: 'Abd-al-Qadir Bajmal.
4. Trends of cultural development and general cultural policy in the PDRY: Faysal Sidfi.
5. The national, Arab and international importance of the 26 June 1978 progressive movement on the phenomenon of reckless leftist opportunism in Democratic Yemen: Dr Muhammad 'Ali al-Shahari.
6. Development of public school and education in the PDRY: Salim Bislam.

Discussions: Socialism and Unity

Most of the sessions were lively, devoted to discussion of specific subjects, especially Yemeni unity, its class and ideological content, and methods of achieving it. Those who spoke on this included Yasir 'Abd Rubban, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Dr Ahmad al-Rifa'i, Egyptian Communist Party; Fawaz Tarabusi, Communist Labor Organization in Lebanon; Majid 'Abd-al-Rada, Iraqi Communist Party; Dr 'Abd-al-Shafi, Sudanese Communist Party; Bert (Ramson), British Communist Party; and Alexander (Zhang), Soviet Communist Party.

Numerous views were expressed in these presentations, and they sometimes differed a great deal. Some of the presentations compared two of the most important views. The first is finding a common mean, the presentation of Yasir 'Abd Rubban stood out because it did not separate the two functions (socialism and unity) in an arbitrary fashion, but linked them in an intertwined way, and the forms and methods of achieving unity were conditional to objective and subjective circumstances in every stage.

One of the sessions was devoted to discussion of the economic, social and cultural aspects of the experiments. Most of the presentations in this session were written.

Closing Statement

In the sixth session 'A'idah 'Ali Sa'idi, a member of the Central Committee and president of the Federation of Yemeni Women, read the text of the statement issued by the participants in the symposium. In it they condemned the agreement of treachery and surrender which Sadat signed with Israel, and they considered it a treacherous deal. It represents complete surrender to Israel's conditions and sacrifice of the national interests of the people of Egypt and Arab national rights, especially the right of the Palestinian people to return and to determine their own fate on their soil and build an independent state. The statement recommended boycotting and isolating Sadat and making efforts at defeating the pact of submission.

In the seventh and final session the closing statement was read on behalf of the rest of the delegations participating in the symposium. It included the following points:

The symposium gave high marks to the unity of progressive groups in Democratic Yemen, since they formed the nationalist front as a unified political organization and important positive step which led to strengthening the domestic front and decisive victory for the ideas of scientific socialism in eliminating the supremacy of the reckless opportunistic left and forming the party of the working class, the Yemeni Socialist Party. The conference also called for strengthening and developing scientific ideological activity in the life of the party and society by continually eliminating any expressions of deviation or strange views about the essence of scientific socialism.

The conferees confirmed that the problem of building Yemeni socialism and unity should not be presented just in this narrow and non-intertwined form: build socialism first or unity first? The tangible, true framework of this question lies in the fact that the operation of progress in the economic-social structure in the southern half of Yemen and the fight for Yemeni unity are two inseparable and compatible operations, and that greater progress toward socialism is support for unity.

In the field of foreign policy, the participants praised the important role which Democratic Yemen assumed on the basis of the principles of international solidarity and peaceful coexistence. The symposium an important political and ideological demonstration, praised the Yemeni revolutionary experiment and its significance.

'Abd-al-Fatah Isma'il: Position of the Party and State

The ideological symposium concluded its activities by listening to a speech by 'Abd-al-Fatah Isma'il, which was tantamount to a small-scale symposium because it went over all of the basic points which the symposium dealt with and recorded the party's and state's position on them.

Speaking of the experience of Democratic Yemen, 'Abd-al-Fatah Isma'il said: "It was natural that our revolutionary experience should arouse this degree of interest because of the radical nature of the revolutionary changes which were achieved by many sacrifices for the sake of the new class forces in society. Democratic Yemen is considered the first Arab country and one of the rare experiments in the developing world which has been able to establish successfully a political authority expressing the interests of labor, the peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, and the rest of the laborers, and the only country in which the revolution progressed from a liberal revolution to a democratic nationalist revolution in which the authority of popular democracy rests with the post of a dictatorship of the proletariat, with its particular local characteristics."

With regard to commitment to scientific socialist ideology and unity as a tool of revolution and forming the vanguard party, the secretary general said: "The theory of scientific socialism has guided us to the road to the present and the future. It has taught us how to organize the masses and move them to the revolutionary battlefield to bring about economic and social change. In the field of unity of the revolutionary vanguard of the people, we could not have unified the political organizations into a united political structure and then formed the Yemeni Socialist Party without realizing that in order for Yemeni revolutionaries armed with scientific socialist ideas to stir up incentives for the revolution in the future, they ought to be united in one party. That is what actually happened in October 1978 when the first conference of our Yemeni Socialist Party was held."

Speaking on Yemeni unity and the future of socialism, after he explained the Yemeni Socialist Party's position, which considers socialism a definitive

law of the Yemeni people, he said: "The Yemeni people are not two peoples but one people and part of one nation, even if it is in a feeble stage of development. Its economic and social development has not achieved clear division, as is the case with German and Korean peoples. Because of this situation in Yemen, it is easy for revolutionaries to fight to achieve unity and socialism, and we must add that the factors of the intervention of single fighting traditions and customs for our people and the unity of their economic and social interests are important components for unity." He concluded his speech on this important aspect: "Our Yemeni Socialist Party, which leads the democratic nationalist revolution, realizes that this revolution and the socialist revolution are two sides of one continuously linked operation which evolves from one end to the other. According to that, the democratic nationalist revolution cannot stop, because it is intertwined with the fight to achieve unity and the position of all Yemen on the threshold of completing the missions of the democratic nationalist revolution and entering the socialist revolution."

Meetings and Joint Cooperation:

On the sidelines of the symposium, while it was meeting, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad received the delegations of Palestine, Lebanon and Egypt, and 'Abd-al-Fatah Isma'il received the delegations themselves. Discussions dealt with continuing to strengthen cooperation between the Yemeni Socialist Party and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Communist Labor Organization, the Communist Party in Lebanon, and the Egyptian Communist Party. The leaders of Democratic Yemen also reviewed with the representatives of these delegations, one at a time, ways of confronting the new imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance, in light of the surrender agreement which Egyptian traitor Anwar Sadat signed with terrorist Menahem Begin, prime minister of the Zionist enemy state. At the same time the two comrades welcomed in turn Anis Ha'san Yahya, a member of the Political Office and secretary of the Central Committee, and Salim Salih Muhammad, nominee for the Political Office and secretary of the Central Committee, the heads of the delegations of the USSR, the German Democratic Republic, the Vietnamese Communist Party and the Japanese Communist Party.

And Afterwards - -

The symposium achieved the purpose of solidarity with the revolution in Democratic Yemen and its vanguard instrument, the Yemeni Socialist Party. It is difficult to say that it achieved the study of the characteristics of the experiment and its special features. Nevertheless, the second large mission has now been introduced and the groundwork laid for achieving it.

Isma'il Addresses Symposium

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 23 Apr 79 pp 45-47

[Text] The following is the complete text of 'Abd-al-Fatah Isma'il's speech at the World Ideological Symposium:

Distinguished comrades participating in the symposium, honored guests:

For 5 days we have followed with great interest the activities of the World Ideological Symposium devoted to evaluating the revolutionary experience in Democratic Yemen and strengthening the solidarity of the forces of the world revolutionary movement with the Yemeni people on behalf of freedom, progress, unity and peace. It is an honor to the Yemeni Socialist Party that you are holding your symposium in Democratic Yemen, and its experience is the core of your subject matter, your treaties, and your discussions submitted to the symposium. Permit me to say now, after the completion of the symposium's work, that the extent of the fruits of the efforts may be in our hands and deserve thanks and appreciation. We believe that the topics, discussions and debates in the symposium have great value for us and constitute scientific material for instructing revolutionaries in the world in the aspects and studies which the revolutionary experiment in Democratic Yemen carried with it.

The experience of our country in the field of revolutionary reform of society has attracted the attention of progressive theorists and won the esteem and aid of revolutionaries in the Arab revolutionary movement and the world revolutionary movement. This ideological meeting place with an international character which includes scholars and prominent scientists from the Arab, socialist and capitalist countries, is one of the signs expressing the position which the experiment of Democratic Yemen occupies in the world revolutionary operation.

Indeed, it was natural that our revolutionary experiment should arouse this much interest, because of the radical nature of the revolutionary changes which were achieved by many sacrifices for the benefit of the new class forces in society. Democratic Yemen is considered the first Arab country and one of the rare experiments in the developing world which has been able to grant successfully political authority expressing the interests of workers, peasants, revolutionary scholars and other laborers, and the only country in which the revolution has progressed from a liberal revolution to a democratic nationalist revolution by a popular democratic authority in the form of a native dictatorship of the proletariat.

Today the victory of the authority of workers and peasants in the PDRY has become the topic of study and discussion. The enthusiasm of our colleagues in study and discussion is attributable to the fact that an authority of this type was formed in a country which was underdeveloped in the economic, social and cultural aspects. Again, more than six decades after the great October socialist revolution, the greatness and validity of the Leninist teaching which confirms that it is possible for underdeveloped countries to move to socialism without passing through the capitalist stage becomes clear.

There is another aspect to the character of Democratic Yemen, and that is that the radical revolutionary authority which we set up was established in part of the Arab nation. As everyone knows, the old class forces and the

forces of imperialism have for many long years, and to this day, considered the authority of the working class in the region as a menace opposing its "sacred" right and the rule of its old social order. Our modern Arab history is filled with a number of crusades which these powers launched against scientific socialism, the leaders of the working class, and the progressive regimes which move toward the goal of revolutionary change.

My colleagues, the PDRY is the first Arab state to go beyond this rule. It confirms that the laws of scientific socialism are completely valid, because they apply to the Arab situation while taking into consideration the special characteristics of this situation. From another aspect, it confirms that the working class and its political vanguard possess the qualities of creativity and the ability to originate and enter the revolutionary struggle to establish their authority, if objective and subjective circumstances are available for the victory of the political class revolution. The false and spurious saying circulated by world imperialism, claiming that scientific socialism is a theory which is not valid for the development of the Arab peoples, conceals the preservation of the interests of this very imperialism, which is plundering the resources and riches and resources of our Arab peoples and trying to prevent them from uncovering the cornerstone of their political and economic liberation and their social development.

Honored colleagues:

Since the victory of the great October socialist revolution, the ideas of scientific socialism have spread far and wide to all continents and countries, and millions of people and organizations have come to rely on this vital theory in their activities and their struggle for the revolutionary rejuvenation of life and society. Our country of Yemen is one of the countries which has been responsive to these ideas, which do not die but stay alive and are constantly renewed by the diversity of local characteristics of societies.

There are material and objective reasons in our current era, the era of the victory of socialism and the collapse of imperialism, which lead people to embrace scientific socialism and put themselves in the forefront of their people's struggle. The greatness of scientific socialism is that it not only answers the questions of class exploitation, national, racial, and imperialist oppression, and problems of strategy and the type of tactics to follow for a true link between theory and practice, it also responds to the issues of social development and building the new socialist society free of exploitation and filled with comfort and happiness. We in the PDRY could not have achieved all of the revolutionary changes without a vanguard relying on the theory of scientific socialism and applying it in a unique way to the tangible situation in our country.

The theory of scientific socialism has shown us our present and future path and taught us how to organize the masses and move them to the revolutionary battlefield to effect economic and social change. Through this revolutionary theory we have been able to uncover the class forces moving the revolution and the operation to revitalize society. In the field of the unity of the

revolutionary vanguard of the people, we would not have been able to unify the political organizations into one political organization and then form the Yemeni Socialist Party without realizing that in order to attain the objective of the revolution in the future, Yemeni revolutionaries armed with the ideas of scientific socialism must be united into one party. This actually happened in October 1978, when the first conference of our Yemeni Socialist Party was held. When speaking about victory in the formation of the Yemeni Socialist Party, we must mention that we passed two tough exams to attain that victory, the first against the opportunist right and the second against the opportunist left. Both camps used appropriate tactics concentrating on the principles of scientific socialism as a source of our ability to overcome the difficulties which stood in the way of the revolution.

Naturally we must say that whatever deeper changes are achieved in the structure of society in the future, revolutionary missions are still before us: developing the national economy, deepening political, ideological and cultural concern among workers and laborers, and increasing the proud leadership role of our party among the ranks of the people.

On the other hand, our party is fighting to achieve unity of the Yemeni people and establish one democratic nationalist authority which will open the horizons to achieve the strategic goals of the Yemeni revolution and increase the role of the Yemeni people in the Arab liberation movement in its struggle against world imperialism and the Zionist regime in Palestine, especially after the establishment of the new alliance between American imperialism, the regime of the agent Sadat, the Zionist enemy state, and the rest of the agents in the region, which was crowned by the signing of the Camp David surrender agreement.

Honored colleagues:

Several of our comrades have dealt with the subject of Yemeni unity and the future of socialism in particular, in light of the existing partition. It seems clear that there is a difference in dealing with the socialist question. The Yemeni Socialist Party considers unity as one of the goals of the democratic nationalist revolution. In order to achieve these goals, it is fighting for unity of the Yemeni nationalist movement, strengthening the unity of the instrument of the Yemeni revolution, and removing the influence of the imperialist and reactionary forces in order to secure unity drawing together democracy and progressive socialism to respond to the interests of wider groups of our Yemeni people.

Also, our party considers socialism as the decisive law for the Yemeni people, and the dialectic of progress and development will impose this law in any form. In our opinion, the existence of two halves is only temporary. This situation cannot last before the future of socialism as the only choice for the progress of the Yemeni people.

The Yemeni people are not two peoples, but one people who are part of one nation. The split is weakly developed; the degree of economic and social development has not reached clear division, as is the case with the German and Korean people. Because of this situation in Yemen, it is easy for revolutionaries to fight to achieve unity and socialism. We must add that factors of customs, one fighting tradition for our people, and unity of economic and social interests are important components of unity. When we consider the revolutionary changes in the southern half, we must consider it as one of two parts exchanging influence, according to the law of the dialectic. What is happening in the North, whether negative or positive, affects the South, and vice versa. However, there is nothing in revolutionary logic to anticipate these changes until unity is achieved. Our party believes that the struggle to achieve Yemeni unity as one of the strategic goals of the Yemeni revolution is intertwined with the struggle to preserve the revolutionary gains and accomplishments in the southern half of the nation. Our party also believes that progress in deepening radical and progressive social changes and achieving successes on the level of economic development, while working to extend the influence of its leadership role in the revolutionary operation, will form a model and center of attraction for the rest of our Yemeni people, and will help to deepen and expand the social base of the Yemeni forces of progress in their struggle to achieve unity and all of the strategic goals of the Yemeni revolution.

We must confirm that reliance on this or that method to achieve unity is subject to the objective and subjective circumstances of the Yemeni people, while taking into consideration surrounding circumstances on the Arab and world level. The establishment of a unified democratic Yemen will strengthen the position of the Arab liberation movement, and any liberal and progressive Arab victories will constitute strong support for the Yemeni revolution.

We must mention there is a time span, which is lengthened or shortened according to the ripeness or slowness of subjective and objective conditions on the Yemeni level, to a basic degree, and on the Arab and world levels, to a lesser degree, during which Yemeni unity will be realized.

Our Yemeni Socialist Party which is leading the democratic nationalist revolution realizes that this revolution and the socialist revolution are two links of one interconnected operation from beginning to end. Naturally, therefore, the democratic nationalist revolution cannot be stopped, because it is intertwined with the struggle to achieve unity. The whole situation of Yemen is on the threshold of completing the missions of the democratic nationalist revolution and entering the socialist revolution.

There is no Great Wall of China separating the two revolutions, just as there is no such wall dividing the lower and higher levels of development of socialism, in view of the fact that the Yemeni Socialist Party is performing the tasks of the two revolutions. They are intermeshed tasks, as we know, though some of them are peculiar to a stage before the socialist revolution and do not appear under the socialist revolution. We believe that the more radical

changes brought about during the democratic nationalist revolution and the form of the Southern half are a center of attraction, the more that will speed up achieving unity and bringing the Yemeni people closer to the beginning of achieving the socialist revolution.

We Yemeni revolutionaries have chosen carefully the path of socialism, which will perfect its material and technical base under the auspices of a united democratic Yemen.

Scientific socialism finds its expression in our party's foreign policy, which is based on the principles of proletarian internationalization. Our party is following a firm, basic foreign policy course embodied in standing beside the Arab and world liberation movement, the bloc of socialist countries, and the world working class in the struggle against world imperialism. As a result of this path, past years have witnessed a deep and steady development in relations with the socialist countries, and the Soviet Union in particular. In this regard we say: The Soviet Union's firm and exemplary support for the policy of revolutionary internationalization in our world has earned it the esteem and respect of our party. Our people will continue to hold in high regard its international policy, which offers pure, sincere support for the struggle of our people to defend their sovereignty and achieve the goals of social progress, and we also appreciate the aid of other socialist countries in this field.

These are some quick ideas which we felt should be mentioned on the occasion of the conclusion of the World Ideological Symposium.

Since we said in the beginning that your symposium is considered an honor to our country or a decoration which revolutionaries in the world pin on our revolution, we want to assure you that the Yemeni revolutionaries who have tackled the future will labor under the banner of their Yemeni Socialist Party to achieve their revolutionary dreams in firm alliance and on one track with world revolutionary forces. That is our share in the world revolutionary struggle. I would like to salute the comradely and constructive spirit which dominated your discussions. It sprang from a desire to strengthen the fighting experience of our party and our people. The different opinions which were expressed in the symposium are the most extensive expression of your appreciation for this experiment. At the same time, they express the firm fighting unity which links our parties and our peoples. We consider this unity a solid base for achieving our common goals.

In conclusion, I wish you success in your struggle and your efforts on behalf of victory for liberation, progress, socialism, and the banner of revolutionary ideology all over the world.

Thank you.

Joint Communiqué Issued

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 23 Apr 79 pp 47-48

[Text] Under the slogan, "Let us reinforce the solidarity of the forces of the international revolutionary movement with the Yemeni people on behalf of freedom, progress, unity and peace," the World Ideological Symposium met in the PDRY ('Aden) from 9-13 April 1979 to evaluate the revolutionary experiment from the 14 October 1963 revolution until the present, and to reinforce revolutionary solidarity with the Yemeni people in their just struggle against imperialism and its supporters and on behalf of a free, unified and happy society.

Intellectuals, scholars and representatives of progressive parties and organizations from socialist, capitalist and Arab countries participated in this symposium, as did independent democratic intellectuals and scholars.

The participants in this symposium confirmed widespread international solidarity with the brave struggle of the Yemeni people and the lofty position on the world scene which is occupied by the progressive nationalist PDRY regime, under the leadership of the Yemeni Socialist Party.

The treatises and discussions praised Democratic Yemen's revolutionary gains in various fields which came about as a result of arming the political vanguard with the revolutionary theory of scientific socialism, rallying the masses of the working people around this vanguard, and gaining international support from the countries of the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union. The participants confirmed the importance of strengthening and developing these gains in order to make this leading revolutionary experiment in the Arab nation a center of attraction for the Arab working masses fighting against oppression, subjugation and exploitation.

They cited the fact that establishing the Yemeni Socialist Party, armed with scientific socialism, as a guide and leader for society constituted a firm guarantee of success in defending the Yemeni revolution and achieving all of its lofty, humane revolutionary goals.

The symposium gave high marks to the unity of progressive groups in Democratic Yemen, since the establishment of the unified political structure-national front was an important positive step which led to the reinforcement of the domestic front and decisive victory for the ideas of scientific socialism by eliminating the supremacy of the reckless opportunist left and establishing a party of the working class, the Yemeni Socialist Party.

The participants confirmed that the great leadership of the establishment of the working class on the Yemeni domestic level, the Arab level, and the world level, now more than ever demands that ideological activity in the life of the party and society be strengthened and developed. This can be done by continuous elimination of any deviations or Western views from the essence of

scientific socialism; tireless work to raise the level of scientific ideological consciousness among party members and to raise the level of class consciousness among the Yemeni working class and the rest of their allies to develop their moral action and alert defense of their class interests; and deepening and expanding the party's link with the working masses, since that is the cornerstone to guarantee solid victory for the revolutionary experiment in the PDY.

With respect to the unity of the Yemeni people, the treatises and discussions confirmed that the continued division of the single Yemeni people, which has been established and deepened by imperialists and reactionaries, serves only the interests of the enemies of the Yemeni people who have an interest in this division and have pursued a policy of dividing people, especially in the Arab nation, to preserve their exploitative interests.

The continual struggle (in any suitable form dictated by circumstances) for the unity of the Yemeni people is a mission which not only fulfills the wishes and aims of the Yemeni masses for this noble goal, but also forms a humane material support for the issue of an economic social structure with socialist horizons in the southern half of the Yemeni nation. The participants confirmed that the question of building socialism and Yemeni unity must not be presented only in this limited and non-intertwined framework: build socialism first or unity first? The tangible, true framework of this question lies in the fact that progress in the economic-social structure in the southern half of Yemen and the struggle for Yemeni unity are two inseparable and compatible goals, and greater progress toward socialism is a support for socialism.

The participants in the symposium confirmed that the democratic nationalist content of Yemeni unity which has been raised as a slogan for the Yemeni revolutionary movement since the Fifties (toward a unified democratic Yemen) means that the Yemeni working masses have the true interest in unity, not the exploitative class forces. The establishment of Yemeni unity on the basis of this progressive content which was confirmed by the documents of the Yemeni progressive nationalist movement and the documents of the Yemeni Socialist Party is a fruit of this movement and its evolved extension, pledged to preserve, deepen, develop and defend the revolutionary gains of the Yemeni people in the southern half of Yemen.

The sound, appropriate manner in which the documents of the Yemeni Socialist Party treated this vital and important question will enable the Yemeni people to achieve their unity on a sound, firm basis.

In the field of foreign policy, the participants in the symposium praised the important role which Democratic Yemen is assuming on the basis of the principles of international solidarity and peaceful coexistence, confirming that this role firmly opposing imperialism, reactionism and Zionism and their plans in the Arab region, and supporting movements of national liberation and democratic and revolutionary forces in the world played a large and

important part in strengthening the defiance and resistance of Arab nationalist and progressive forces to those plans. Democratic Yemen won the attention and respect of all forces of peace, democracy and socialism in the world. The importance of this role which Democratic Yemen is playing will multiply in light of the dangerous and difficult circumstances confronting the Arab national liberation movement today after the formation of the American-Zionist-Sadat alliance.

As a result of this fundamental, established role and because of the existence of the progressive regime in the PDRY in an important strategic position which threatens the interests of imperialism and exploitative reactionism, these forces which are hostile to the Yemeni people, the Arab nation, and all peoples of the world have worked and will constantly work to exterminate this revolutionary experiment by many methods, including military methods.

The PDRY has stood firm and defeated all of the conspiracies and reactionary imperialist interventions, thanks to the clear vision of its political vanguard, arming itself with the scientific socialist ideology and gathering the working masses around it, and it will continue its resistance and its defeat of all conspiracies and interventions. It does not stand alone in this struggle. All of the forces of the world revolutionary movement stand with it, especially the countries of the socialist bloc, with the Soviet Union in the forefront.

The participants in the symposium issued an appeal for solidarity with the Egyptian people and their progressive forces, with the Palestinian people and their revolutionary groups, and with all Arab peoples and their fighting political vanguards. It criticized the agreement of betrayal and surrender signed by the agent Sadat and the fascist Begin, which officially consecrated the American-Zionist-Sadat alliance which is hostile to the peoples of the region and their hopes and aspirations for freedom, social progress, unity and peace, attempting to strike the Arab revolutionary forces, make them give up hope, and preserve the huge exploitative interests of American imperialism in the Arab nation and Africa. The appeal stressed the importance of confronting these dangerous developments in the Arab region by joining together the forces of the Arab national liberation movement and their fundamental, firm resistance, attracting secondary opposition at this decisive stage, and applying democratic freedoms to the masses and their progressive political forces.

The symposium was an important ideological and political demonstration which praised the Yemeni revolutionary experiment and the significance of this experiment for its progress toward freedom, progress, unity and peace.

Stand Against Mideast Treaty

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 23 Apr 79 p 48

[Text] The delegations participating in the World Ideological Symposium held in 'Aden from 9 to 13 April under the slogan: "Let us reinforce the solidarity

of the forces of the world revolutionary movement with the Yemeni people on behalf of freedom, progress, unity and peace," feel that the traitorous Camp David agreements and the recent treaty constitute an isolated deal between the regime of Anwar Sadat and Zionism. It represents complete surrender to Israel's conditions and sacrifice of the national interests of the people of Egypt and Arab nationalist rights, especially the right of the Palestinian people to return and determine their fate on their land and build an independent state. It strengthens the Israeli occupation of Arab lands and encourages Zionist expansionist and aggressive ambitions. It not only constitutes national betrayal of the hopes, aspirations and interests of the Arab peoples, but it also forms an explosive element for wars in this sensitive area of the world.

From another aspect, these agreements announce the formation of the new black alliance led by American imperialism with its most prominent local agents, Zionism and the Sadat regime, as members, to form the warhead of the Imperialist-Zionist-reactionist attack against the independence of the Arab countries and their hopes for unity and progress, against the Arab liberation movement and the struggle of the peoples of Africa and Asia, and against the forces of liberation and peace in the world, primarily the Soviet Union. Therefore, the participants in the symposium, who represent 16 socialist, capitalist and Arab countries, feel that it is their duty to confirm the following:

1. The participants in the symposium condemn the Camp David agreements and the treaty with which they were crowned. They support all efforts to defeat them, especially the harsh implementation of the decisions of the meeting of Arab foreign ministers and ministers of economy in Baghdad, directed at isolating and punishing the swamp of treachery and surrender.
2. The participants in the symposium feel that the rising level of provocation imposed by the treacherous agreements and the formation of the new black alliance make it necessary to put the battle against it in its true framework--the framework of the complete battle against American imperialism and its political, strategic and economic interests throughout the Arab region, drawing especially on the weapon of oil, the most effective weapon in defending national rights.
3. The participants in the symposium feel that the effective method of resisting Sadat's treachery requires strengthening and reinforcing the alliance with the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, as an effective element of strength in the battles of the Arab liberationist struggle.
4. The participants in the symposium support the Palestinian revolution under the leadership of the PLO, the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the struggle of these people within and outside of the occupied land on behalf of their goals of self-determination on their own land and building an independent state.
5. The participants in the symposium announce their support for the struggle of the Egyptian masses under the leadership of their nationalist movement,

the proper representative of their great people and trustee of their great revolutionary fighting heritage, to foil the treachery, bring down the Sadat regime, and restore Egypt to its role in the heart of the Arab nation and its liberation movement.

6. The participants in the symposium support the struggle which the Lebanese nationalist movement is entering in the face of the Israeli isolationist project to establish a second Israel on the soil of Lebanon. They confirm their support for the independence and unity of Lebanon, securing its Arab membership, opening horizons before its democratic development.

7. The participants in the symposium believe that the necessary condition for achieving these missions lies in uniting the efforts of all nationalist and progressive forces in a unified front able to mobilize the abilities of the Arab masses in battle and to prevent disputes and differences among its parties from overcoming the basic missions.

Finally, the participants in the World Ideological Symposium turn to world public opinion, to all of the forces of liberation and socialism in the world, to launch a wider campaign for solidarity with the struggle of the Arab peoples and with their national liberation movement in their ferocious battle against the new black alliance led by American imperialism, on behalf of the national and social aspirations of the Arab nation for complete national liberation, social progress and popular national unity.

Issued by the World Ideological Symposium, 'Aden, 11 April 1979.

Representatives of the USSR, Democratic Germany, Bulgaria, Cuba, representatives of Socialist Vietnam, Republic of India, Japan, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Britain, Somalia, France, Yemen.

7587

CSO: 4802

SUDANESE INFORMATION MINISTER GIVES INTERVIEW ON UGANDA, SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

London ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 27 Jun 79 p 3 LD

[Interview granted by Sudanese Culture and Information Minister 'Ali Muhammad Shummu to ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT correspondent in Khartoum--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] News agencies and newspapers have been reporting news of the terrible massacres to which Muslims in Uganda in general and Ugandans of Sudanese origin in particular are being subjected. Sudan is also the target of an intensive propaganda campaign by the Tanzanian and Ugandan information media.

First, what are the facts of these massacres and how serious are they?

Second, what is Sudan's attitude toward them?

Third, why is Sudan the target of this intensive propaganda campaign and why do Tanzanian soldiers constantly storm the Sudanese Embassy in Kampala and the Sudanese diplomats' residence in the Ugandan capital and plunder them in broad daylight?

[Answer] The reports we receive from refugees and eyewitnesses in Juba and even from certain priests confirm that there is a terrible massacre in Uganda against anybody who believes in Islam and whoever is labeled as being of Sudanese origin. These massacres have now become so serious that the Muslim Ugandan citizens or citizens known to be of Sudanese origin no longer feel that their lives are safe. As a result, large numbers of refugees have arrived, and are still arriving, in Juba. Many of them have lost their husbands, their children and their property and have seen the invading Tanzanian army's actions. Our information is based on reports by eyewitnesses who have arrived in Juba. Anybody can contact them and hear their stories. What the world radios and televisions have reported confirm that such reports are true.

With regard to the Ugandan and Tanzanian information campaign against us we are trying as much as we can to avoid getting involved in it because the purpose of such campaigns is to distract attention from what is actually taking place there. Sudan is a neighboring country to Uganda, respects Uganda's sovereignty and borders and does not wish to interfere in its internal affairs. Therefore, we are anxious to maintain a firm and an unchanging stand based on these principles.

As for the Tanzanian soldiers' storming of our embassy in Kampala, it was a surprise to us because our diplomats were exemplary in their behavior during Uganda events. They did not interfere in Uganda's internal affairs during the previous regime or the present regime. In fact, they are striving to promote cordial relations between the two countries.

[Question] Does Sudan intend to take any preventive steps?

[Answer] I hope that matters will not go that far.

[Question] Is there a plan behind what is happening in Uganda and elsewhere to liquidate the Islamic elements in East and Central Africa?

[Answer] What is happening in Uganda now and the manner in which it is happening confirms that there is a war or some sort of plan for a crusade [against Muslims] in East Africa. Otherwise, how can one explain what is happening there--to be killed simply because you are a Muslim.

[Question] How serious are these plans to the future of the African countries?

[Answer] What is happening in Uganda is grave. This is the first time the continent has faced such a situation. Throughout its history the African continent was free of religious wars between Muslims and Christians. In fact, history proves that the Africans, with total disregard to religious affiliations, have waged battles of liberation and a struggle against colonialism of all forms and in order to repel foreign aggression. What is happening in Uganda now threatens the future of the continent and its aspiration for unity and for the well-being of the African, regardless of his religion and beliefs.

[Question] Will Sudan, in view of what has happened, put the matter to the OAU?

[Answer] President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, as the OAU chairman, will submit a complete review of events that have occurred in the continent during the 1-year term of his OAU chairmanship. He will particularly discuss what happened in Uganda and will talk about Tanzanian interference in Uganda.

[Question] Let us move on to Chad. Reports indicate that there have been renewed clashes despite the reconciliation in bringing about which Sudan played a major role. Would you throw some light on the developments and the situation there?

[Answer] What happened in Chad recently was merely a clash among the allied forces. We--as a country playing a fundamental role in normalizing the situation--are greatly affected by what is happening there, especially because we are a neighboring country. We still support the trend toward reconciliation and are exerting all efforts in order to stabilize the situation in Chad.

[Question] What practical steps is Sudan taking in order to bring about the success of President Numayri's call for a conference of Arab solidarity in Mecca?

[Answer] President Numayri's call was an idea. The practical steps to implement it will begin next week when a special presidential envoy will go to the Saudi Arabian kingdom in order to meet with His Majesty King Khalid. The next steps will be defined in the light of these consultations.

[Question] Is the present Arab situation conducive to the convening of such a conference?

[Answer] The proposed conference will not be held next week or next month. Rather, preparations for it will take months. We believe that with contacts and proper preparations the idea will succeed and will become a reality. The political changes will perhaps contribute to the success of Sudan's efforts.

CSO: 4802

SYRIA

TWENTY MILLION SYRIAN POUNDS FOR LOCAL PROJECTS

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 26 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by Sami Hamzah: "Investment Budget Approved Primarily for Water Projects"]

[Text] Ghazi Mustafa, in charge of planning and budget in the al-Raqqah Province executive bureau, declared that a budget of 19,638,000 Syrian pounds has been approved. Two million Syrian pounds will be added to this from the central account for popular action. Allocations will be spent on water projects, roads, health and schools. Studies of various projects are being completed and departments in charge of implementation are ready to act. Also, the investment budget of 38 million Syrian pounds has been approved to be spent primarily on water projects in rural areas and on secondary roads, schools and health. Studies will be ready before the end of April this year, in order to invite bidders after public companies are notified.

The deputy head of the province's Peasants' Union has declared that the union is importing refrigerators of various sizes which will be sold on installment at a profit margin lower than that charged by the merchants. This is done as a service to citizens, to strengthen the Union's budget and to allow the villages recently blessed with electricity to enjoy refrigerators this summer.

On the other hand, the head of the animal resources office is visiting cooperatives which specialize in raising sheep and improving pastures in the desert. He is accompanied by representatives of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and Agriculture to study conditions in the cooperatives and submit a report of their needs.

Further, the bureau of organization is supervising the establishment of 11 new cooperatives specializing in sheep raising and is preparing a report in this regard. Finally, members of the executive bureau are visiting with the committee concerned with beets in both the cooperative and private sectors to discuss this crop and to offer their services.

9298

CSO: 4802

EMIGRATION OF WORKERS ENDANGERS DEVELOPMENT PLANS

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 22 Apr 79 p 3

[Article by Sa'id Hilal: "Emigration Poses Ever Larger Problem"]

[Text] Lately there has been much talk and many studies concerning internal and external emigration. They have pointed out the negative aspects but were not comprehensive and deep enough to answer the following questions:

Who are the emigrants?

Where do they come from, where do they go and why?

Some studies blame emigration for the growing crises in the various services in cities, and others blame it for all the hindrances in the public sector.

Statistics show that:

1. Annually, about 40,000 rural people move to cities permanently, of whom 17,000 enter the labor market. They represent 18,000 families in need of housing, education, and health services, etc.
2. From 1970 to 1975, the number of people going abroad between the age of 20 to 44 was 279,000, of whom 259,000 were males and 20,000 were females. The total number of Syrians working abroad is 500,000.

Accordingly, we propose the following:

A committee made up of representatives of the Central Bureau of Statistics, the State Planning Agency, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Federation of Trade Unions and the Union of Peasants be formed to make a comprehensive study of both internal and external emigration and present proposals and solutions for the problem.

The committee's task should be:

To detail the extent and trends in emigration in the last 10 years.

The extent and trends in the present emigration.

Human resources in the next 10 years.

Labor force needs in the various branches of the national economy and the various provinces.

Labor force surplus or shortage in each branch and province.

Regulate emigration abroad by bilateral agreements between the Syrian Government and other Arab countries which are importing Syrian labor, within the framework of the agreement governing the transfer of labor among Arab nations and signed by Syria in accordance with legislative decree No 38, 1969.

This agreement was aimed at:

Protecting Syrian workers from exploitation by [labor] brokers in other countries. Insuring good working and living conditions for Syrian workers abroad.

Continued observance of social security laws for workers abroad.

Obtaining taxes for the treasury

Insuring the workers' remittances in foreign currencies through the state to combat illegal operations and to encourage the investment of these resources in economic and social development. Finally, we propose that emigration abroad should be regulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.

Signed, Minister of Social Affairs and Labor Yusuf Ju'aydani.

The above is a summary of letter No 337414 dated 16 Sep 1979, which must be on file at the office of the deputy prime minister for service affairs. However, shouldn't we take another look at the matter and ask the minister of labor about the circumstances of our workers abroad, the control of their movements, etc.?

We received the following reply from the Minister: Our ministry "is the last to know about our workers' movements to and from the other Arab countries; we do not know more than the statistics available abroad, and we have no control over the workers' movements."

While reminding the office of the prime minister of the above letter, we would like to look into a study made by Dr Shafiq al-Sallah, labor force director, Minister of Labor, which provides statistics showing the dangers which threaten our development plans as a result of haphazard emigration.

Dr Sallah's study indicates the distribution of the labor force among the various economic activities and age categories as shown in Table 1. This shows that the number of workers 10 years and older increased between 1960 and 1975 by 82.5 percent; the number of workers has increased by 80.4 percent and the number of workers aged 10 and over had declined from 35.6 to 35.2 percent of the total population. This is due to an increase in workers' emigration to the oil producing Arab countries. The table shows that the workers in the age category 15 to 64 declined from 75.8 percent in 1960 to 70.5 percent in 1975.

In analyzing the distribution of workers among the various economic activities, the agricultural sector is in first place with over a million. It is followed by the industrial sector, as shown in Table 2.

This is due to an increase in cultivated land from 1970 to 1975, in addition to an increase in agricultural equipment. Thus, tractors of 50 hp and over increased from 1,929 in 1970 to 9,030 in 1975.

Although there has been expansion in the industrial sector, it remains inadequate.

If we agree that emigration is endangering our plans for economic and social development by attracting our capable youth to neighboring Arab countries, we should review the figures showing the dimension of the problem and the necessity that it be given priority in any serious study on how to move our development forward. Indeed, such a review should be made the subject of the first working paper on how we can retain a minimum degree of manpower.

Emigration today does not particularly affect college graduates, as was the case in the fifties and early sixties. It is affecting every segment of our labor force--technicians, skilled laborers and even unskilled manual labor.

Dr Sallah's study shows that 8,182 college graduates, at a national cost of 951 million Syrian pounds, emigrated between 1956 and 1969. In other words, Syria is losing 600 educated persons per year who have cost the nation 68 million Syrian pounds to be educated. The greater percentage lost in the various field of specialization is as follows:

	Percent
Engineering	61
Science	59
Medical doctors	65
Dentists	50
Veterinarians	33
Pharmacists	39
Agricultural engineers	57

Statistics also show that until 1970, 14,000 college graduates were abroad, or 31 percent of the total number of graduates estimated at 46,000. In addition, the Ministry of Interior's statistics show 1,200 professionals emigrated to other Arab countries in 1974. This figure reached 2,400 workers in the first quarter of 1975.

Thus, it would not be improper if we were to answer the question asked by the Minister of Labor: "Who are the emigrants," that they are our educated people, technicians and skilled workers who are so essential to our development programs. This loss of blood should be stopped. They should be attracted to remain at home.

They are emigrating to escape the crises in our cities such as housing, communications and other basic services. They leave when they are young, in their twenties, not so much because of a love of travel or for quixotic adventures. They leave hoping to return to their beloved homeland in a few years.

Table 1 Human Resources and Persons Employed According to Age in 1960-75

Age	In Thou- sands		1960		1970		1975	
	Popula- tion	Employ- ed	Unem- ployed	Popu- lation	Employ- ed	Unem- ployed	Popula- tion	Employ- ed
10-14	475	49	5	813	94	20	1160	96
15-64	2046	878	107	7819	1260	71	3500	1565
65 and over	201	43	3	268	75	5	307	90
Total	2722	970	115	3900	1429	96	4967	1750
								Unem- ployed
								13
								71
								4
								88

Census 1960 and 1970. Statistical Bulletin 1971

Table 2 Percentage of Workers in Various Economic Sectors 1960-75

	1960		1970		1975	
	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970
Agriculture	51.7	51.3	51.1	51.1	51.1	51.1
Industry	13.2	13.3	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0
Construction	5.5	7.1	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
Commerce	8.8	9.4	10.6	10.6	10.6	10.6
Transport and Communications	3.7	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2
Services and Finance	13.6	14.4	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
Others	3.5	3.3	-	-	-	-
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

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SYRIA

IMPROVEMENT, EXPANSION OF ELECTRICITY NETWORK REPORTED

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 14 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by Salman Riuslan: "Electricity Network Improvement Continued"]

[Text] Ministry of Electricity officials report that improvements in electricity are continuing. The Al-Hamah steam station has been repaired, the Qattinah station has been expanded by adding a sixth group which is expected to be completed in 1980, and a contract has been signed for work on Baniyas station.

Official sources in the Ministry of Electricity have stated that offers to build a nuclear [energy] generation plant are being sought. Studies are being made on the utilization of Syrian phosphate and water resources. The Euphrates dam station is in service. Water resources include the Zyzum, Tall Shihab, al-'Ash'ari, al-Shaddadah, and Tigris Rivers and the seasonal streams of the coastal mountains. An experimental solar station has been bought, and it will be installed in 'Adra. Studies are being made in coordination with the Ministry of Oil to utilize natural gas.

Maskanah and Tartus transformer stations are now in service; eight transformer stations 20-66 KV have been installed; and seven stations, with a capacity of 20-66 KV, have been installed in various parts of the country.

Further, all the topographical and mechanical studies concerning the Fayrouzah line have been completed, and several lines, tension 20-60, 265 kilometers long, have been completed.

In 1978, electricity was brought to a village each day. Thus, 367 villages in the following provinces have been provided with electricity:

<u>Provinces</u>	<u>Number of Villages</u>
Damascus	56
Dar'a	32
Al-Swayda'	16
Homs	44
Hamah	52

Tartus	28
Latakia	28
Aleppo	34
Idlib	20
Al-Riqqah	15
Dayr al-Zawr	21
Al-Hasakah	21

Contracts have been awarded to establish an electricity workshop, which will be operational in 1980. The intermediate school is expected to be completed and transferred to 'Adra this month. Work on a plant to provide concrete columns has begun and it is expected to be completed toward the end of this year. Several command centers for the entire electric network, which are equipped with the best technological devices, have been completed.

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SYRIA

COOPERATIVES FAIL TO IMPROVE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 25 Apr 79 p 4

[Interview with Fayez Abu-Fakhr, head of the Peasants Union in Al-Suwayd; by Nabighah Zayni: "Al-Suwayda' Agriculture Problems Subject to Scrutiny"]

[Text] The cooperative sector has been entrusted with major tasks aimed at raising the standard of the agricultural sector; hence, the significance of strengthening the association between the peasant and the land. This entails the important task of improving the peasants' economic status. It is an established fact that it failed to dominate the private sector. On the contrary, the private sector is growing, while the returns from the cooperatives are declining.

For this reason we wonder: If the cooperative sector is the better sector as far as the peasant is concerned, why doesn't the peasant feel such a dire need for it?

What are the reasons for the failure to raise the level of the agricultural sector through a socialist program?

Who is responsible for all this?

Concerning this topic, we had a talk with Fayez Abu-Fakhr, head of the Peasants' Union in al-Suwayda'.

He said:

We have promised to carry out the strategy of our leading party and to develop our peasants in various fields.

However, agriculture in this province depends on rainfall. The lack of rainfall this year affected both the cooperative and private agricultural sectors.

We contacted officials in the regional command to request drinking water. Peasants in the southern area are paying 50-60 pistres for a can of water.

Unless the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and Agriculture helps us with water tank-trucks, our animal resources will be annihilated.

We bring water from Sad al-Mzayrib and Damascus, since we have no water resources.

Shahba in the north and Salkhad in the south are suffering from lack of rainfall.

As to the first settled area, the new crop is not over 5 centimeters high. If we get enough rainfall, the situation might improve and help the peasants somewhat.

We have asked the comrade who heads the regional peasant office to increase our wheat provisions in view of the fact that the allocation for the province is 300 tons per month while the province needs 500 tons per month. He promised to take the matter up with the Minister of Supply.

The head of the peasants union brought up the subject of fodder and said: "We have high yielding herds of cattle and abundant flocks of sheep."

However, fodder is expensive. A load of barley or straw costs 120 to 130 Syrian pounds. That is more expensive than wheat.

[Question] Intensified agriculture, which is new in Syria, is aimed at achieving a greater yield and the improvement of the land. How is it carried out in your province? What crops can be introduced, what is the attitude of the peasants, and what is the extent of his commitment to carry out the agricultural plan, as well as your contribution to this so far?

[Answer] We have carried out the plan 100 percent in the first area. However, due to lack of rainfall, this year peasants are growing only wheat and barley.

[Question] The cooperative sector needed technical expertise, engineers, equipment, bank loans and land surveys. How are you handling these matters?

[Answer] We have no large properties as in al-Jazirah in the north. Our problem concerns labor.

As for equipment, we need small machinery. We have no use for large tractors, as is the case in the north. However, the trend toward planting trees increases the need for machines.

Our problem is expensive labor, and small machinery replaces labor. In the old days we had the plow. You could have a feddan plowed for 20 Syrian pounds. It kept increasing to 30, 40 and 50 Syrian pounds. This year they are asking 60 and 70 Syrian pounds and you are fortunate to find the labor.

Emigration to Arab countries has furthered the labor scarcity, plus the fact that bad seasons are driving the rural people to the cities.

[Question] Do you have a price policy for the various crops?

[Answer] Yes, our prices are all right, especially for grapes, an important crop in the first area. Our output is estimated at 60,000 to 70,000 tons a year. However, we often sell at less than cost.

Thus, while the cost per kilogram is 50 piastres, the agriculture council has set the price at 45 piastres, which kept the peasants from bringing their grapes to the public sector plants for distilling.

[Question] How about irrigation projects in the province?

[Answer] The Jabal al-'Arab dam held no water due to a lack of rain. Al-Rum dam is irrigating several villages. The province is planning to bore some artesian wells. Water resources are being sought in the desert and settled areas.

Artesian wells are needed to insure irrigation during dry periods.

[Question] Do you have cooperatives specializing in raising sheep? And what is the size of your animal resources?

Our animal resources are all right and we have cooperatives specializing in raising sheep.

We have 17 to 18 cooperatives for raising cattle and improving pastures. For 124 villages in the province we have 130 cooperatives raising livestock.

The sheep number about 200,000.

Goats number 50,000 to 60,000.

[Question] What is required to introduce production cooperatives into our agricultural society? What difficulties have you experienced in your production cooperatives?

[Answer] We have no production cooperatives. According to the plan, we are expected to establish one. The matter is still under study, and we should secure the land for such cooperatives.

We have tried to establish one from the lands distributed through agrarian reform. However, people were not very enthusiastic, and we applied no pressure. Such matters should be based on free choice.

[Question] What is the focus of agriculture in Al-Suwayda'?

[Answer] Our province differs from others in Syria. We do not have a single irrigated dunum. Thus, the focus is on change and on planting trees.

The mountaintop area is just as good as any in the country for planting trees. However, it needs cultivation. We have borrowed 2 million Syrian pounds from the agricultural bank for tree planting.

The province is divided into two areas: The top of the mountain where we are planting apples and cherries, and other crops which require a cooler climate. It has a fair rainfall.

In the lower area we plant almond and olive trees.

[Question] There seems to be great interest in fruit tree planting. Is this in accordance with the national plan, or is it left to peasants and their wishes?

[Answer] It is in accordance with the plan. However, our peasants go beyond the plan most of the time.

We are planting over 120,000 seedlings a year. However, this year the agricultural nursery destroyed about 70,000 diseased seedlings, especially tubercled apple seedlings. Such diseased plants are harmful to the soil, which must be washed after the plants are destroyed.

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SYRIA

BRIEFS

DAR'A WATER PROJECT--(1) Governor 'Ammash Jadi' of Dar'a requested the Department of Housing and Utilities to contract for all mechanical equipment required for the al-Thawrah water project which will provide 34 villages with water, in addition to a reserve line for the city of Dar'a. The cost of the project is estimated at 36 million Syrian pounds, but it may reach 70 million. (2) Dar'a still suffers from poor bread. This problem will not be solved until modern bakeries are established. The Ministry of Supply must honor its promise. [Excerpts] [Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 14 Apr 79 p 2] 9298

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SPAIN WANTS TO TAKE PART IN SETTLEMENT OF SAHARA ISSUE

Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Jun 79 p 4

/Article by Charles Vanhecke/

/Text/ Madrid--A month and a half after Prime Minister Suarez' trip to Algiers, King Juan Carlos is traveling to Morocco on 14 June. These two trips were not easy to arrange. The king's trip was postponed twice; that of the chief of government had been delayed for nearly a year. In any event, the trips show that Spanish diplomacy is being reestablished in North Africa, after the long paralysis which followed the cession of the Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania in November 1975.

During this entire period, the Spanish were "ashamed spectators" of the Saharan conflict, for which they felt morally responsible. Now, they wish to participate in the process which leads to peace. "The POLISARIO Front, Algeria and Mauritania have asked us to do so," said Javier Ruperez, who is responsible for international relations of the Democratic Center Union /UDC/, the government party. "Up to now, no one has studied the minimum demands of the parties to the dispute. That is what we are attempting to do."

Reportedly it is the ambition of the Spanish Government to serve as mediator in the conflict and to facilitate an overall negotiation which could take place on its territory. During their visit to Algiers, Suarez' colleagues sensed in their Algerian and Saharan counterparts the desire to hold talks with Morocco. They say that they detected tension between the POLISARIO Front and its Algerian protectors, which doubtless favors the search for a solution. "Spain is in a better position than France to offer its good offices," the Madrid authorities say. "It is not a military power. Moreover, it is the former occupying authority of the Western Sahara."

De Facto Recognition of the POLISARIO Front.

Suarez' trip to Algiers served to bring balance back to the Maghrebian policy of the Madrid government, which was considered pro-Moroccan because of the 1975 agreements. The turnabout had begun in the fall of 1978 when Javier Ruperez, in the name of his party, had signed a joint communique with

the POLISARIO Front. Adolfo Suarez consummated this de facto recognition in Algiers with Mohamed Abdelaziz, secretary general of the Saharan movement. Even if he had taken this action as the president of the UCD and not as the chief of government, he thus "corrected" the policy of his minister of foreign affairs, Marcelino Oreja, who was opposed to recognition of a movement which he said "was neither recognized by the UN nor the sole legitimate representative of the peoples of the Sahara."

Today, the Spanish leaders note that half of the POLISARIO Front is indeed "composed of Saharans from Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Algeria but that it has succeeded in creating a common spirit among these Saharan peoples." If the Spanish leaders have decided to resume relations with the POLISARIO Front, it is also for the purpose of getting out of the impasse of their relations with Algiers. Economic realities weighed heavily in this decision: Spain is the fifth largest supplier of Algeria, and the two countries are engaged in increasing trade. A gas pipeline from one bank of the Mediterranean to the other is in the planning stage: the joint communique published on 2 May, after Suarez' visit, underscored "the great economic and political impact" of "such a project." Finally, the Algerian Government had exerted great pressure on the Madrid government by inviting the Organization of African Unity to consider the Canary Archipelago as "nonautonomous territory" and to demand its "decolonization." Spanish diplomacy had to perform acrobatics to have examination of the Canary problem by the African organization postponed. Once this danger was set aside, Spanish diplomacy felt it could more freely seek a rapprochement with Algiers.

The Military Situation

The military decline of Morocco also incited Madrid to demonstrate realism. Several weeks ago, a delegation from the Spanish Communist Party visited the theater of operations on the Saharan side. Upon its return, the chief of the delegation, Catalanian deputy Jordi Sole-Tura, told us, "The POLISARIO Front is master of the terrain. It cannot win by itself; but it has made it impossible for a Moroccan military victory. Hassan's army is in the process of falling apart. His pilots have been ordered to fly without parachutes to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. Therefore, they drop their bombs just anywhere so they can return to their base safe and sound."

After the 1975 agreements, the Madrid government thought it was rid of the Saharan problem and made increasingly more statements to this effect. Today it has been led to reaffirm the theses which have always its own but to which it had only been paying lip service. The decolonization of the Western Sahara, the Madrid government said, is not ended; Spain ceded the administration of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, not a sovereignty which it did not possess. In 1969 Spain was ready to organize a referendum among the Saharans so that they could exercise their right to self-determination; however, the need for a census delayed the referendum, which was finally abandoned when Rabat--with the agreement of Algiers--requested the arbitration of the International Court of The Hague which decided in favor of the Moroccan positions.

Madrid and Nouakchott have again taken up the idea of a referendum. The Spanish say that Algeria is not opposed to it. However, they wonder whether such a solution is realistic in a country at war. "Who would vote, the POLISARIO Front or the Saharans?" For a referendum to be possible, it would be necessary for Moroccan troops to evacuate the terrain and for an international organization to exercise control. "For the POLISARIO Front, that would be the trap," it was said in Madrid, "for the right to vote would be denied to combatants who are not Saharans."

What is the solution? On the Spanish side, the idea is being advanced of "an autonomous federal or confederated entity." The creation of a Saharan state solely on the territory ceded to Mauritania seems unattainable, as the principal natural resources of the region, the Bou-Craa phosphates, are to be found in the part administered by Morocco. Mauritania, in any event, it is said on the Spanish side, would like to see the creation of a buffer entity with Morocco. Moreover, Mauritania fears that if the POLISARIO Front wins the war it will not confine itself to its borders.

The principal obstacle to peace, however, continues to be Hasan II. For the Moroccan King, the decolonization of the Western Sahara is really ended. The Spanish leaders hope that he will moderate his positions but without placing his crown in jeopardy. They effected a rapprochement with Algiers by handling Rabat's sensitivities carefully. A sign that they have in part succeeded: it is the Moroccan press--not the government officials--which has been attacking Suarez' diplomacy since his meeting with the secretary general of the POLISARIO Front.

Nevertheless, tension between the two countries continues to be high. Like Algiers with the Canary Islands, Rabat has a serious point of pressure to exert on Madrid: the traditional claim to the Spanish presidios of Ceuta and Melilla, located in Moroccan territory. It has another pressure point: preventing Spanish boats from fishing in Moroccan waters. A fishing agreement was concluded between the two countries and ratified by the Cortes in Madrid in 1978. However, after more than a year, it still has not been ratified by the Moroccan Parliament. The Spanish fleet has always been severely affected by the restrictions /on fishing/ in European Community waters. More than ever it has a need for an "exit" to the south.

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